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CONSTITUTIONALISING CONTRACT LAW: IDEOLOGY, 
JUDICIAL METHOD AND CONTRACTUAL AUTONOMY 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This thesis develops a conceptual framework which represents a systematic, 
integrated approach to the constitutionalisation of the common law of contract.  
Although it is beyond doubt that the Bill of Rights must apply horizontally to 
contract law, there is still considerable debate about the manner in which the 
system of contract law should be constitutionalised.  The thesis begins with an 
analysis of the respective roles of ss 8 and 39 of the Constitution and finds that 
they call for the constitutional development to take place within the common law 
framework, though with constitutional adjustments as required.  Whilst the 
entire body of contract law must be constitutionalised incrementally over time 
(within the common law tradition), constitutional justice must be done 
simultaneously in every contract case too.  The thesis interrogates the 
substance, form and attending legal mechanics of operation of contractual 
autonomy; the idea being that a constitutionalisation of contractual autonomy 
would in effect constitutionalise or, at the very least, set the stage for the 
constitutionalisation of contract law in its entirety.  The thesis proceeds to 
unpack the classical liberal underpinnings of contractual autonomy and to tease 
out its internal (content) and external (reach) dimensions.  It highlights 
contractual autonomy’s preference for an atomistic, independent conception of 
the contracting self as bolstered by strongly individualist values, and explains 
that this is out of step with the constitutional vision of a more contextual, 
interdependent, conception of the self as grounded in collectivist values.  
Rather, a fluid triage comprising the foundational constitutional values of 
freedom, dignity and equality, which is cognisant also of the rights enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights, must now form the basis of contractual autonomy.  Moving 
to the legal methodology employed in the common law of contract, the thesis 
shows how the extant contract law machine ensconces the classical liberal 
conception of freedom of contract and thereby mostly frustrates bona fide 
efforts to constitutionalise the contract law.  It thus argues that the legal 
methodology must be adjusted so that it dovetails likewise with the foundational 
constitutional triage’s basis of contractual autonomy.  Finally, the thesis 
considers the practical implications of its argument by applying the triage in a 
number of concrete contexts.  Focusing on the economic right to freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession, the civil-political right to freedom of religion, 
belief and opinion and the socio-economic right of access to health care 
services, it shows how a proper (substantive and methodological) invocation of 
the triage in relation to the internal and external dimensions of contractual 
autonomy can resolve much of the uncertainty surrounding the question of how 
precisely to approach the process of constitutionalising contract law. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 THE BROADER GOAL OF CONSTITUTIONALISING THE COMMON LAW OF 
CONTRACT 
“There is only one system of law.  It is shaped by the Constitution which is the 
supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the 
Constitution and is subject to constitutional control [my emphasis].”1 
The Bill of Rights in Chapter Two of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa2 is horizontally applicable.3  What this means is that the domain of the 
Bill of Rights extends beyond the traditional constitutional supervision of public 
power; it seeks also to deal with private power as exercised between private 
individuals and sanctioned by the long-established common law.4 
In broad terms, the Constitution envisions a democratic South African 
society based on the core values of “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms”;5 a society based 
on “social justice and [an] improved quality of life for all of its citizens”, where 
every person has a genuine opportunity in substance, (as opposed to a mere 
formal opportunity),6 to unlock his or her potential and so realise his or her 
vision of the good life.7  In other words, the Constitution strives for a 
                                                 
1
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of South Africa: In re ex parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 44 (per Chaskalson P).  See also Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at paras 88-95; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) at 
paras 17-24; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at para 6; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (7) 
BCLR 691 (CC) at para 15. 
2
 Act 108 of 1996.  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’ or the ‘final Constitution’. 
3
 As per ss 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution. 
4
 Halton Cheadle and Dennis Davis ‘Structure of the Bill of Rights’ in MH Cheadle; DM Davis 
and NRL Haysom South African Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights 2ed (2005 Issue 13 
September 2012) chapter 1; Stuart Woolman ‘Part II – Bill of Rights: Application’ in Stuart 
Woolman, Michael Bishop; Jason Brickhill; et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed 
(2008 Revision Service 4 2012) chapter 31 at 31.1; Hector L MacQueen ‘Delict, contract, and 
the Bill of Rights: A perspective from the United Kingdom’ (2004) 121 SALJ 359 at 361; 
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘The horizontal application of constitutional rights in a comparative 
perspective’ (2006) 10 Law, Democracy & Development 21 at 21-22.  See also Dennis M Davis 
and Karl Klare ‘Transformative constitutionalism and common and customary Law’ (2010) 26 
SAJHR 403 especially at 408-431. 
5
 As per s 1(a) of the Constitution. 
6
 i.e. the individual must be in a position where he or she is able to make an actual choice in 
reality as to whether to exploit the opportunity or not.  This is a significantly different position 
from that of an individual being afforded such opportunity in the abstract. 
7
 Davis and Klare op cit note 4 at 410 quoting President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, amici curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC); 2005 (8) 
BCLR 786 (CC) at para 36.  See also the preamble; s 1; s 7 of the Constitution. 
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substantively progressive society which recognises that, in moving forward, 
past wrongs have to be righted constructively in a manner that eliminates the 
socio-economic inequalities fostered by the apartheid regime,8 restores basic 
human dignity and espouses freedom in all spheres of an individual’s life.9 
Importantly, the constitutional aspiration of a substantively progressive 
and transformed society is for South Africa as a whole where the classical 
liberal divide between the public (State) and the private (market) can no longer 
hold, (at least not to the same degree).10  In the post-apartheid era, it must be 
appreciated that the wielding of socio-economic power is not limited to the 
public arena.11  On the contrary, the private sector is a key player in the South 
African economy.  The power wielded by private actors is often comparable to, 
if not greater than, that of the State itself. 
                                                 
8
 These inequalities have been fostered also by patriarchy, colonialism, social hierarchies and 
status relationships.  In this thesis, references to apartheid must be understood to encompass 
these power structures too. 
9
 At the broader level therefore, the Constitution articulates both the South African society that it 
envisions as well as the ideal of the constitutional self living in such society.  See further Lucy 
Williams ‘The legal construction of poverty: Gender, “work” and the “social contract”’ (2011) 22 
Stell LR 463 at 468-470; 476-481; Sandra Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication 
Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) at chapter 7; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Grootboom and 
the seduction of the negative/positive duties dichotomy’ (2011) 26 SA Public Law 37 at 45-48; 
DM Davis ‘Developing the common law of contract in the light of poverty and illiteracy: The 
challenge of the Constitution’ (2011) 22 Stell LR 845. 
10
 Deeksha Bhana and Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and 
constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited’ (2005) 122 SALJ 865 at 866-872; Cheadle 
and Davis op cit note 4; Halton Cheadle ‘Application’ in MH Cheadle; DM Davis and NRL 
Haysom South African Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights 2ed (2005 Issue 13 September 
2012) chapter 3.  See also Duncan Kennedy ‘The stages of the decline of the public/private 
distinction’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1349.  For a further discussion 
of the public-private divide, see 1.3.1 below. 
11
 See PJ Sutherland ‘Ensuring contractual fairness in consumer contracts after Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 5 SA 323 CC – Part 1’ (2008) 19 Stell LR 390 at 396: 
“…The Constitution makes a clear break with the preceding legal order.  It is impossible to think 
that this break should not also have profound consequences for horizontal relationships.  Many 
of the abuses of the apartheid system and much of the exploitation that marked apartheid society 
occurred on a horizontal level.  Private law assisted in creating the values of apartheid South 
Africa against which the Constitution turns its face:  equality must replace inequality, dignity 
repression and transparency suppression of information.  A restrictive approach would rely on 
the public-private divide to an extent that simply does not accord with the basic tenets of our 
Constitution and society.” 
See also Halton Cheadle and Dennis Davis ‘The application of the 1996 Constitution in the 
private sphere’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 44 at 50; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The application of socio-
economic rights to private law’ (2008) TSAR 464 at 464-465; 469; MacQueen op cit note 4 at 
361-363; Johan Van der Walt ‘Progressive indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: 
Towards a co-operative relation between common-law and constitutional jurisprudence’ (2001) 
17 SAJHR 341 at 352-355; Christopher J Roederer ‘Post-matrix legal reasoning: Horizontality 
and the rule of values in South African law’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 57 at 59-62; Woolman op cit note 
4. 
  3 
For the most part, the current distribution of wealth and the resulting 
power dynamics within the private market is a product of the socio-political as 
well as legal structures of the apartheid regime.12  The classical (private) 
common law structures,13 although seemingly ‘value-neutral’ when considered 
in the abstract, implicitly endorsed the carefully engineered patterns of wealth 
and power of the apartheid society in which they applied.14  Accordingly if the 
substantively progressive and transformative vision of the Constitution is to 
become a reality in South Africa, it is not sufficient to transform our social and 
political institutions.  The South African legal enterprise, including the private 
legal enterprise, likewise must conform to, and if necessary, be re-aligned with, 
our constitutional goals.15  The law cannot tolerate a perpetuation of the 
apartheid legacy by virtue of continuing pre-constitutional socio-economic 
power relations in the private arena. 
Historically, the common law of contract has been hegemonic in relation 
to other spheres of private law.16  In this tradition, contract law ought therefore, 
to take a leading role in private law’s working towards the Constitution’s goals.  
Yet, there is considerable ambivalence about the precise interplay between the 
Bill of Rights and contract law; an ambivalence which reveals itself in the 
debate about the extent to which, and the manner in which, our system of 
contract law should be constitutionalised. 
In Brisley v Drotsky17 the Supreme Court of Appeal, (hereinafter referred 
to as the SCA), situated the existing common law of contract within the 
constitutional context.  Briefly stated, Cameron JA (as he then was) 
emphasised the point that the Bill of Rights applies to the common law of 
contract and that, from now on, the development of contract law by the courts 
must promote the Bill of Rights’ spirit, purport and objects.18  Cameron JA 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Briefly stated, the classical common law structures are rooted in classical liberalism and 
laissez faire ideology.  For a detailed discussion of these concepts, see chapter 2 at 2.2.1. 
14
 Deeksha Bhana ‘The role of judicial method in the relinquishing of constitutional rights 
through contract’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 300 at 302-303.  
15
 As per s1 of the Constitution; Karl E Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ 
(1998) 14 SAJHR 146 at 156; Davis and Klare op cit note 4 at 408-413; MacQueen op cit note 
4 at 361; Williams op cit note 9 at 468-470. 
16
 On the traditional hegemony of contract law, see generally, Alfred Cockrell ‘The hegemony of 
contract’ (1998) 115 SALJ 286. 
17
 Brisley supra note 1 at paras 88-95. 
18
 Brisley supra note 1 at para 88. 
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further identified the contractual doctrine of legality, with its concept of ‘public 
policy’,19 as the appropriate portal for the constitutionalisation of contract law: 
“In its modern guise, ‘public policy is now rooted in our Constitution and the 
fundamental values it enshrines.”20 
In terms of the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality then, 
Cameron JA explained that the value of freedom encapsulates the fundamental 
principle of freedom of contract and the attending maxim pacta sunt servanda 
(contracts must be honoured).21  Furthermore, the value of human dignity 
complements the value of freedom in the sense that individual contractants 
locate their dignity in their freedom to govern their own lives by deciding for 
themselves whether, and if so, on what terms to contract.  At the same time, 
Cameron JA pointed out that any ‘obscene excesses’ of autonomy must be 
rejected as counter-intuitive to individual dignity and self-respect.22  The values 
of freedom and dignity thus require the courts to continue to exercise 
‘perceptive restraint’ when deciding whether to strike down or refuse to enforce 
a contract on the basis that it is against public policy; an ‘obscene excess’ of 
autonomy being the exception, rather than the norm.23 
Shortly thereafter, in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,24 the SCA also 
recognised that the value of equality is relevant insofar as parties are presumed 
to contract on an equal footing and therefore, to exercise actual freedom of 
contract.  Accordingly, where there is evidence of unequal bargaining power, it 
                                                 
19
 In terms our contract law, if a contract is held to be against public policy, it is illegal and 
therefore void and unenforceable.  In brief, common law illegality is based on common law rules 
(eg. the in duplum rule or the general prohibition against champerty) and broader open-ended 
standards that have developed over time.  The latter comprise the boni mores (eg. a slavery or 
prostitution agreement is said to be contra bonos mores), public policy (eg. a contract that 
undermines the administration of justice is said to be against public policy) and the broader 
public interest.  Although there are subtle distinctions between each of these standards, these 
distinctions are not significant for the purposes at hand.  Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, 
any reference to public policy should be understood to encompass all of these bases.  For a 
detailed discussion of legality of contracts see SWJ (Schalk) Van der Merwe, LF Van 
Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke and GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 4ed (2012) at chapter 7. 
20
 Brisley supra note 1 at para 91. 
21
 Brisley supra note 1 at para 94.  See also Afrox supra note 1 at paras 17-24 where freedom 
of contract was itself held to be a constitutional value. 
22
 Brisley supra note 1 at paras 94-95. 
23
 Brisley supra note 1 at paras 92-94.  In casu, the Cameron JA held that the value of equality 
was not relevant as the clause in question protected both parties (at para 90). 
24
 Afrox supra note 1 at para 12. 
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must be taken into account so as to ensure that contractual autonomy is not 
undermined.25 
To sum up, Brisley and Afrox set the stage for the broader 
constitutionalisation of our law of contract in an autonomy-based 
(empowerment) image of the values of freedom, dignity and equality.  Indeed, 
this has become the foundation of further SCA judgments,26 as well as the first 
Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as the CC) judgment, dealing with 
the constitutionalisation of contract law.27 
Even so, commentators are critical of the results yielded by these cases.  
The cases, despite ostensibly aligning the common law of contract with the Bill 
of Rights, seem to leave contract law largely intact and unaffected by the Bill of 
Rights, often with results that appear to be patently unfair to individual 
contractants and inimical to the transformative aspirations of the Constitution.  
Rather, they seem to valorise the unequal and unjust status quo. 
Some commentators have ascribed such results to the manner in which 
the courts have aligned themselves unquestioningly with the underpinning 
classical liberal ideology and ensuing laissez faire conception of contractual 
autonomy.28  To expound, the courts continue uncritically to apply the 
individualist paradigm of classical contract law, to regulate market transactions, 
where the continued preference for ‘self-interest, self-reliance and self-
determination’ effectively maintains status quo distributions of wealth and 
power, as fostered by apartheid.29  In adopting this approach, it is argued that 
the courts fail to take sufficient cognisance of the significantly altered legal 
                                                 
25
 Afrox supra note 1 at para 12; Napier supra note 1 at paras 8; 14. 
26
 See for instance Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) at para 12; 
Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) at para 12; Napier 
supra note 1 at paras 11-14. 
27
 Barkhuizen supra note 1 at para 57.  The discussion here elaborates on arguments 
advanced in Bhana op cit note 14 at 300-301. 
28
 I, myself, have argued along these lines:  Deeksha Bhana ‘The law of contract and the 
Constitution: Napier v Barkhuizen (SCA)’ (2007) 124 SALJ 269; Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 
10.  See further Jonathan Lewis ‘Fairness in South African contract law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 330; 
Luanda Hawthorne ‘The principle of equality in the law of contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 157; 
Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its implications for 
the development of contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395; Dire Tladi ‘One step forward, two steps 
back for constitutionalising the common law: Afrox Healthcare v Strydom’ (2002) 17 SA Public 
Law 473; Kevin Hopkins ‘Insurance policies and the Bill of Rights: Rethinking the sanctity of 
contract paradigm’ (2002) 119 SALJ 155. 
29
 Bhana op cit note 28 at 273-278 and authorities cited there; Cheadle and Davis op cit note 
11 at 50; 56; Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 360-363; Roederer op cit note 11 at 61-62. 
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context of post-apartheid South Africa, with the result that our established body 
of contract law is mostly non-responsive to the substantively progressive and 
transformative socio-economic goals of the Bill of Rights.  So, whereas the 
courts ostensibly have constitutionalised the classical liberal conception of 
contractual autonomy, they have failed actually to transform it. 
Other commentators have gone a different route to argue that the 
problem lays not so much with the substance of contractual autonomy 
employed by the courts, as it does with the very concepts of our common law of 
contract and their application.30  Briefly stated, it is argued that, in the context of 
a constitutional question, the invocation of common law concepts within the 
established common law framework, (coupled with its accepted methodology in 
applying the common law concepts), is inclined to conflate “rights analysis, 
value analysis and public-policy analysis”.31  This approach, it is argued, 
undermines the general spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and the 
substantive rights32 that are enshrined therein.  So, the basic charge against 
the courts here is that their adoption of a common-law-centred approach avoids 
substantive engagement with the fundamental rights enumerated in the 
Constitution, with the result that the values which underpin them, including the 
foundational constitutional values, fail significantly to impact on the law of 
contract. 
This thesis reconciles and adds to these two explanations of a 
constitutionalised contract law, by locating the cause for the criticisms at once 
in ideology and methodology, and investigating the links between them.33  
Beginning with ideology, I will investigate contract law’s classical liberal 
underpinnings and explain why its laissez faire conception of contractual 
autonomy may fall short of what the Constitution envisions for contractual 
                                                 
30
 See generally Stuart Woolman ‘The amazing vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ 762; 
Stuart Woolman ‘Category mistakes and the waiver of constitutional rights: A response to 
Deeksha Bhana on Barkhuizen’ (2008) 125 SALJ 10; IM Rautenbach ‘Constitution and contract 
– Exploring “the possibility that certain rights may apply directly to contract terms or the 
common law that underlies them”’ (2009) TSAR 613.  See further IM Rautenbach ‘Constitution 
and contract: The application of the Bill of Rights to contractual clauses and their enforcement 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 9 BCLR 892 (SCA)’ (2011) 74 THRHR 510. 
31
 Woolman (2007) op cit note 30 at 772. 
32
 In this thesis I use the term ‘substantive rights’ loosely to denote the human rights 
enumerated in ss 9-35 of the Bill of Rights.  From time to time, I also refer to these rights as 
‘enumerated’ or ‘listed’ rights. 
33
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 301. 
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autonomy.  In doing so, I endeavour also to develop a conceptual framework 
for the effective constitutionalisation of contractual autonomy, both, in terms of 
the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality, as well as the 
substantive rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  Thereafter, I intend to shift 
focus to the methodology dimension of contract law.  In terms of methodology, I 
will interrogate the contract law mechanism as currently employed by the 
courts.  In particular, I plan to canvass the general configuration of contract law 
rules, standards and principles and the manner in which they are applied by our 
courts, individually and jointly, to produce the legal outcomes that they do.  
Here, I hope to show how the courts’ application of our contract law concepts is 
also intertwined with classical liberal ideology and so requires constitutional 
interrogation too.  Finally, I will venture to consolidate the ideology and 
methodology foundations of this thesis, and consider their practical implications 
for the actual constitutionalisation process of our common law of contract by the 
courts, firstly, in terms of the foundational values and then, the enumerated 
substantive rights.  In relation to the latter, I will consider the application of three 
different rights in several concrete contexts that involve contracts and 
demonstrate how courts ought properly to approach and resolve such cases. 
The arguments in the thesis are framed by the implications of the more 
immediate debate between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ horizontal application for the 
above-outlined accounts.  Notably, a seeming parallel between the ideology-
methodology critiques and the direct-indirect horizontality debates has 
emerged: whereas proponents of the ideology critique prefer an indirect 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights (through invocation of the common 
law framework), proponents of the methodology critique argue for a more direct 
form of horizontality that would bypass the challenges presented by contract 
law in its present form.34 
                                                 
34
 Compare for instance, Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11; Van der Walt op cit note 11 and 
Lubbe op cit note 28, with Roederer op cit note 11; Woolman (2007) op cit note 30.  Note 
further, that when I use the phrase ‘common law framework’, I mean the more concrete legal 
structure within which the rules, standards, principles, etc. of the common law of contract 
operate, rather than intangible common law sensibilities or logic.  Similarly, the notion of the ‘Bill 
of Rights’ framework’ refers to the more concrete constitutional legal construct, within which the 
foundational values and enumerated rights operate, rather than the more abstract constitutional 
mindset. 
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Therefore, the next section of this chapter will explain the South African 
concept of horizontality as it underlies this thesis.  In particular, it will show how 
the final Constitution largely transcends the direct-indirect horizontality debate 
and sets out the distinct roles that are to be played by the relevant sub-sections 
of ss 8 and 39 in the process of constitutionalising our common law of contract.  
Thereafter, section 1.3 will tease out the interplay between the values and 
rights within the Bill of Rights framework, and explain their horizontal impact 
upon the underpinning ideology and methodology that animates the traditional 
common law concept of contractual autonomy.  Finally, section 1.4 will set out 
the basic aims, objectives and premises of the thesis, together with a 
breakdown of what will be done in each subsequent chapter. 
 
1.2 THE APPLICATION DEBATE: DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT HORIZONTALITY 
In relation to the application of the Bill of Rights of the final Constitution, the 
horizontality debate has focused on whether direct or indirect horizontal 
application is to be preferred, the received premise being that the Bill of Rights 
must apply to contract law.35  In this respect, ss 8 and 39(2) of the Bill of Rights 
have occupied centre stage where the former section generally is associated 
with direct horizontality and the latter with indirect horizontality.36  Yet, 
confusion abounds; upon perusal of the cases and academic writings in this 
area, one uncovers a dissonance that extends to the very definition of ‘direct 
versus indirect horizontality’.37  Accordingly, I begin by canvassing the main 
conceptions of this distinction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 See for instance Woolman (2007) op cit note 30; Iain Currie and Johan De Waal The Bill of 
Rights of Handbook 5ed (2005) at chapter 3; Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11; Chris Sprigman 
and Michael Osborne ‘Du Plessis is not dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the 
application of the Bill of Rights to private disputes’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 25; Roederer op cit note 
11; Van der Walt op cit note 11. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Sutherland op cit note 11 at 396; Frank I Michelman ‘On the uses of interpretive ‘charity’: 
Some notes on application, avoidance, equality and objective unconstitutionality from the 2007 
term of the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 1 at 5, 
make the same point.  See more generally, Alistair Price ‘The influence of human rights on 
private common law’ (2012) 129 SALJ 330. 
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1.2.1 Conceptions of ‘direct versus indirect horizontality’ 
 
(a) Law versus conduct 
The South African distinction between direct and indirect horizontality, in its 
earliest and most rudimentary form, depends on whether or not the common 
law acts as the portal through which the Bill of Rights applies to a legal dispute 
between private individuals.  Articulated further, indirect horizontality 
contemplates an indirect application of the Bill of Rights to private legal 
disputes, by way of an intermediate invocation of the common law framework, 
together with its legal process of interpreting, applying and (where required), 
developing new common law rules and standards, in accordance with the 
dictates of the Bill of Rights.  In contrast, direct horizontality contemplates a 
direct application of the Bill of Rights to the conduct of private individuals, 
meaning that a plaintiff can rely directly on a particular substantive right, 
(insofar as it is applicable to private individuals), to found a cause of action and 
the defendant, likewise is able to do so for the purposes of raising a defence.38 
This basic distinction reflects the conventional distinction between law 
and conduct, derived from the interim Constitution.39  Under the interim 
Constitution however, there was no clear indication of horizontal application, 
except for s 35(3), in terms of which, it was argued that the Bill of Rights should 
regulate law, rather than conduct.  The debate related primarily to the initial 
question of whether, (and if so, the extent to which), the Bill of Rights found 
horizontal application, rather than, the ensuing question regarding the form (or 
manner) of such application.40  In the seminal case of Du Plessis and Others v 
De Klerk and Another41 the majority of the CC, guided by the text of the interim 
Constitution, articulated the contemplated function and reach of the Bill of 
Rights, in terms of a traditionally verticalist constitutional framework, so that, the 
Bill of Rights applied neither directly to private conduct, nor indirectly to the 
                                                 
38
 Cheadle op cit note 10 at 3-4. 
39
 of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘interim 
Constitution’. 
40
 On the distinction between law and conduct, see Cheadle op cit note 10 at 3-5, who argues 
that emphasis should be on the Bill of Rights’ regulation of law as opposed to conduct.  See 
also Michelman op cit note 37 at 6-7, who submits that s 8(3) renders this distinction redundant 
under the final Constitution. 
41
 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). 
  10 
common law, unless, the State was a party to the dispute.42  Additionally, s 
7(1)’s non-inclusion of the ‘judiciary’, as one of the State organs bounded by 
the Bill of Rights, meant that a common law dispute between private parties 
that was brought before a court of law, was not open to an importation of the 
US doctrine of State action43 potentially to permit a ‘backdoor-horizontal 
application’44 of the Bill of Rights.  On the contrary, s 7(1)’s omission of the 
‘judiciary’ was held to qualify the reach of s 7(2)’s directive (i.e. that the Bill of 
Rights “shall apply to all law”), so that, the common law, as applied between 
private parties, was not subject to any definitive Bill of Rights’ review (i.e. the 
common law was at least not subject to review in terms of the Bill of Rights’ 
substantive rights’ provisions).45 
This general position was nonetheless subject to a caveat - in terms of s 
35(3), the common law was subject to the Bill of Rights in the sense that it 
required a court to have “due regard” to the general “spirit, purport and objects” 
of the Bill of Rights when interpreting, applying and/or developing the common 
law.46  It would appear therefore, that in Du Plessis v De Klerk, the CC 
ultimately did sanction some form of horizontality which, in terms of the ‘law 
versus conduct’ distinction, would comprise indirect horizontality.  That this was 
so was particularly evident from Mahomed DP’s concurrence with the majority 
judgment.  Although concerned about the danger of a privatised apartheid 
within our constitutional dispensation,47 Mahomed DP felt reasonably assured 
that s 35(3) was robust enough to curb such danger, by way of an aligning of 
the common law with the Bill of Rights.48  So, the key would be to focus on the 
                                                 
42
 Du Plessis supra note 41 at paras 44-49; 60-66 - As per ss 7; 33(4); 35(3) of the interim 
Constitution.  See further the summary by Woolman op cit note 4 at chapter 31.2. 
43
 As formulated in Shelley v Kraemer 334 US I (1948).  In terms of the State action doctrine, 
the use of State machinery (including the judiciary) to enforce a private claim (as founded in the 
common law), constitutes State action, and thus subjects the claim to the application of the 
Constitution.  See Du Plessis supra note 41 at para 47. 
44
 I use this phrase to denote the formalistic manipulation of what, in substance, would 
comprise a species of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, to fit the mould of vertical 
application of the Bill of Rights. For a critique of the State action doctrine, see Sprigman and 
Osborne op cit note 35 at 32-33; Chirwa op cit note 4 at 22-26 and the authorities cited there.  
See also 1.2.2(a)(i) loc cit note 79. 
45
 Du Plessis supra note 41 at paras 44-46; Woolman op cit note 4 at chapter 31.2(b). 
46
 Section 35(3) of the interim Constitution reads: 
“In the interpretation of any law and the application and development of common law and 
customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter.” 
47
 Du Plessis supra note 41 at para 75 ffg.  See also the judgment of Madala J at para 163 (as 
quoted in Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11 at 56). 
48
 Du Plessis supra note 41 at para 87. 
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constitutional muster of the applicable rules (and standards) of the common law 
and not on the conduct of the parties per se. 
That being said, the majority court, having focused on the ‘vertical-
horizontal’ application debate, was not very forthcoming about the precise 
implications of s 35(3) as a species of indirect horizontality, or even, 
horizontality generally.  For instance, in what sense, and/or to what extent, was 
a court to have “due regard” to the Bill of Rights?  Furthermore, what comprised 
the “spirit, purport and objects” of the Bill of Rights - ought courts to focus 
exclusively on the “spirit, purport and objects” of the founding values of 
freedom, dignity and equality or ought they to pay attention also to those of the 
specific substantive rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights?  In the final event, 
how did s 35(3) envisage revision of the common law – did it contemplate 
incremental development, by way of a gradual infusion of constitutional values 
within the common law tradition, or was a more direct overhaul of the common 
law required?49 
To sum up, the court’s fluidity, in its employment of the language of 
horizontality, failed to provide concrete guidance - the language of ‘direct 
versus indirect horizontality’ was so enmeshed in that of the more pressing 
‘vertical-horizontal’ distinction, that the particulars of the former distinction were 
obscured, rather than elucidated, by the court.  Accordingly, the usefulness of 
the court’s distinction between direct and indirect horizontality does not extend 
much beyond the vertical-horizontal debate.  It is nevertheless, instructive for 
the purposes of highlighting what ought to be two distinct, (albeit related), legs 
of the horizontality debate viz. the scope (content)50 of horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights and the form (method)51 of such application (i.e. direct or 
indirect application).52 
                                                 
49
 Stuart Woolman ‘Application’ in Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, 
Gilbert Marcus, Derek Spitz and Stuart Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(1996) (Revision Service 5 1999) chapter 10 at 10-40. 
50
 By ‘scope (content)’ leg of horizontal application of the Bill of the Rights I mean to what 
extent does the Bill of Rights apply to the common law?  Phrased differently, what is the 
specific content of the Bill of Rights that applies horizontally to the common law? 
51
 By ‘form (method)’ leg of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights I mean how does the Bill 
Rights apply horizontally to the common law?  It is here, therefore, that the conceptions of 
direct and indirect horizontality are most relevant. 
52
 Michelman op cit note 37 at 3; 7. 
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The final Constitution appreciates this nuance:  inasmuch as it accepts 
and delineates the scope of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, it also 
adopts as the basic principle for the ensuing form of such application, that the 
common law must act as the medium through which private conduct is 
subjected to the Bill of Rights.53  This stands to reason, given that the object of 
the common law has always been to regulate such private conduct, which it 
deems worthy of legal attention.  In the final event, where the extant law fails 
(effectively) to distinguish such private conduct, which the Bill of Rights would 
now insist upon regulating, it would again be the law that would need to be 
reformed accordingly.54  The secondary level of the ‘direct-indirect’ horizontality 
distinction is thus brought into play. 
 
(b) Rights versus values based analysis 
At the secondary level, the distinction between direct and indirect horizontality 
focuses on the nature of the legal analysis, the question being whether the Bill 
of Rights applies directly or indirectly to the common law.  Articulated further, 
direct horizontality entails a rights-based analysis, in terms of which, the 
common law is tested directly against the substantive rights, as embodied in 
the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights.55  In other words, direct horizontality 
contemplates a testing of common law rules and standards outside of the 
traditional common law framework.  Rather, the Bill of Rights’ legal framework, 
(coupled with its methodology), finds application.56  Direct horizontality thus 
focuses on the particular substantive right invoked by a claimant, and considers 
firstly, whether the right is horizontally applicable, secondly, whether it has in 
fact been infringed by the relevant common law rule (or standard), and thirdly, 
whether such infringement of the right constitutes a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation, in terms of s 36(1) of the Constitution.  Finally, to remedy the 
unconstitutionality of the common law rule (or standard), a Court has a variety 
                                                 
53
 Cheadle op cit note 10 at 3-5 to 3-6; 3-9 to 3-10. See also the discussion of ss 8(3) and 39(2) 
in 1.2.2 below. 
54
 As per s 8(2) read with s 8(3) of the Constitution; Cheadle op cit note 10 at 3-6; Woolman op 
cit note 4 at chapter 31.1(c); Currie and De Waal op cit note 35 at 49-50.  See further the 
Hohfeld ‘privilege-liberty/no right’ distinction, as discussed in Wesley N Hohfeld ‘Some 
fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning’ (1913-1914) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16 especially at 30. 
55
 As set out in ss 9 to 35 of the Constitution. 
56
 Currie and De Waal op cit note 35 at 34 (especially footnote 9); 49. 
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of constitutional remedial options at its disposal, including the developing, 
striking down or replacing of the common law – ultimately, a constitutional body 
of contract law, as per the Bill of Rights’ framework, is envisaged.57 
In relation to contracts between private parties therefore, direct 
application of the Bill of Rights will entail abandoning the common law of 
contract’s methodology, in favour of the Bill of Rights’ methodology.58  This, in 
turn, will impact on the nature of the constitutional development of our contract 
law and moreover will situate any such development outside the extant 
common law of contract.  Presumably, the parallel constitutional law of contract, 
as developed by the direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, eventually 
will replace its common law counterpart. 
Understandably, contract lawyers tend to be circumspect of this 
approach to the constitutionalisation process, because the contemplated 
replacement would occur, presumably, only to the extent that current contract 
law rules (and standards) are held to be unconstitutional.  Further, the 
constitutional remedies are relatively new and untested in the private domain, 
with few guidelines on when to invoke which remedy from the wide range of 
options.  The envisaged constitutional law of contract therefore poses a real 
risk of being piecemeal, incomplete and unpredictable.59 
Indirect horizontality on the other hand, entails a values-based analysis, 
in terms of which, the Bill of Rights constitutes the ‘objective normative value 
system’ that must inform the interpretation, application and development of the 
rules (standards, and remedies) of the common law.60  Importantly, indirect 
horizontality contemplates a constitutionalisation of the common law of contract 
from within i.e. by invocation of the common law’s legal framework, coupled 
with its concepts and methodology. 
                                                 
57
 Woolman (2007) op cit note 30 at 763; 768-769; 775-776; Woolman (2008) op cit note 30 at 
14; Currie and De Waal op cit note 35 at 34 (especially footnote 9); 32; 50-52.  See further, 
Roederer op cit note 11 at 71, on the undesirability of a ‘bifurcated’ approach where 
constitutional rules (rather than common law rules) regarding standing, damages etc. would 
apply. 
58
 Woolman (2007) op cit note 30 at 763; 772-781; Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 355. 
59
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 308-309.  See also Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 359. 
60
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 308; Currie and De Waal op cit note 35 at 32; 34-35. See also 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para 40. 
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In the common law of contract, a foremost portal for horizontal 
application would comprise the doctrine of legality and its public policy scale.61  
Briefly stated, the doctrine of legality determines the lawful reach of contractual 
autonomy, and thus of contracts generally, in light of competing policy 
considerations and foundational contract law values.62  Further, the public 
policy scale guides the balancing process by which the legal (and socio-
economic) desirability of contracts are determined.  So, the general idea under 
indirect horizontality would be to continue to invoke the legality doctrine’s public 
policy scale, but at the same time, to infuse its content and method of 
application with the values espoused by the Bill of Rights.63 
Additionally, the “common-law method of decision making”64 envisages 
the gradual evolving of contract law into an integrated, constitutionalised body 
of modern contract law.  This approach to the constitutionalisation process is 
what ‘contemporary’ contract lawyers prefer, because such engagement with 
contract law, within the common law tradition of incremental development of the 
law over time, is familiar.  More importantly, they trust it for being systematic 
and maintaining a strong coherence of legal principle and certainty.65 
This secondary level of the distinction between direct and indirect 
horizontality clearly is more comprehensive than the original distinction.  
Furthermore, contract lawyers generally would align themselves with its 
conception of indirect horizontality.  Indirect horizontality’s deference to the 
common law experience, in terms of how best to develop a constitutionalised 
contract law, in an incremental, methodical and legally principled manner, is 
especially persuasive in relation to contract law’s public policy framework.66  
However, insofar as it is accepted that there is no substantive difference in the 
legal outcome produced by the different routes of direct and indirect 
horizontality, it is crucial also, that all applicable common law concepts and 
                                                 
61
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 303-308; 310; Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 10 at 867-872. 
62
 The foundational contract law values comprise ‘freedom’ and ‘good faith’.  See Bhana and 
Pieterse op cit note 10 at 867-872. 
63
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 309-310.  This issue will form the essence of the discussion in 
chapter 3 below. 
64
 Phrase borrowed from Currie and De Waal op cit note 35 at 34 footnote 9. 
65
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 309-310; Currie and De Waal op cit note 35 at 32; 50-52; cf 
Woolman (2007) op cit note 35 at 763; 768-769; 772; 776-779; Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 
362-363. 
66
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 309-310. 
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methodologies, (as they operate within the common law framework), are 
themselves adjusted appropriately so that, they likewise reflect the new 
constitutional ideology and what ought to be an altered legal culture.67  In this 
respect, it would be logical for such framework adjustments to be informed by 
the Bill of Rights’ legal framework and its methodology.  The upshot is that 
there could well be interplay between direct and indirect horizontality at the 
secondary level. 
The difficulty however, is that the CC again has been less than 
unequivocal in its understanding and support of the secondary definition of 
‘direct versus indirect horizontality’ under the final Constitution.  In particular, 
the CC has been vague about the precise implications of, and relationship 
between, the allegedly conflicting application, interpretation and development 
sections of the Bill of Rights.68  For instance, there remains a lack of clarity as 
to the Bill of Rights’ values exacted by the ‘objective normative value system’ 
contemplated by indirect horizontality – are they limited to the broader 
constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality, or do they also comprise 
the distinct values, which underpin the relevant substantive rights enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights?  Further, if the latter values are included, does the common 
law constitutionalisation process still fall exclusively within the parameters of s 
39(2) (read with s 173),69 or does it instead implicate s 8 (read with s 172(1))70?  
                                                 
67
 On the links between autonomy, ideology and methodology, see 1.3.3 below.  See also 
Bhana op cit note 14 at 302-308; chapter 3 at 3.2. 
68
 That is s 8 read with s 172(1) versus s 39(2) read with s 173. In terms of CC cases, the most 
notable are Barkhuizen supra note 1; Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC). 
69
 Section 39(2) of the Constitution reads: 
“When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” 
Section 173 of the Constitution then reads: 
“The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to 
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the 
interests of justice.” 
70
 Section 8 of the Constitution reads: 
“(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and 
all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it 
is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by 
the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
subsection (2), a court – 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common 
law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in 
accordance with section 36(1).” 
Section 172(1) of the Constitution then reads: 
“When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court – 
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Alternatively, could s 39(2) be read in combination with s 8 (either, as a whole 
or, with any of its subsections, individually)? More importantly, do the 
respective associations with s 39(2) and/or s 8 adjust the above-outlined 
secondary distinction between direct and indirect horizontality, and if so, how?  
It is with these questions in mind, that we turn to consider the implications of ss 
8 and 39(2) respectively. 
 
1.2.2 Sections 8 and 39(2) of the final Constitution 
In contrast to the modest reference to the common law in s 35(3) of the Bill of 
Rights of the interim Constitution, the drafters of the final Constitution were alert 
to expressing the horizontal applicability of the Bill of Rights to the so-called 
‘private realm’, as governed traditionally by the common law, and moreover, to 
addressing the form that such horizontal application should take.  In addition to 
s 39(2) of the final Constitution retaining the interim Constitution’s interpretation 
section (i.e. s 35(3)), s 8 overhauls the former application section (i.e. s 7) of 
the interim Constitution. 
 
(a) Section 8 – The application section 
 
(i) Section 8(1) 
In terms of s 8(1), both according to its ordinary, grammatical meaning, and its 
broader constitutional meaning, the Bill of Rights applies, without qualification, 
to all law, regardless of whether the relevant law has its roots in the legislature, 
executive or judiciary.71  Likewise, the latter part of s 8(1) decidedly subjects all 
State conduct, including that of the judiciary, to the Bill of Rights under the final 
                                                                                                                                              
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the 
extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including – 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.” 
71
 In terms of the broader context, I mean the context of s 8, the Bill of Rights and the history of 
the judgment of Du Plessis supra note 41 at paras 44-47, where omission of the judiciary was 
held to qualify the reference to ”all law” in s 7(2).  But cf Khumalo supra note 68 at paras 29-33, 
which interpreted s 8(1)’s reference to “all law” to mean all law that finds application where the 
State is a party to the dispute.  For a convincing critique of this interpretation see Woolman op 
cit note 4 at chapters 31.1(c); 31.4(a)(v); 31.4(b).  See also Pharmaceuticals supra note 1 at 
para 44, in terms of which, all law is subject to the Constitution and Barkhuizen supra note 1 at 
para 15, which can be interpreted in line with my interpretation.  Finally, see Cheadle and Davis 
op cit note 11 at 55. 
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Constitution.  The quintessential function of s 8(1) therefore, is to delineate the 
general scope of application of the Bill of Rights to cover all State conduct 
which, as a matter of course, must include the consequences of such conduct. 
It stands to reason then, that in relation to law-making powers, s 8(1)’s 
reference to the binding application of the Bill of Rights to all branches of the 
State, extends, not only, to the law-making conduct of the legislature, executive 
and judiciary, but also, to the resulting laws.  So, why the express reference to 
‘all law’ in s 8(1)?  Arguably, such reference was meant to make it clear that the 
Bill of Rights also binds the common law - by definition, the common law forms 
an integral species of our law and as such must fall under the umbrella of ”all 
[South African] law” subject to the Bill of Rights.72  However, the nature and 
source of the common law has long been a point of contention.  On the one 
hand, conservative common lawyers define the common law as that law 
extrapolated (almost exclusively) from Roman Dutch sources.73  In this respect, 
the judiciary is held out as that branch of the State, charged technically with 
discovering, interpreting and applying such laws, as founded in Roman Dutch 
law, but not with making laws.74  This is particularly pertinent in relation to 
contract law, where courts generally are reluctant to disturb the long-
established common law framework and attendant legal rules.75  On the other 
hand, progressive common lawyers regard the common law as a body 
comprised essentially of ‘judge-made law’, which transcends its Roman Dutch 
Law roots and thereby purports to address the changing needs of an emerging 
constitutional South African society.76  So whilst, in line with the broader 
constitutional project, s 8(1)’s reference to the ‘judiciary’ almost certainly would 
                                                 
72
 Pharmaceuticals supra note 1 at para 44; Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 347. 
73
 There are a few exceptions, for example doctrines like the doctrines of rectification and 
repudiation, as received from English law.  However, these importations are regarded as 
derogations.  See Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) at 
606A-610B. 
74
 Bhana op cit note 14 at 302-303.  Such understanding is fairly formalistic – it is submitted 
that the distinctions between discovering, interpreting, applying and making law are technical 
and artificial. 
75
 The common law’s long-standing pedigree is the very thing that makes courts reluctant to 
interrogate its rules against the Bill of Rights.  Accordingly, it seems that courts employ the 
technical distinctions in a manner that complements the maintenance of the status quo. 
76
 MM Corbett ‘Aspects of the role of policy in the evaluation of our common law’ (1987) 104 
SALJ 52 at 54; 67; Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 359-363. See also s 173 of the Constitution, 
which restates the inherent power of the courts to develop the common law. 
  18 
encompass the extant body of common law,77 the precursory reference to “all 
law” at once makes clear the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the common 
law, including the common law of contract, and furthermore, obviates the need 
for any engagement with Hartian-type (formalist) thinking78 about the nature 
and pedigree of the common law. 
Additionally, s 8(1)’s reference to ‘all law’, (which must include the 
common law), effectively precludes the need for any importation of the 
problematic US doctrine of State action.79  Section 8(1) makes it clear that our 
Bill of Rights is applicable horizontally to the whole of the common law, 
including the common law of contract, even when operating within the 
traditionally private domain, and without needing to show that, the State is a 
party, (either directly, or indirectly), to the particular dispute. 
To sum up, the common denominator in s 8(1) is the State, in its broader 
sense, meaning that all State conduct, and the consequences thereof, including 
all law, is subject to the Bill of Rights.  By definition therefore, s 8(1) extends the 
Bill of Rights’ reach to the common law of contract in its entirety, 
notwithstanding the controversy as to whether it comprises ‘judge-made law’.  
More importantly, s 8(1) cuts across the original vertical-horizontal distinction of 
Du Plessis v De Klerk80 and rejects any potential verticalist insulation of the 
(private) common law, from the Bill of Rights, in terms of the traditional public-
private divide.  Section 8(1) focuses rather, on delineating the general scope of 
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 I would lean toward a more Dworkinian model of law, where policies, principles and purposes 
of law are paramount.  See generally Ronald Dworkin ‘Hard Cases’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law 
Review 1057; Ronald Dworkin ‘No Right Answer’ in PMS Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds) Law, 
Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of HLA Hart (1977); Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire 
(1986). 
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 Woolman (2007) op cit note 30 at 789; Michelman op cit note 37 at 23. 
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 See 1.2.1(a) op cit note 44 for an explanation of the US doctrine of state action.  In the 
absence of a reference to ‘all law’, many would have argued that the reasoning of Du Plessis 
supra note 41 becomes relevant:  Whereas the majority relied primarily on the non-inclusion of 
the ‘judiciary’ to argue that a common law dispute between private parties, brought before a 
court of law, was not open to an importation of the US doctrine of State action, the converse 
should hold true in relation to s 8(1) of the final Constitution.  This doctrine, however, is 
notoriously problematic - it relies on formalistic reasoning within a traditionally verticalist 
constitutional framework, essentially to permit an arbitrary ‘backdoor-horizontal application’ of 
constitutional rights to private persons and/or private law.  In contrast, our Bill of Rights 
provides expressly for both vertical and horizontal application, inter alia in s 8(1), and so 
completely obviates the need for the doctrine. See Sprigman and Osborne op cit note 35 at 32-
33 and authorities cited there; cf Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 347-348 who submits that 
horizontality comprises a secondary classification of verticalist constitutional review.  See also 
Woolman op cit note 4 at chapters 31.1(c); 31.4(a) for a critique of the CC’s failure in Khumalo 
supra note 68 to engage with this doctrine. 
80
 Supra note 41. 
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application of the Bill of Rights, to cover all aspects of State conduct, including 
all law, regardless of its classically ‘public’ or ‘private’ nature.81 
 
(ii) Section 8(2) 
Section 8(2) comprises the ‘natural or juristic person’ counterpart of s 8(1), in 
that it relates to the binding of private persons, (as opposed to the State), to the 
Bill of Rights.  Articulated further, s 8(2) provides expressly for the possibility of 
binding private persons, (and thus private contracting parties), to the 
substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Like s 8(1) therefore, s 8(2) moves 
beyond the traditional verticalist constitutional framework, and attendant 
vertical-horizontal distinction, contemplated by Du Plessis v De Klerk82.  
Indeed, s 8(2) accepts the legitimacy of horizontality and focuses rather, on the 
scope of such horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to private persons.83 
This position was confirmed in Khumalo and Others v Holomisa84 where 
the CC held that, in terms of s 8(2), the scope of horizontal applicability of any 
provision of the Bill of Rights, has to be determined principally in terms of the 
nature of the relevant substantive right and corresponding duty.  So, whilst the 
fact that s 8(2) purports to bind private persons must continue to constitute an 
important factor in the determination of the Bill of Rights’ horizontal reach, this 
factor by itself can no longer be decisive.  Rather, s 8(2) requires the judiciary 
to conduct a contextual determination of whether the relevant provision, (and 
the right/duty embodied therein), is ‘capable, fit and suitable’85 for application to 
private persons.  To begin with, courts will have to look at the wording of the 
relevant provision(s), in proper context of the case at hand, for any express or 
implicit indicators that the right(s) finds horizontal application.86  Further, they 
will have to take cognisance of the underlying spirit, purport and objects of the 
substantive right (and corresponding duty) as enshrined in the relevant 
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 See also Woolman op cit note 4 at chapters 31.1(c); 31.4(a)(v), who argues that on a ‘good 
faith reconstruction’ of Khumalo supra note 68, s 8(1) deals with the ‘range of application’ of the 
Bill of Rights: 
“The ‘range of application’ speaks to FC s 8(1)’s commitment to ensuring that each and every 
genus of law is at least formally subject to the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights.” 
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 Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11 at 55. 
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 Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11 at 55; Michelman op cit note 37 at 3. 
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 Supra note 68 at para 33. 
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 Khumalo supra note 68 at paras 35-45; Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11 at 57-60; 
Liebenberg op cit note 11 at 467; Currie and De Waal op cit note 35 at 53-54. 
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 Cheadle and Davis ibid; Currie and De Waal ibid. 
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provision.87  In the final event, the courts must always be mindful of the broader 
constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality and the transformative 
type of post-apartheid society envisaged thereby.88 
 
(iii) Sections 8(1) and 8(2):  A mandate for direct horizontal application? 
Without a doubt, ss 8(1) and 8(2)s’ mapping of the scope of application of the 
Bill of Rights, effectively addresses the scope leg of the horizontality debate 
and thereby, marks the end of the verticalist era of Du Plessis v De Klerk.  
Indeed, s 8(1) clearly indicates the scale of both vertical and horizontal 
application in its express binding to the Bill of Rights, of all law, (including 
‘private’ common law), and other State conduct.  Additionally, s 8(2) intimates 
the extent of horizontal application in its proposed binding of such private 
conduct, that ought legally to be subject to the Bill of Rights. 
What is unclear however, is whether ss 8(1) and 8(2) also purport to 
address the form leg of the horizontal application debate according to the 
succeeding distinction between direct and indirect horizontality.89 
At the outset, it must be noted that neither s 8(1), nor s 8(2), makes 
explicit reference to any particular mode of horizontality.  Even so, in Khumalo v 
Holomisa90 the CC held that any invocation of, or reliance upon, either s 8(1) or 
s 8(2), would involve direct application of the Bill of Rights.  In this respect, the 
CC seemed to draw on the original distinction between law and conduct, as 
well as the secondary distinction between values and rights based analysis.  
Articulated further, it would appear that s 8(2)’s contemplated application of the 
Bill of Rights to private persons, without an express reference to the 
corresponding common law portal, entails a direct assessment of the relevant 
substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights, to determine whether and to what 
extent they apply to the conduct91 of such persons.92  Likewise, s 8(1)’s 
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 Khumalo supra note 68 at para 33 refers to the ‘intensity’ of the relevant right – Currie and 
De Waal op cit note 35 at 52 interpret this to mean the scope of the right. 
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 Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11 at 55; 60; Liebenberg op cit note 11 at 467; 469; 470.  See 
also discussion of ‘power’ in Hohfeld op cit note 54 at 44-54. 
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 Roederer op cit note 11 at 70.  See also Michelman op cit note 37 at 7-8, who observes that 
the distinction between direct and indirect application can apply both vertically and horizontally.  
For the purposes of this discussion however, I focus only on the horizontal dimension. 
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 Supra note 68 at paras 29-34. 
91
 In the case of a contract between private persons, conduct could well comprise the relevant 
contractual term. See Barkhuizen supra note 1 at paras 23-26. 
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contemplated application of the Bill of Rights to ‘all law’, (including the common 
law of contract),93 calls for a direct assessment of the relevant substantive 
provisions, within the Bill of Rights’ legal framework, in order to determine the 
extent to which, such provisions ought to apply horizontally to the common law. 
By definition, the bounds of such ‘direct application’ cannot exceed the 
essential function of ss 8(1) and 8(2) i.e. the delineation of the scope of 
application of the Bill of Rights.  Along these lines therefore, there can be no 
objection to the mandate of direct application advocated by Khumalo v 
Holomisa.  Several commentators accept such approach as sound and 
commonsensical.94 
Nevertheless, the subsequent decision in Barkhuizen v Napier95 has 
again caused confusion.  In this case, the CC basically held that, as between 
private contractants, the Bill of Rights can only apply indirectly to a contract, by 
way of an invocation of the common law of contract’s standard of public 
policy.96  At face value, this case goes completely against the mode of 
application sanctioned by Khumalo and, more disconcertingly, does so without 
any attempt to distinguish itself from, or overrule Khumalo, either expressly, or 
impliedly.  Consequently, it has been argued that the application debate is in a 
state of flux which, in turn, means that a court can manipulate the mode of 
horizontal application, according to the outcome that it wishes to achieve.97 
It is submitted that the apparently conflicting CC judgments can be 
explained and reconciled in terms of the earlier outlined nuance of the two 
distinct, (albeit related), legs of the horizontal application enquiry viz. the scope 
(content) leg of the enquiry and the form (method) leg of the enquiry.  So, 
whereas the direct application contemplated by Khumalo is situated within the 
scope (content) leg of the horizontal application enquiry as presented by ss 8(1) 
and 8(2) respectively, the indirect application contemplated by Barkhuizen is 
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 See above discussion of s 8(2) and the Hohfeld right-duty / liberty – non-right definition (as 
discussed in Hohfeld op cit note 54 at 30) which serves to distinguish s 8(1) from s 8(2). 
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 Op cit note 71: Khumalo supra note 68 at paras 29-33 adds the gloss that s 8(1) applies 
where the State is a party to the dispute. However, based on the critique of this aspect of the 
judgment, and the broader interpretation of s 8(1) above, I would argue that this should be 
interpreted rather as ‘regardless of its nature and source’. 
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 Woolman op cit note 4 at chapters 31.1(c); 31.4(a); Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 350-355; 
Roederer op cit note 11 at 68-70. 
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 Barkhuizen supra note 1 at paras 28-30. 
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 Barkhuizen supra note 1 at paras 23; 28-30. 
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 Woolman (2007) op cit note 30 at 773-776. 
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situated within the ensuing form (method) leg of such horizontal application 
enquiry which, as will become apparent below, finds expression in s 8(3) (read 
with s 172(1)), as well as s 39(2) (read with s 173).  Notably, the two cases 
read together, also indicate that the contemplated direct application, within the 
confines of the scope (content) leg of the enquiry, does not necessarily pre-
empt, or mandate, the particular mode of application envisaged by the form 
(method) leg of the enquiry.  The net result therefore, is that it is plausible, not 
only, to read the relevant pronouncements on application in Khumalo and 
Barkhuizen consistently with one another, but also, to explain the alleged 
application inconsistencies within each judgment.98 
To sum up, ss 8(1) and 8(2) serve to resolve the preliminary enquiry as 
to whether, and if so, the extent to which the relevant substantive rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights apply horizontally to the common law and private 
conduct99 respectively.100  In the final event, the conducting of the ss 8(1) and 
8(2) enquiries necessarily employs a mode of (direct) application.  However, 
such application is strictly a function of the delineation of the scope of 
application of the Bill of Rights and must be distinguished from the main enquiry 
relating to the manner of horizontal application, as envisaged by the form leg of 
the enquiry. 
 
(iv) Section 8(3) read with s 172(1) 
As previously alluded to, s 8(3) comprises the form leg that follows on from the 
s 8(2) scope leg, of the horizontal application enquiry i.e. s 8(3) explains how 
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 For example, in Khumalo supra note 68 at paras 29-34, the court interprets s 8 as mandating 
direct horizontal application.  That said, the court’s invocation of the common law, in terms of s 
8(3), has elements of indirect horizontal application (see for instance paras 43-44; see also 
paras 18-19; 24-26).  So too, in Barkhuizen (supra note 1 at paras 28-30; 35), the court 
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99
 Insofar as there is no applicable common law rule in the Hohfeldian right/duty sense of a law 
- Hohfeld op cit note 54 at 30. See also Van der Walt op cit note 11 at 354-355. 
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rights and the ‘objective normative value system’.  So, whilst the focus here is on the 
applicability of substantive rights, the objective normative value system’s foundational values of 
freedom, dignity and equality feed into the scope leg of the horizontality enquiry. At the same 
time, the specific values emanating from the horizontally applicable rights (as per ss 8(1) and 
8(2)) reciprocate by feeding likewise into the content of the freedom, dignity and equality.  For 
further discussion of the ‘objective normative value system’ see the discussion of s 39(2) below. 
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the law must give effect to the relevant constitutional right(s) which, in terms of 
s 8(2), binds a private person.101 
In terms of s 8(3)(a), the process begins with a court’s examination of 
legislation, that may find application to the case at hand.  Here, the court must 
determine whether the legislation, if relevant, gives (adequate) effect to the 
horizontally applicable substantive right(s).102  If the court finds as much, it will 
consider the applicable right(s) vindicated, or at least, reasonably and justifiably 
limited, by way of the application of the particular legislative provision(s),103 
either way marking the end of the matter.  Importantly, in so applying the 
relevant legislation to the parties’ dispute, constitutional justice will be achieved 
between them. 
So, s 8(3)(a) recognises the legislature as the foremost institution, which 
must give voice to the enumerated substantive rights and general dictates of 
the Bill of Rights.  More significantly, the legislature is meant to make the hard 
choices between what may be competing constitutional rights, underpinning 
values and broader policy considerations.104  Arguably, such deference to the 
legislature addresses the counter-majoritarian concerns surrounding s 8(2)’s 
latitude for judicial activism in the constitutionalisation process of the classically 
private domain.105 
At the same time, s 8(3)(a) appreciates the practical constraints of what 
the legislature can do:106 in terms of s 8(3)(a), where legislation fails to give 
(adequate) effect to the applicable right(s), a court must look to the common 
law.  Section 8(3)(a) accordingly, sanctions the court to enquire into, to apply 
and where required, duly to develop the common law rules, standards and 
remedies, with a view to give effect to the relevant substantive right(s) in 
relation to private persons.  In other words, the common law must continue to 
act as the portal through which private conduct, as identified by s 8(2), is now 
regulated by the Bill of Rights.107 
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 Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11 at 61. 
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 Section 8(3)(a); Cheadle and Davis op cit note 11 at 62. 
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 See Liebenberg op cit note 11 at 471-472; s 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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Section 8(3)(b) then, recognises the reality of the court having to make 
the difficult choices between potentially competing constitutional rights, 
underpinning values and broader policy considerations.  As such, it provides 
expressly for the possibility of the court also developing common law rules, 
which limit the relevant substantive right(s), along the lines of s 36(1) of the 
Constitution. 
As a final point, s 8(3), when read with s 172(1) of the Constitution, 
contemplates a striking down of unconstitutional common law rules, as well as 
possible adjustment of (common law) remedies, according to what would be 
‘just and equitable’ in the circumstances.108 
 
(v) Section 8(3) read with s 172(1):  A mandate for direct or indirect 
horizontal application? 
In terms of the primary ‘conduct versus law’ level of the distinction between 
direct and indirect horizontality, s 8(3) clearly opts for indirect horizontality, in its 
adoption of the common law as the appropriate platform for the Bill of Rights’ 
regulation of private disputes.  At the secondary ‘rights versus values’ level of 
the distinction however, it is not entirely clear whether s 8(3) anticipates a direct 
or indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law. 
Some contend that s 8(3)’s expressed linkages to s 8(2) and s 36(1) 
respectively, coupled with the attendant references to ‘rights’, mandates direct 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to the common law.109  Moreover, s 
8(3), when read with s 172(1), regards the matter as a ‘constitutional matter’ 
that affords the court a judicial review power.  Such review power, it is argued, 
intends for the Bill of Rights to superimpose its legal framework (and its ‘rights-
based’ methodology) onto the substantive content of the common law, in order 
to engage directly with the common law’s rules (standards and remedies).  This 
means that the court must test the relevant common law rule(s) directly against 
the applicable substantive right(s), and if the rule is found to be 
unconstitutional, it must rectify the common law by way of an appropriate 
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‘constitutional development’.110  Notably, such ‘constitutional development’ 
could range from a simple adjustment of an extant common law rule, to the 
striking down and formulation of an entirely new replacement rule (standard 
and/or remedy). 
In contrast, others focus on s 8(3)’s expressed reliance on the “common 
law” in relation to the vindication (or limitation) of a right, and interpret it to 
mean that the Bill of Rights must apply indirectly to the common law.  In other 
words, s 8(3) does not intend for the substantive content of the common law to 
be tested and developed directly against the applicable rights.  It intends rather, 
for such testing and development to be mediated through the common law’s 
legal framework, (together with its concepts and methodology).111  The 
constitutionalisation of the common law thus happens, by way of a continuing 
assessment, and an ensuing incremental development, of the common law’s 
content and methodology (within the common law tradition), to reflect 
ultimately, the ‘objective normative value system’ that is the Bill of Rights.112  
Notably, such ‘development’ could comprise a mere purposive interpretation 
and application of an extant common law rule (standard and/or remedy), which 
better infuses it with the underlying Bill of Rights’ values.  It could also comprise 
an adjustment of an extant common law rule, concept and/or methodology, to 
reflect the general ethos and legal culture of the Bill of Rights.113  In this 
respect, the adjustment could range from a slight modification of an existing 
legal rule, to its re-formulation, or even the introduction of a new common law 
rule altogether, and an innovative, (or at least updated), common law concept 
or legal method.114 
Upon a purely linguistic treatment of s 8(3) (read with s 172(1)), it is 
submitted that the interpretation advocating for direct horizontal application is 
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more compelling.  Even so, it must be acknowledged that s 8(3) also 
incorporates elements of indirect horizontality.115 
To begin with, a closer inspection of s 8(3) reveals three basic stages of 
analysis in relation to the common law: 
First, the court must identify the relevant common law rule (standard 
and/or remedy), that can be said to ‘give effect’ to the relevant constitutional 
right(s) which, in terms of s 8(2), binds a private person.  If no such rule exists, 
the court must proceed directly to the third stage of the s 8(3) process, to 
develop the common law appropriately. 
Second, upon identification of the relevant common law rule, the court 
must assess the rule.116  Here, the court needs to determine whether the rule in 
question gives adequate effect to the applicable right(s), or whether it infringes 
the right.  Where the rule gives adequate effect to the applicable right, meaning 
that the right either, is vindicated, or reasonably and justifiably limited, by the 
common law, the enquiry comes to an end.117  Conversely, if it is found that the 
rule unreasonably or unjustifiably infringes the relevant right, the court may 
strike down the rule as unconstitutional, in terms of s 172(1), before it proceeds 
to the third stage of the s 8(3) process, to develop the common law 
appropriately. 
Finally, where required, the court must develop the common law to give 
(adequate) effect to the relevant substantive right(s) so that, the common law 
either vindicates, or reasonably and justifiably, limits such right.118 
Upon examination of s 8(3) against the direct-indirect horizontality 
classification then, it is submitted that the identification stage essentially 
embodies the primary level of indirect horizontality, whereby the common law 
must comprise the basic interface between the Bill of Rights and the conduct of 
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private persons.119  At the same time however, the process of identifying 
relevant common law rules (standards and remedies), necessarily takes place 
against the backdrop of the substantive rights that were earlier identified and 
delineated under s 8(2).  This is confirmed by s 8(3)’s linkage to s 8(2), as well 
as the reference to ‘rights’ - what is contemplated is that the results of the s 8(2) 
(rights-based) analysis be used to identify potentially corresponding common 
law rules that may find application.  To this extent therefore, the secondary 
level of direct horizontality, contemplated by s 8(2), bleeds into the identification 
stage of s 8(3). 
In the same vein, the s 8(2) analysis sets the stage for direct 
horizontality in the assessment stage of the s 8(3) process.  The corresponding 
rights-based assessment of the relevant common law rule(s) complements the 
preliminary s 8(2) assessment of the applicable constitutional rights.  Such 
testing of the common law, dovetails with s 8(1)’s binding of the Bill of Rights to 
the common law.  In the final event, the invocation of the Bill of Rights legal 
framework, at this stage of the s 8(3) process, can facilitate a comparative 
assessment of the common law framework,120 and may further inform the 
extent of any methodological adjustments to the latter framework, in the 
development stage of the s 8(3) process. 
Moving finally to the development stage, the crucial question, in terms of 
the direct-indirect horizontality distinction, relates to whether s 8(3) intends for 
development to take place within the Bill of Rights’ legal framework or the 
common law’s legal framework.  Once again, the key to resolution of this 
particular question is to be found in the seminal CC case of Khumalo v 
Holomisa.  In this case, the CC appears mindful of the danger of a ‘bifurcated’ 
approach to the common law.121  If s 8(3) were to sanction the development of 
the common law, within the Bill of Rights’ legal framework, the result would be a 
set of constitutional rules and remedies that would replace those common law 
rules and remedies that fail to pass constitutional muster.  Presumably, such 
constitutional rules and remedies, operating within the Bill of Rights’ framework, 
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will exist alongside those common law rules and remedies which happen to 
pass constitutional muster and thus, still operate within the common law 
framework.  In contrast, if s 8(3) directs the development of the common law 
within the common law framework, it ensures the development of a single, 
integrated system of constitutionalised common law. 
What I find therefore, is that the Khumalo court, although interpreting s 
8(3) as requiring direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, at the same 
time, appreciates that the development stage of s 8(3) requires the common 
law to be developed within the common law framework.122  I would add the 
caveat however, that the Bill of Rights’ framework and methodology must still 
inform necessary methodological adjustments to the common law framework.  
Indeed s 8(3)(b)’s reference to s 36(1) of the Constitution, can be interpreted to 
mean that the common law ‘public policy scale’, for instance, and the balancing 
process contemplated thereby, must now be informed by the Bill of Rights’ 
limitations analysis set out in s 36(1).123 
To sum up, s 8(3) is able, through interplay between direct and indirect 
horizontality, to facilitate rigorous engagement of the common law with the Bill 
of Rights, (including relevant substantive rights), and at the same time, to 
ensure its systematic and integrated development within a constitutionally 
adjusted, common law framework. 
 
(b) Section 39(2) (read with s 173) – The interpretation section 
In essence, s 39(2) addresses the form leg of the horizontal application enquiry 
that follows on from s 8(1).  So, whilst s 8(1) renders the Bill of Rights 
applicable to the common law, s 39(2) (read with s 173), provides for its 
constitutionalisation by way of its interpretation, application and incremental 
development in a manner that not only accords with, but promotes the ‘spirit, 
purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights.124  In other words, s 39(2) sanctions 
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indirect horizontality at the secondary level by way of a values-based analysis, 
within the common law framework, where the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the 
Bill of Rights comprise the ‘objective normative value system’. 
At the very least therefore, s 39(2) contemplates a general imbuing of 
common law rules and underlying principles, open-ended standards, doctrines 
and concepts, with the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality.125  
That is to say, that s 39(2) has a role to play in every common law case, 
whether or not any enumerated right or value in the Bill of Rights is explicitly 
brought up.  Accordingly, it could be argued that s 39(2) comprises the broader 
stage for the general operation of the common law within the constitutional era.  
Indeed, if understood in this way, s 39(2) functions distinctly, as the broader 
constitutional backdrop, that complements, (rather than eclipses), the analysis 
anticipated by s 8(2) read with s 8(3).126 
Increasingly however, the judiciary has come to rely on s 39(2) as the 
basic mechanism for constitutionalisation of the common law, even when one 
or more of the enumerated constitutional rights are implicated.127  As a result, s 
39(2) is interpreted increasingly, in favour of a more inclusive ‘objective 
normative value system’, that captures the specific values underpinning the 
implicated substantive rights too.  The rationale seems to be that this ‘muscular’ 
version of s 39(2), will facilitate a rigorous ‘values-based’ equivalent of the s 
8(3) common law engagement with the Bill of Rights.  But such an approach to 
s 39(2) is counter-intuitive:  it effectively usurps the function of s 8(2) read with 
s 8(3).  This could not have been the intention of the legislature, especially in 
light of the fact that the latter provisions were enacted in the final Constitution 
specifically,128 and not in the interim Constitution.129 
For the purposes of this thesis therefore I advocate for the interpretation 
of s 39(2), (read with s 8(1)), that contemplates the general constitutionalisation 
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of the common law, in terms of the foundational values of freedom, dignity and 
equality, in every common law case.  Importantly, as with s 8(3), the s 39(2) 
development of the common law is designed to take place ultimately, within the 
common law framework which, as I will show later in this thesis, may itself 
require constitutional adjustment.130 
 
1.2.3 The way forward 
If the above-outlined interpretations of ss 8 and 39 are accepted, the direct-
indirect horizontality distinction loses much of its significance.131  On the 
contrary, it appreciates the value of fluid interplay between the two.  In this 
thesis therefore, I will take care to distinguish the scope (content) leg of 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, as well as the form (method) leg of 
such horizontal application. 
In particular, s 8(1), read with ss 39(1) and (2), delineates the broader 
scope of operation of the Bill of Rights, in the sense that all law, including the 
entire body of (private) common law (also contract law), must reverberate with, 
and give effect to, (or at the very least, be consistent with), the ‘objective 
normative value system’ of the Bill of Rights.  Importantly, this broader 
constitutional assessment of the common law must happen in every case.  In 
contrast, s 8(2) focuses on the scope of application of substantive constitutional 
rights, (and corresponding duties), to the conduct (including contracts) of 
private persons, and by logical extension, to the laws that govern such conduct 
themselves.  Accordingly, the s 8(2) exercise must happen where specific rights 
are relied upon, or otherwise implicated, in the particular case before the court. 
Sections 39(2) and 8(3) then take up the form leg of the horizontality 
enquiry, with s 39(2) focusing on how the common law ought to be developed, 
so that it accords with, and gives effect to, the ‘objective normative value 
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system’ (comprising the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality), 
and s 8(3) focusing on how the common law ought to be developed, in order to 
give effect to the applicable substantive right(s), (and duties), as identified, and 
assessed, in s 8(2).  Once again, the s 39(2) infusion must happen in every 
case, whilst the s 8(3) development ought to happen only in cases where 
specific rights are relied upon, or otherwise implicated. 
In the final event, whereas the scope and form legs of horizontal 
application each have links with direct and indirect horizontality, both ss 8(3) 
and 39(2) dictate that the relevant constitutional development process of the 
common law, (as opposed to the preceding identification and assessment 
processes), ultimately must take place within the common law framework, as 
constitutionally adjusted. 
 
1.3 THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO THE COMMON LAW 
OF CONTRACT:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AUTONOMY, 
IDEOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.3.1 The Bill of Rights horizontality framework:  Values, rights and 
context 
What emerges clearly from the horizontality discussion above, is that the 
constitutionalisation of our (private) common law must occur at two levels.  
First, in terms of s 8(1), read with ss 39(1) and(2), it must occur at the 
overarching level, where the foundational values of freedom, dignity and 
equality are meant jointly to align the common law, (and the results produced 
thereby), with the broader constitutional vision of a substantively progressive 
and transformative South African society.  Second, s 8(2), read with s 8(3), 
require the constitutionalisation also to occur at the level of the more concrete 
substantive rights, where the common law may not, (unreasonably or 
unjustifiably), infringe those right(s) that may be implicated in a particular case. 
A significant consequence of this understanding of the horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights, is that the strict traditional divide between public 
law and private law can no longer hold – the impenetrable brick wall between 
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the public and the private must be torn down.132  However, this cannot mean 
that public entities and private individuals must now be treated in exactly the 
same manner.  Nor can all private individuals be treated alike.  In relation to 
contract law, for instance, there is a spectrum of private individuals participating 
in the market, (by way of contract), ranging from extremely powerful private 
businesses, to uneducated and vulnerable individuals living below the poverty 
line.  So, whilst it may be appropriate for the law to impose onerous public-like 
duties on the former, this would clearly be inappropriate for the latter.  How 
private parties are to be treated in terms of the Bill of Rights therefore, must 
differ necessarily according to the parties’ respective natures (or stations in 
life), the attending nature of the interplay between freedom, dignity and 
equality, in the broader factual context and finally, the nature of the relevant 
constitutional rights (and corresponding duties), implicated in the particular 
case.133 
To sum up, the Bill of Rights mandates a tearing down of the 
impenetrable brick wall between the public and the private, in order to initiate 
the constitutionalisation process of our private law.  Further, it contemplates the 
wall’s replacement, simultaneously, with a more permeable wire-mesh fence, 
which has to ‘translate’ the application of the foundational public law values, 
and applicable substantive rights, to the private common law in a manner that 
befits the particular factual context.134 
 
1.3.2 The common law framework 
In contrast to the Bill of Rights framework, with its foundational values and 
comprehensive set of substantive (human) rights for post-apartheid South 
Africa, the common law framework has dealt, traditionally, with (classical 
liberal) values alone.  Moreover, the particular values at stake and the manner 
in which they are invoked within the common law framework, differ from area to 
area of the (private) common law. 
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For instance, in the common law of delict, liability turns primarily on a 
collectivist policy-oriented concept of wrongfulness, where substantive fairness 
and justice are paramount.  Accordingly, the re-alignment of the content of our 
delict law, with the substantively progressive and transformative rights, values 
and goals of the Constitution, does not create much conceptual difficulty.135  
Moreover, the methodology employed by our common law of delict, favours a 
balancing of the relevant values, in a manner similar to that contemplated by 
the Bill of Rights, with no particular value, automatically occupying primacy of 
place.  The constitutionalisation of our delict law therefore, ought to be relatively 
straightforward.136 
Unlike the law of delict however, the common law of contract has one 
dominant value, that of contractual autonomy, which traditionally has been 
understood in a particular ideological sense viz. classical liberalism.137  As 
previously alluded to, classical liberalism affords our contract law a laissez 
faire, individualist concept of autonomy where the values of self-interest, self-
reliance and self-determination dominate.  A more collectivist concept of 
autonomy is yet to be explored fully, in this realm.  Rather, the policy 
considerations of legal certainty, commercial efficacy and international 
competitiveness of the South African economy, continue to bolster the classical 
liberal conception of autonomy.  Moreover, this understanding of contractual 
autonomy operates in a manner that generally trumps competing values, not 
only within the conventional realm of contract law, but also, in relation to other 
branches of the common law.138  In the end therefore, the South African 
common law of contract has as its central value, a fixed, classical liberal 
conception of contractual autonomy, which furthermore, adopts an ‘autonomy 
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trumping’ methodology, that renders it fairly extensive in its reach i.e. autonomy 
is trumped in exceptional circumstances only. 
In terms of the constitutionalisation of South African contract law then, 
the Bill of Rights envisages contract law’s engagement with the Constitution’s 
substantively progressive and transformative goals, as per its foundational 
values and enumerated rights.139  In other words, the Constitution brings into 
play a set of values and rights, that are different from, (and/or additional to), 
those associated with classical liberty.  Furthermore, the Constitution 
recognises that such values and rights are multi-faceted and further, that the 
interplay between the relevant values themselves, as well as between the 
relevant values and rights, is multi-dimensional.  Much is dependant on the 
context within which the contract at hand operates.  The constitutionalisation of 
contract law therefore, is likely to disrupt the fixed meaning of autonomy, (i.e. 
the content of autonomy), that is currently assumed by our common law of 
contract. 
In the final event, the Bill of Rights is likely to affect, not only the content 
of contractual autonomy, but also, the largely unchallenged ‘trumping method’ 
upon which, it presently operates.  In contradistinction to contract law, the Bill of 
Rights does not automatically assume the hegemony of any particular value or 
right, or even, a particular understanding of such value or right - the Bill of 
Rights implies a context-sensitive balance rather than a trumping 
mechanism.140  As a result, it is likely that contract law’s inherent trump for 
classical liberty will be transformed by the Bill of Rights. 
 
1.3.3 The relationship between autonomy, ideology and methodology 
An essential premise of this thesis is that judicial method is as imbedded in the 
traditional conception of autonomy, as is liberal ideology, so that it plays a 
significant role in shaping the outcome of a case.  Indeed, Karl Klare has 
questioned the use, by South African judges, of conservative methodology, to 
realise substantively progressive constitutional aims.141 
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South African contract law, with its central axis of autonomy, is 
entrenched in classical liberal ideology and legalist methodology.142  The 
danger of the resultant common law framework and method is that they could 
undermine the realisation, within contract law, of the foundational constitutional 
values, in substance, as well as the rights, as set out in the Bill of Rights.143 
In relation to the common law of contract, adjudication has been viewed 
traditionally, as a value-neutral exercise in legal reasoning that is distinct from, 
and impervious to, politics.  Judges are constrained by the rule of law: their job 
is to interpret and apply the law, but not, (at least not overtly), to make the 
law.144  Judges therefore, appear mindful not to permit personal and/or political 
ideologies, values and sensibilities, to feature in the adjudication process.  In 
South Africa, these concerns are articulated in a cautious approach that prefers 
analysis that is ‘highly structured, technicist, literal and rule bound’.145 
Nevertheless, judges do adjudicate according to a particular system for 
the determination of meaning.  The traditional understanding of adjudication, as 
outlined above, is termed ‘liberal legalism’.146  Karl Klare depicts this reality as 
the ‘legal culture’ that comprises ‘the professional sensibilities, habits of mind 
and intellectual reflexes’ of the legal fraternity.147  Such legal culture, 
necessarily informs the judicial mindset and therefore, the decision making 
process (legal method) and ultimately the legal outcomes of cases. 
Ideology then, exists as a sub-set of legal culture.  Consequently, 
ideology and legal method are necessarily linked to one another.  Nevertheless, 
in relation to ideology, judges still claim to be value neutral.  Klare explains that 
the claim to neutrality stems from what he describes as the ‘naturalisation’ of 
the common law of contract’s classical liberal underpinnings, as an intrinsic part 
of our common law legal culture.  Be that as it may, liberalism does reflect a 
particular set of individualist values that is ultimately political in nature.148  
Classical liberalism however, is more amenable to formalist reasoning that, by 
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and large, embraces rules-based analysis, with minimal judicial discretion.149  
The result is two-fold:  the preferred liberal ideology underpinning contract law’s 
conception of autonomy informs the applicable legal method, and the legal 
method, in turn, usually relieves judges from having expressly to articulate their 
policy preferences. 
In summation, because legal method is imbedded in legal culture and 
ideology, it actually informs the substantive determination of the legal 
parameters of contractual autonomy itself and therewith, the substantive 
development of contract law, as a whole.150  Consequently, in fulfilling the 
mandate of constitutionalising contractual autonomy, and thus, the common law 
of contract, it is important to be conscious, not only of the South African legal 
culture and its preferred ideology, but also, of the influence of the established 
legal methods on the attainment of the constitution’s substantively progressive 
and transformative aims.151 
 
1.3.4 Constitutional transformation of the ideology and methodology that 
underpin contractual autonomy 
As discussed in the introductory portion of this chapter, the Constitution marks 
an ideological shift, away from liberalism, toward a more substantive 
recognition of ‘human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.’152  Consequently, whilst freedom 
remains a foundational value, substantive equality153 has also become a 
foundational value, whilst dignity must mean more than an empowering of an 
individual, to decide for him or herself, in a mere, formal sense.  Freedom of 
contract now operates within a constitutional democracy that mandates 
substantive transformation of the ‘very fabric of [the South African] society as a 
whole – in the behaviour and perceptions of all people in South Africa, as both 
public and private actors.’154  The ideology underpinning contract law must 
therefore be assessed against this broader socio-economic constitutional 
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context, as well as the factual context in which parties find themselves.  
Importantly, such ideology must be reconciled with the substance of the (multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional) foundational values of the Bill of Rights, and the 
fluid (contextual) manner in which they are meant to work together.  
Furthermore, where any substantive right(s) is implicated, the content of our 
contract law must also engage contextually with such right(s) and be reconciled 
therewith. 
At the same time, the legal culture too, must be revised in order to 
complement the new constitutional order.  Indeed, Klare stresses that a 
progressive legal culture, i.e. a legal culture that is more ‘policy-oriented and 
consequentialist’,155 is a pre-requisite for the ultimate success, of what he calls, 
‘transformative constitutionalism’.156  The implication for legal method, (as 
informed by legal culture and ideology) therefore, is that effective engagement 
with the Bill of Rights calls for stronger emphasis on purposive adjudication, 
where freedom of contract (and pacta sunt servanda), in their classical liberal 
conceptions, can no longer automatically occupy primacy of place. 
Accordingly, the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to the 
common law of contract, contemplates the constitutional interrogation and 
development of the underpinning ideology and attending methodology, that 
basically animate the legal principle of contractual autonomy, and the ensuing 
rules, standards and doctrines, that together, comprise the common law of 
contract. 
As a final point, it is imperative that the contemplated horizontality 
exercise, be situated within the earlier-outlined horizontality framework.  
Dealing first, with the scope of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to 
South African contract law, s 8(1), read with ss 39(1) and (2), requires the 
content/substance of contractual autonomy to be assessed against the 
foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality, with a view ultimately to 
aligning our contract law, (and the results produced thereby), with the broader 
constitutional vision of a substantively progressive and transformative South 
African society.  Additionally, s 8(2) mandates the interrogation of those 
substantive constitutional rights (and corresponding duties) that may be 
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applicable in the particular case, in order to determine whether they are in fact, 
applicable. 
Moving then to the form leg of horizontal application, s 39(2) focuses on 
how to develop our common law of contract, so that it articulates with the 
‘objective normative value system’.  In turn, s 8(3) focuses on how to give effect 
to the applicable substantive right(s) (and duties), as identified and assessed, in 
terms of s 8(2).157  Notably, both ss 39(2) and 8(3) sanction the invocation of 
the broader common law framework and methodology, for the actual process of 
constitutionalising contract law.  However, as explained above, the framework 
and methodology employed by the common law of contract has generally 
favoured a particular, classical liberal conception of contractual autonomy, as 
against competing common law rights.  A blanket invocation of the pre-
constitutional contract law methodology could therefore, inadvertently subvert 
the substantively progressive and transformative goals of the Constitution (as 
per the objective normative value system), and furthermore, diminish the 
significance of substantive constitutional rights. 
Accordingly, as will be shown in this thesis, the common law of contract 
methodology also must be reviewed against the substantively progressive aims 
of our constitutional order, and adjusted appropriately, to reflect the weight that 
ought to be attached to the foundational values, and any applicable 
constitutional rights.  Here, s 8(3) provides some guidance, by way of its 
reference to the s 36(1) limitations analysis.  Further, judges can draw from ss 
172(1) and 173 of the Bill of Rights, to guide the general constitutional 
adjustment of the contract law framework and methodology.158 
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1.4 BASIC PREMISES AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS THESIS 
 
1.4.1 The basic aim of this thesis 
Having established the premise for horizontal application of the foundational 
values and substantive rights of the Constitution, and showing how this 
challenges our common law of contract, both at the level of content and 
method, it should be evident that, the constitutionalisation of South African 
contract law, is not clear-cut. 
This thesis postulates that there is no single, ‘one-size-fits-all’ way, in 
which to constitutionalise contract law.  Nor can there be a single conception of 
contractual autonomy.  I propose, that the manner in which the value of 
contractual autonomy is invoked and given content, will vary, based on the fluid 
content of, and interplay between, freedom, dignity and equality, as well as that 
of any constitutional rights (and corresponding duties) that find application, in 
each particular case.  In terms of the foundational values, I will show that their 
content, and the appropriate legal methodology to be employed, in integrating 
them into the relevant common law rules, (standards and principles), will 
depend on the particular factual context within which the contract operates.  
Additionally, the specific legal outcome must measure up to the broader, 
substantively progressive and transformative constitutional context.  Further, 
where a substantive constitutional right is implicated, I suggest that the nature, 
content and operation of the particular right will also inform the content of, and 
interplay between, the foundational values.  Here, the content of contractual 
autonomy, and the methodology to be employed, in aligning the particular rule 
(or standard/principle) of contract law, ought to be informed, likewise with the 
spirit, purport and object of the right in question. 
The focal point of this thesis therefore, is the development of a 
conceptual framework for the actual constitutionalisation process of South 
African contract law, by the judiciary. 
 
1.4.2 The basic premises of this thesis 
In this thesis, I proceed from the essential premise that the principle of 
contractual autonomy comprises and must continue to comprise the keystone 
principle of our contract law.  I assume further, that a constitutionalisation of 
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contractual autonomy effectively would constitutionalise, or, at the very least, 
set the stage for the constitutionalisation of our contract law, in its entirety.  The 
scope of my thesis therefore, is one that will interrogate the substance, form 
and attending legal mechanics of operation of contractual autonomy, with a 
view ultimately to developing the conceptual framework for South African 
contract law, operating in a constitutional context. 
Before outlining how I plan to approach this thesis however, I need to 
make three preliminary points.  First, as a common lawyer, and based on my 
discussion of ss 8(3) and 39(2) above, my emphasis in this thesis will be on the 
constitutionalisation of the common law of contract from within i.e. the 
constitutional development of our contract law, (as opposed to its assessment), 
must proceed ultimately from the common law platform, which embraces the 
common law tradition of incremental, judicial development, over time, as cases 
present themselves before the courts.  That said, allowance must be made for 
constitutional adjustment of the common law platform itself, as and when 
required. 
This brings me to my second point: I have not engaged with the debate 
on the subject of legislative intervention, either as a preferred or secondary 
route, for constitutionalising our contract law.159  My thesis proceeds rather, on 
the premise that legislative intervention may not be required, and that common 
law development is a more doctrinally sound way of constitutionalising contract 
law.  Accordingly, I have not interrogated any of the recent interventions, such 
as the National Credit Act160 and the Consumer Protection Act.161  
Nevertheless, I would argue that the interpretation of these pieces of legislation 
ought to be informed by, and dovetail with, the constitutionalised judicial 
approach, that I will advocate for, in this thesis. 
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My final preliminary point then, is that a comparative analysis of the 
contract laws of other jurisdictions, falls largely beyond the scope of this thesis.  
This is necessarily so, given the somewhat unique South African context of 
transformative constitutionalism, with its mandate of doing public-law-type 
justice within the private law context. 
 
1.4.3 Thesis outline 
Starting with Chapter Two, I will launch my investigation by looking at the 
substance of contractual autonomy.  I will begin my analysis by canvassing the 
conceptions of contract law, beginning with the 18th and 19th century, classical 
liberal model, followed by the 20th century, neo-classical, economic model and 
finally, the late 20th century, modern model of contract law.  Significantly, 
elements of each of these models still underpin our contract law today and I do 
not purport in this thesis to reconcile them.162 
I intend to draw attention rather, to the continued tension between the 
classical liberal preference for an atomistic, independent (negative liberty) 
conception of the contracting self, as bolstered by strongly individualist values, 
on the one hand, and the more substantive, interdependent (positive freedom) 
conception, that pays greater attention to modern collectivist values, on the 
other hand.163  My principal purpose for doing so is to tease out, what I will 
argue, are the two essential dimensions of contractual autonomy viz. the 
internal (content) and the external (reach) dimensions of contractual 
autonomy.164 
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Ideologies and approaches’ (2005) 68 THRHR 253; Chris-James Pretorius ‘The basis of 
contractual liability (2): Theories of contract (will and declaration)’ (2005) 68 THRHR 441; Chris-
James Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (3): Theories of contract (consideration, 
reliance and fairness)’ (2005) 68 THRHR 575 at 581-590; Chris-James Pretorius ‘The basis of 
contractual liability (4): Towards a composite theory of contract’ (2006) 69 THRHR 97. 
163
 See Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 10 at 883-889; Bhana op cit note 28 at 273-274; 276-
278. 
164
 In relation to this thesis, the internal (content) dimension will focus on the very concept of 
autonomy, in the sense of determining what exactly an exercise of autonomy entails (and ought 
to entail), for the purposes of contract law.  In other words, the focus of the internal dimension is 
on how the law regards the contracting self.  Most important, would be the legal delineation of 
the pre-conditions that are necessary for the contracting self validly to exercise his or her 
autonomy: So, whereas the pre-conditions for the exercise of autonomy by the atomistic, 
independent self would be minimal, the same cannot be said for the more substantive, 
interdependent self.  In contrast, the external (reach) dimension focuses on the scope of 
operation of autonomy, in the sense of determining precisely how far an exercise of autonomy 
extends (and ought to extend), as compared to other values operating in contract law.  So here, 
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On the basis of this paradigm, I plan then, to unpack the manner in 
which our common law of contract currently articulates the internal and external 
dimensions of contractual autonomy respectively and show, why it is likely that 
they will fall short of what the Bill of Rights envisages.  Finally, to conclude 
Chapter Two, I will attempt actually to conceptualise the constitutionalisation of 
contractual autonomy, in terms of the foundational values of freedom, dignity 
and equality, which, at once, will need to be context sensitive and responsive to 
any applicable substantive rights, as well as to the broader constitutional vision 
of a substantively progressive and transformative post-apartheid South Africa. 
Moving on to Chapter Three, I propose to shift focus to the conservative 
legal culture and the attending liberal legalist methodology employed in our 
common law of contract.  Here, I want to look, particularly, at how the contract 
law machine165 continues to entrench both, the internal and external 
dimensions of contractual autonomy, in classical liberal ideology.  In particular, I 
aim to show how the methodology employed by the contract law machine, may 
frustrate bona fide efforts to constitutionalise our contract law.  Accordingly, I 
will argue that the legal methodology employed in contract law, must dovetail, 
likewise with the constitutionalised conception of contractual autonomy, as 
outlined in Chapter Two.  In concluding the chapter then, I endeavour to point 
out where, I anticipate, constitutional adjustments, generally, will need to be 
made. 
Having, by this point, outlined how conceptually to constitutionalise the 
substance, form and attending methodology of contractual autonomy, Chapter 
Four will consider the practical implications of the conclusions reached in 
Chapters Two and Three, by contemplating their application in a number of 
concrete contexts.166 
Thereafter, I am going to pay special attention to the further dimension of 
one or more of the substantive constitutional rights finding application, both at a 
                                                                                                                                              
the balancing of relevant individualist and collectivist considerations, as per the traditional 
legality exercise, would be brought into play. 
165
 The contract law machine comprises a configuration of rules and standards that primarily 
use deductive legal reasoning to determine the legal outcomes of cases that come before the 
courts.  For a detailed discussion of the contract law machine, see chapter 3 at 3.2; 3.3. 
166
 As per s 39(2) of the Constitution – the ‘objective normative value system’.  See discussion 
at 1.2.2(b) above. 
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general, and a case-specific, level.167  In doing so, I will look at three different 
constitutional rights, that are broadly representative of the rights enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights viz. the freedom of trade, occupation and profession,168 the 
freedom of religion, belief and opinion169 and the right to have access to health 
care services.170.  For each of these rights, I will examine their basic content 
and nature, and consider how they could influence contractual autonomy.  The 
main conclusion that I hope to draw, is that there cannot be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach.  Much will depend on the nature of the particular constitutional right 
implicated, the ideology most germane to the particular context, and the 
attendant altered conception of contractual autonomy, both in terms of content 
and legal method. 
In conclusion, Chapter Five will reiterate the need for the transformation 
of South African private law, and illustrate how the findings of this thesis, assist 
to facilitate this transformation, in the realm of contract law. 
                                                 
167
 As per s 8(2) read with s 8(3) of the Constitution. 
168
 Section 22 of the Constitution. 
169
 Section 15(1) of the Constitution. 
170
 Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AUTONOMY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Autonomy comprises the central axis of South African contract law.  Its 
manifestation as the principle of freedom of contract and the attendant maxim 
pacta sunt servanda can be traced back to foundational Roman Dutch legal 
sources.1  Moreover, the elevated emphasis on freedom of contract, during the 
ensuing classical liberal era (of the 18th and 19th century), continues to 
dominate contract law jurisprudence.2  This, notwithstanding much of 20th 
century discourse, which centred on what generally, was labeled ‘the rise and 
fall of freedom of contract’.3  As of the late 20th century, the principle of freedom 
of contract is back full-circle, in its rise once more, to primacy of place within the 
law of contract.4  Yet, the question of what contractual autonomy is, (and ought 
to be), and how it operates, (and ought to operate), remains contentious in 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
In the constitutional era, where the law must also transform power 
relations between individuals in the private law realm, it is uncertain how even 
to conceive of individual autonomy.  This uncertainty extends to the concept of 
contractual autonomy too. 
                                                 
1
 Luanda Hawthorne ‘Legal tradition and the transformation of orthodox contract theory: The 
movement from formalism to realism’ (2006) 12-2 Fundamina 71 at 71-74; FDJ Brand ‘The role 
of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African law of contract: The influence of the 
common law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71 at 71-73. 
2
 Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman ‘From classical to modern contract law’ in Jack Beatson 
and Daniel Friedman (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) at 7; Luanda 
Hawthorne ‘The principle of equality in the law of contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 157 at 164; 
Deeksha Bhana and Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and 
constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited’ (2005) 122 SALJ 865 at 866-868.  Note 
further, that unless otherwise stipulated, I use the terms ‘freedom of contract’, ‘contractual 
autonomy’, ‘liberty’, ‘freedom’, ‘free will’, ‘choice’ and ‘voluntary’ loosely and interchangeably. 
3
 See Ronald KL Collins (ed) Grant Gilmore ‘The Death of Contract’ (1995) at 103-104; 106-
107; 111-112; PS Atiyah Essays on Contract (1988) especially Essay 1 ‘The modern role of 
contract law’ 1; Essay 2 ‘Contracts, promises and the law of obligations’ 10; Essay 6 ‘The 
liberal theory of contract’ 121; Essay 7 ‘Executory contracts, expectation damages, and the 
economic analysis of contract’ 150; Essay 12 ‘Freedom of contract and the new right’ 355; cf 
Charles Fried Contract as Promise A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981) especially at 1-
21; FH Buckley ‘Introduction’ in FH Buckley (ed) The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract 
(1999) at 1-14. 
4
 Buckley op cit note 3; Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 2’ at 40; ‘Essay 12’ at 355-358.  See also 
Stephen A Smith ‘Future freedom and freedom of contract’ (1996) 59 MLR 167 at 175-176, on 
the role of contracts and contract law in daily life. 
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I show in this chapter, that the concept of contractual autonomy 
comprises two essential dimensions viz. the internal (content) and the external 
(reach) dimensions.  The former dimension focuses on the substantive concept 
of the (constitutionalised) contractual self and the latter, on the extent to which 
contract law gives, and ought to give, credence and effect to exercises of 
autonomy (as per the internal content dimension).  In relation to contractual 
autonomy therefore, the question of how to conceive of contractual autonomy in 
the post-apartheid constitutional context, must extend both to its internal and 
external dimensions. 
Recent debate has focused primarily on the external ‘reach’ (scope of 
operation) dimension of this question; the idea being, that the striking of a fitting 
constitutional balance between the classically individualist and the increasingly 
pervasive collectivist ideologies must re-define the contractual doctrine of 
legality.  In so doing, the doctrine of legality can continue to comprise the 
external legal policy, (and now constitutional), corrective for our modern law of 
contract.5  At the same time, not much attention has been paid to the internal 
‘content’ dimension of the above question.  Nevertheless, a holistic approach to 
the constitutionalisation of contractual autonomy makes it imperative, that the 
very content of autonomy itself, as it operates within our common law of 
contract, likewise be interrogated constitutionally and adjusted, if required.6 
In this chapter, I evaluate the general landscape of autonomy in contract 
law and constitutional law respectively, with a view to determining the relevant 
conceptions of contractual autonomy, both externally (in terms of its ‘reach’ 
dimension) and internally (in terms of its ‘content’ dimension), that animate, or 
at least, ought to animate, a constitutionalised contract law operating in a 
substantively progressive and transformative South Africa.  I begin by 
canvassing the classical model of contract law and its laissez faire conception 
of autonomy.  Here, I also look at the neo-classical economic analysis of 
                                                 
5
 See for instance, Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 2 at 887-889; Hawthorne op cit note 2 at 
171-176.  See further, Jonathan Lewis ‘Fairness in South African contract law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 
330; Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its implications 
for the development of contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395; C-J Pretorius ‘Individualism, 
collectivism and the limits of good faith’ (2003) 66 THRHR 638. 
6
 Stuart Woolman and Dennis Davis ‘The last laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, classical liberalism, 
creole liberalism and the application of fundamental rights under the interim and final 
Constitutions’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 361 at 382-390. 
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contract law, which, at once, feeds into and augments the classical conception 
of contractual autonomy.  This is followed by a discussion of the modern model 
of contract law, as it operates in South African law, and the manner in which it 
tempers the classical liberal foundations of contractual autonomy.  In particular, 
I canvass the relevance of ‘apparent (reliance-based) autonomy’ and 
collectivist-type normative considerations, such as fairness, reasonableness 
and good faith.  Thereafter, I complete my analysis of contractual autonomy, by 
teasing out and examining the implicit external (reach) and internal (content) 
dimensions of contractual autonomy in contemporary contract law. 
I then move on, to assess critically, the conception(s) of autonomy 
contemplated by Chapter Two of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, and relevant constitutional (contract) law cases.  In this chapter, I focus 
specifically on the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality7 and 
carefully look at how they articulate with the pre-constitutional, common law 
concept of autonomy.  Finally, I consider the interplay between the various 
conceptions of autonomy, potentially at work in post-apartheid contracts and 
propose the way forward for the constitutionalisation of contractual autonomy. 
So, this chapter concentrates on the substance of contractual autonomy, 
both internally and externally, and how conceptually, to align this with the Bill of 
Rights’ objective normative value system.8  As such, this chapter constitutes 
the ideological axis of the overall thesis, that will frame the subsequent 
chapters’ interrogations of legal methodology and the implication of the 
enumerated constitutional rights respectively, as well as the development 
ultimately of a framework for the constitutionalisation of our common law of 
contract. 
I argue here, that the fixed ((neo-) classical) understanding of the 
substance of contractual autonomy is liable to fall short of what the Constitution 
requires.  I explain that the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality 
are multi-faceted, and their interplay, multi-dimensional.  Accordingly, a 
constitutionalised conception of the substance of contractual autonomy that is 
grounded in these values must be a shifting one that, at once, will need to be 
                                                 
7
 As per s 8(1) read with ss 39(1) and (2) of the Constitution.  See the discussion of 
horizontality in chapter 1 especially at 1.2.2.(a). 
8
 As outlined in chapter 1 at 1.2.2(a), I adopt the narrower concept of the ‘objective normative 
value system’ that is limited to the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality. 
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sensitive to the factual context, any applicable substantive rights, as well as the 
broader constitutional vision of a substantively progressive and transformative 
South Africa. 
 
2.2 THE GENERAL LANDSCAPE OF AUTONOMY IN THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT:  
FROM THE CLASSICAL TO THE NEO-CLASSICAL AND MODERN MODELS OF 
CONTRACT LAW 
 
2.2.1 The classical model of contract law in outline 
In the main, the classical period was epitomised by the industrial revolution and 
its rejection of the (generally exploitative) power dynamics of the then existing 
social hierarchies and status relationships.9  During this period, the focus 
shifted from such hierarchical and status structures to the liberty of the 
individual, as a free human being, respected as equal to all others and, in the 
same way, capable of forming and exercising free will (in the form of free 
choice) and control, over his or her person and immediate private sphere.10  
Along these lines then, every person was said to be the master of his or her 
own destiny and to be responsible, above all, for the realisation of his or her 
particular vision of the ‘good life’.11  A strongly individualist concept of 
autonomy thus prevailed, with the values of self-interest, self-reliance and self-
determination paramount, and collectivist concerns minimal.12 
                                                 
9
 Beatson and Friedman op cit note 2 at 7; Hugh Collins ‘Contract and Legal Theory’ in W 
Twining (ed) Legal Theory and Common Law (1986) chapter 8 at 136-141; Hawthorne op cit 
note 2 at 164. 
10
 Note however that the society of the time was still rooted in patriarchy and racism.  For a 
further discussion of ‘choice’ and ‘choice theory’, see 2.2.3(a) below. 
11
 There are major philosophical texts that deal with individual liberty.  See for instance, the 
texts relied upon by Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 
and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at paras 47-54.  Most notably, these included Isaiah Berlin 
Four Essays on Liberty (1969); Karl R Popper The Open Society and its Enemies. Volume 1: 
The Spell of Plato 4ed (1962).  I will not be engaging with the substance of these texts here.  
Rather, I focus more narrowly on how their view of autonomy has manifested in legal 
understandings of autonomy. 
12
 Duncan Kennedy ‘Form and substance in private law adjudication’ in Dennis Patterson (ed) 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory An Anthology (2003) 193 at 207-209; 214-216, who 
submits that in order for self-interested individuals to co-exist with one another, there must be a 
limit on their respective pursuits of self-interest viz. respecting the rights of one another; Chris-
James Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (1): Ideologies and approaches’ (2005) 68 
THRHR 253 at 258-264.  See also Collins op cit note 9 at 137-144; Smith op cit note 4 at 
175ffg, on the central role of autonomy in relation to an individual’s ‘well-being.’ 
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It follows therefore, that the classical model of contract law identifies 
itself with this conception of autonomy.13  Indeed, the principle of freedom of 
contract exemplifies a non-interventionist, individualistic approach in the sense 
that parties are free, (at least in theory), to decide whether to enter into a 
contract,14 with whom and on what terms.  Such autonomy, is given expression 
through the legal concept of consensus to a contract15 i.e. an (outwardly) 
expressed meeting of minds, a correspondence of wills, an articulation of a 
common intention, envisaged upon the basis of theoretical arm’s length 
negotiations between parties of sound mind, mature age and (formally) equal 
standing.16  Importantly, the corollary of such exercise of autonomy is the 
principle of sanctity of contract (pacta sunt servanda).  The interplay between 
the two principles is described best in the following well-known dictum: 
“If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that 
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily 
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice.  Therefore you 
have this paramount public policy to consider – that you are not lightly to 
interfere with this freedom of contract.”17 
The upshot is that the underlying assumptions of individual autonomy and the 
attendant liberty to consent to a contract, comprise the cornerstones of the 
principle of sanctity of contract which, under classical contract law, are 
presented as an ‘axiomatic truth’.18  Accordingly, the classical model of contract 
law embraces a laissez faire approach that generally respects the contracting 
parties’ freedom to arrange their affairs as they see fit, by way of the terms of 
their contract. 
                                                 
13
 What follows in the remaining paragraphs of this section relies heavily on the discussion by 
my colleague and me, in an earlier article, Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 2 at 867-869. 
14
 Whilst parties are free to enter into contracts, and so create legally binding obligations, the 
converse applies likewise. Parties are free equally not to contract, meaning that, in the absence 
of (express or tacit) consent, they are free from contractual obligation. 
15
 See Reinhard Zimmerman ‘Good faith and equity’ in Reinhard Zimmerman and Daniel Visser 
(eds) Southern Cross – Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217 at 217-220; 
Gerhard Lubbe and Christina Murray Farlam and Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials, 
Commentary 3ed (1988) at 18–22. 
16
 Pretorius op cit note 5 at 640; Hawthorne op cit note 2 at 164-165. 
17
 Sir George Jessel MR in Printing and Numerical Registration Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 
462 at 465 as quoted in Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69 at 73; Roffey v 
Catterall, Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) at 505; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) 
SA 742 (A) at 761.  See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) at para 169. 
18
 Alfred Cockrell ‘Substance and form in the South African law of contract’ (1992) 109 SALJ 40 
at 46; Luanda Hawthorne ‘Materialisation and differentiation of contract law’ (2008) 71 THRHR 
438 at 441. 
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This means that when courts are asked to resolve contractual disputes, 
they concern themselves primarily, with the formal validity of consensus (so-
called procedural fairness) and/or the enforcement of the resulting contract, by 
way of an abstract (and somewhat mechanical) application of the monistic set 
of rules of contract law; rules which have crystallised over time.19  In other 
words, the rules of contract law, rather than the courts, are the authority for the 
substance of contractual autonomy.  This is because, in terms of the classical 
model, it is the contract law rules that delineate the conditions for the exercise 
of free will (i.e. autonomy in the classical liberal sense), which the law will give 
credence and effect to.  In contrast, the courts simply apply these rules, to the 
particular factual context.  So, ultimately the rules determine whether the 
conditions of autonomy have been satisfied and whether autonomy is present.  
In terms of the classical model, the role of the courts is limited to being referees 
of the conditions for autonomy; they are mere arbiters of fact that have a 
procedural, rather than a substantive role. 
Courts generally do not engage contextually, with the substantive 
fairness or otherwise, of contracts.  The classical model mostly disregards a 
contractant’s (potential or actual) change in circumstances subsequent to 
conclusion of a contract.  The focus rather, is on discrete (as opposed to long-
term continuing) transactions, where a party is presumed able, fully “to judge 
[and presentiate] his [or her] own future state of mind, as well as more obvious 
matters like the true nature and extent of the risk.”.20  Moreover, it fosters a 
                                                 
19
 Gilmore op cit note 3 at 7.  The focus, in terms of procedural fairness, is on the rules that 
articulate contractual consensus, and whether, the requirements for the valid formation of a 
contract have been fulfilled.  In relation to contractual autonomy, the relevant rules are housed 
in the requirements of contractual capacity and agreement, including the paradigm of offer and 
acceptance, the doctrine of mistake, and the established categories of misrepresentation, 
duress, undue influence and bribery.  Importantly, such rules presuppose a single model of 
contract.  For a critique of this position see Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 1’ at 1; 5-8, who submits 
at 8 that “we must try to extricate ourselves from the tendency to see contract as a monolithic 
phenomenon.” 
20
 Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 6’ at 126; 148.  Arguably, the doctrine of supervening impossibility 
is the portal for a change of circumstance.  Nevertheless, this doctrine is subject to fairly strict 
parameters.  See also the Shifren principle, (as established in SA Sentrale Ko-op 
Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 760 (A)), which is also fairly strict in its 
application, notwithstanding the (potential) hardship caused by a change in circumstances; cf 
the approach formulated by our courts in relation to restraint of trade contracts (Magna Alloys 
and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A)), and more recently, in Barkhuizen 
supra note 17 at paras 30; 56-58.  See also 2.2.3(c); 2.3.2; 2.4.2 below.  See further Andrew 
Hutchison ‘The doctrine of frustration: A solution to the problem of changed circumstances in 
South African contract law?’ (2010) 127 SALJ 84; Andrew Hutchison ‘Gap filling to address 
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narrow doctrine of legality, in terms of which, a court will strike down a contract 
as illegal only in extreme cases, where the contract’s content and/or basic 
tendency offends well-established boni mores of the community,21 or is against 
reasonably articulated public policy or the broader public interest.22 
The result is a certain, predictable and efficient legal framework of 
contract law, comprising a formal set of rules, (articulating freedom of contract 
in the form of consensus and the attendant pacta sunt servanda), coupled with 
a nominal set of balancing standards, (articulating underlying (classical liberal) 
policies, socio-economic mores and (predominantly individualist) values).  It is 
within this framework therefore, that society recognises the legitimacy of 
contracting parties’ exercises of contractual autonomy.  The courts then, as 
representatives of society, effectively endorse and enforce such exercises of 
autonomy, when invoking the classical contract law framework and applying the 
relevant rules and standards.23 
Insofar as contractual justice is concerned, the classical liberal model 
avers, that a crucial dimension of consensus, as the basis of contract, is that it 
necessarily implies, that all contracts are entered into in good faith.24  In fact, 
Roman Dutch law consistently maintained this to be the position.  Moreover, 
the underlying value of good faith, in its classical liberal understanding, requires 
persons also to honour their agreements.  Good faith is thereby reconciled with 
the individualist maxim of pacta sunt servanda and its classically extensive 
reach.  Articulated further, the classical liberal advocates that the presence of 
                                                                                                                                              
changed circumstances in contract law: When it comes to losses and gains, sharing is the fair 
solution’ (2010) 21 Stell LR 414. 
21
 Arguably, the boni mores as articulated by the common law of contract, finds its roots in 
canon law.  Examples of contracts that are contra bonos mores include slavery and prostitution. 
22
 The concepts of public policy and the broader public interest tend to bleed into each other.  
For a detailed discussion of these concepts, see SWJ (Schalk) Van der Merwe, LF Van 
Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke and GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 4ed (2012) at chapter 7.  
See also Brand op cit note 1 especially at 74-83; Beatson and Friedman op cit note 2 at 8-9; 
Matthew Kruger ‘The role of public policy in the law of contract, revisited’ (2011) 128 SALJ 712. 
23
 For a detailed discussion on the role of rules and standards, and the manner in which they 
operate, see chapter 3.  See Kennedy op cit note 12 at 220 ffg; Cockrell op cit note 18 at 43-44; 
Pretorius op cit note 12 at 258-265.  Notably, during the classical liberal era, the rules and 
standards of contract law were permeated with individualist thinking, and as a result, freedom of 
contract was far-reaching, especially in light of the then underlying belief that the political was 
distinct from law. 
24
 Zimmerman op cit note 15 at 218; 220; P Du Plessis ‘Good faith and equity in the law of 
contract in the civilian tradition’ (2002) 65 THRHR 397 at 407.  It is important at this point to 
note that, whilst good faith is generally assumed in contract law, there is limited recognition of 
bad faith insofar as it underlies the categories of improperly obtained consensus, the doctrine of 
fictional fulfillment, various breaches and remedies, as well as the doctrine of legality. 
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consensus,25 coupled with the value of good faith, renders our law of contract 
inherently equitable - the concept of good faith is said to infuse the law of 
contract with an equitable spirit and concomitantly, to diminish the significance 
of apparently competing collectivist norms of substantive fairness, justice and 
reasonableness, as against the individualist principle of freedom of contract.26 
To sum up, contract law as per the classical model constitutes a self-
contained network of legal rules and limited standards that animate an 
individualist, laissez faire conception of (formal)27 autonomy.  The courts, 
although legally recognised as the representatives of the society in which 
people contract, are placed in an extraneous ‘referee’ position.  They oversee 
contracts, permitting them to run their course, as long as the requisite formal 
preconditions (as delineated by the rules of contract law) have been fulfilled; 
they intervene only where the rules have clearly been broken. 
 
2.2.2 The neo-classical economic analysis of contract law in brief 
Briefly stated, neo-classical economists present an instrumentalist argument, in 
terms of which, the classical model of contract law is defended in the modern 
era, by way of its continued recognition, as the basic tool for the realisation of 
desired, socio-economic goals, within a free market system.28  In terms of free 
market ideology, the marketplace represents the forum, where participants at 
arms’ length and on a formally equal footing, come together to do business with 
each other, freely and fairly.29  Notably, this market is said to foster a free and 
fair competitive environment, which, in turn, prefers ‘self-regulation’ and ‘self-
                                                 
25
 Contract law has acknowledged and sought to address the possibility of defective consensus 
by means of limited interventions such as the doctrines of mistake, misrepresentation, duress 
and undue influence.  For further discussion of these, see 2.3.3(c); 2.3.3(d) below. 
26
 Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 2 at 867-868; see further, at 889-893, and the authorities 
cited there.  See also Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 441. 
27
 I use the term ‘formal’ to denote autonomy that is grounded in the negative liberty conception 
of freedom, coupled with a limited conception of good faith and the abstract treatment of 
individuals as equals, irrespective of their particular contexts. See further discussion at 2.3.3(a) 
below. 
28
 Peter Cane ‘The anatomy of private law theory: A 25
th
 anniversary essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 203 especially at 204-206; Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 441; 443-444; 
Michael J Trebilcock The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993) at 15-17; Anthony T Kronman 
and Richard A Posner in Hugh G Beale, William D Bishop and Michael P Furmston Contract 
Cases and Materials 2ed (1990) chapter 5 at 71-78; Lubbe and Murray op cit note 15 at 22-26; 
Beatson and Friedman op cit note 2 at 7; Pretorius op cit note 12 at 273. 
29
 Pretorius op cit note 12 at 258; Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 441. 
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correction’,30 as opposed to State intervention.  This clearly dovetails with the 
above-outlined individualist, laissez faire nature of classical contract law. 
In a free market economy,31 the basic idea is that every individual must 
be afforded an equal opportunity (albeit only in a formal sense), to participate in 
the market, with a view to achieving the socio-economic position in life, to which 
he or she aspires.  This is premised on the individual of sound mind and mature 
age, being a rational actor and accordingly, being best suited in relation to 
market transactions, to decide for him or herself whether to conclude a 
particular type of transaction (self-determination), upon the basis of his or her 
own assessment (self-reliance) of what comprises his or her best interests and 
how best to achieve it within the parameters of the market (self-interest i.e. with 
whom to transact and on what terms to transact).32  In other words, neo-
classical economic analysis contemplates a rational, individualist market, where 
participants, by the rational exercise of free choice, transact only when the 
transaction enhances their respective welfares, as defined subjectively.  In this 
manner, market resources are said to migrate naturally, to those individuals 
who value them most.  This, in turn, is said to promote economic efficiency in 
the market and overall welfare of society.33 
The fundamental function of classical contract law then, is to comprise 
the legal framework for the operation of the free market.  Articulated further, the 
law of contract facilitates the voluntary conclusion of competitive market 
transactions, upon the basis of its cornerstone principles of freedom of contract 
and pacta sunt servanda.34  As discussed in the previous section, the 
established set of simple, yet, robust rules, that is the law of contract, serves 
basically, to identify (clearly) and to enforce (strictly) the parties’ exercise of 
                                                 
30
 Dikgang Moseneke ‘Transformative constitutionalism: Its implications for the law of contract’ 
(2009) 20 Stell LR 3 at 9. 
31
 As with most Western countries, the South African economy ascribes primarily to a free 
market economy, with limited pockets of State intervention. 
32
 Beale et al op cit note 28 at 73; Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 441; Luanda Hawthorne 
‘Contract law’s choice architecture: The hidden role of default rules’ (2009) 73 THRHR 599 at 
599-601; Stephen A Smith Contract Theory (2007) at 126-127; Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 6’ at 
128; ‘Essay 7’ at 155-156; Pretorius op cit note 5 at 640; Hawthorne op cit note 2 at 163. 
33
 Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 7’ at 152-153, that discusses Posner’s conception of economic 
efficiency.  See further, Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 443; Trebilcock op cit note 28; Beale et al 
op cit note 28.  For a critique of the premise of rationality in the market, see Hawthorne op cit 
note 32 at 600-601; Lubbe and Murray op cit note 15 at 24-26. 
34
 Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 441; Hawthorne op cit note 32 at 599-601. 
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autonomy, as expressed in their consensus to resulting contracts.35  
Accordingly, the identification of market transactions with contracts, as 
governed by classical contract law, likewise affords legal security to market 
participants’ voluntary exchanges36 and more importantly, promotes certainty, 
predictability and efficiency in the marketplace.37 
At this juncture, it is important to note, that neo-classical analysis 
employs the language of economic efficiency, to substantiate the sub-set of 
contract law rules stipulating the (internal) pre-conditions for a valid exercise of 
contractual autonomy, as well as the corresponding (external) normative 
parameters of pacta sunt servanda.  This means that, in economic terms, the 
internal and external parameters of contractual autonomy are meant to 
accommodate failures of the market and thereby, to curb inefficient 
transactions.  Most notable, are those internal failures relating to imperfect 
competition in the marketplace, by reason of inequalities in information and/or 
bargaining power,38 which, in turn, lead potentially to a deficient exercise of 
autonomy itself.39  Market failures may also be caused by the externalities of 
market transactions - these translate generally, into the (potential) harm of 
market transactions to third parties and/or the community, as a whole.40  Of 
particular concern, are the policy implications of the purported situating within 
the marketplace, of certain, social facets, of what comprises a valuable life and 
their resulting commodification.41 
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 Pretorius op cit note 12 at 258; Hugh Collins The Law of Contract 4ed (2003) at chapter 1. 
See also 2.2.1 above. 
36
 Trebilcock op cit note 28 at 16. 
37
 Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 2 at 868; cf discussion at 883-885. 
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 See discussion of improperly obtained consensus under 2.3.3(d) below.  South African 
contract law, as it currently stands, needs to grapple with realities of unequal bargaining power, 
as well as the legal delineation of the concept of economic duress.  In this respect, neo-
classicists clamour for necessary alignment. See Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 451; Michael J 
Trebilcock ‘External critiques of laissez-faire contract values’ in FH Buckley (ed) The Fall and 
Rise of Freedom of Contract (1999) 78 at 82-86; Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee 
2005 (5) SA 315 (SCA) at para 18. 
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 See further discussion of autonomy and the doctrine of mistake under 2.3.3(c) below; Smith 
op cit note 4 at 173; Andrew Robertson ‘The limits of voluntariness in contract’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 179 at 180-181. 
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 In the extant contract law, such externalities are accommodated, presumably, by the doctrine 
of legality.  Trebilcock op cit note 28 at 17; Trebilcock op cit note 38 at 88-90. 
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 Smith op cit note 4 at 174, refers to the marker of ‘efficiency’ as ‘a morally unattractive 
foundation’. See further, Smith op cit note 32 at 260-263; Trebilcock op cit note 38 at 88-90; cf 
Collins op cit note 9 at 147-151, who advocates for a social market theory; Hawthorne op cit 
note 18 at 443-444; 445-453, on the movement from ‘solitary’ to ‘solidarity’ in the sphere of 
contract; See further, Collins op cit note 35 at chapter 5. 
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Dealing finally, with the residual default rules of contract law, the neo-
classicists contend, that these rules too, promote economic efficiency.42  For 
one thing, the contracting parties still maintain autonomy in relation to such 
default rules, insofar as they are free usually, to vary them or to contract out of 
them.43  Additionally, such rules provide the backdrop that enables parties to 
conclude valid transactions, with minimal negotiation about their content; the 
idea being, that the rules, importing implied terms, for example, will fill in the 
relevant gaps and thereby, reduce transaction costs.  In the final event, the 
default rules are said to be premised on rationality and accordingly, to be 
geared toward the maximisation of contracting parties’ overall welfare.44 
The net result, according to neo-classical economic analysis therefore, is 
that classical contract law is defensible, because it facilitates the efficient 
conclusion and enforcement of those market transactions, that enhance overall 
welfare; the market maintaining its (somewhat paradoxical) premise of rational 
individualism which, at the same time, insists on a subjective delineation of an 
individual’s welfare. 
It must however, be remembered that this defense is ultimately an 
instrumental one.  The neo-classicist accepts as much, conceding that where 
the classically delineated law of contract falls short of the free market mandate 
of an efficient economic order, such law must be re-aligned accordingly.45  In 
other words, the neo-classicist’s defense of the classical contract law stands, 
only for so long as, the market’s (individualist) foundations, socio-economic role 
and (laissez faire) relationship with the State, resonate with classical liberalism.  
As these dimensions of the market evolve, the neo-classicist will have to heed 
the modern economist’s critique of the classical liberal model and its conception 
of contractual autonomy.46 
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 Those terms that are implied by law (naturalia) are an example of this type of rule. 
43
 Hawthorne op cit note 32 at 604; Todd D Rakoff ‘Contracts of adhesion: An essay in 
reconstruction’ (1983) 96 Harvard LR 1173 at 1182. 
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 Trebilcock op cit note 28 at 16-17.  On the ‘standardisation of implied terms’, see Rakoff op 
cit note 43 at 1182. 
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 In fact neo-classicists make a compelling case inter alia for the recognition of economic 
duress and unequal bargaining power.  See further, Michael G Martinek ‘Contract law theory in 
the social welfare state of Germany – developments and dangers’ (2007) TSAR 1 at 14-16; cf 
Smith op cit note 4 at 174. 
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 See for instance, Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 443; 452-453.  See also Sandra Liebenberg 
and Beth Goldblatt ‘The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights under 
South Africa’s transformative constitution’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 335 at 360-361, who highlight the 
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In summation, the ‘hands-off-the-market’ mentality of neo-classicism, 
would limit the role of the State and therefore, the courts, along the same 
‘referee-type’ line, espoused by the classical model of contract law. 
 
2.2.3 The modern model of contract law in outline 
As previously alluded to, the gradual 20th century movement away from 
classical individualism and toward a more welfarist State, brought with it, the 
alleged ‘decline of freedom of contract’.47  Moving beyond the initial debate of 
contract being rooted in morally binding promise,48 the then leading academics 
focused on three crucial issues within the modern law of contract, that 
purportedly detracts from the classical conception of freedom of contract – first, 
the increased awareness of the objective determination of contractants’ 
subjective states of mind, as manifested in the concretised classical rules of 
contract law; second, the growing incidents of reasonable reliance liability, 
based upon a so-called ‘apparent’ exercise of autonomy, as opposed to an 
actual exercise of autonomy in the form of ‘free will’ and lastly, the greater 
degree of substantive contractual justice in the form of substantive fairness, 
reasonableness and good faith.49 
In other words, the modern model of contract law continues to identify 
freedom of contract as its central axis, and for the most part, takes forward, the 
classical liberal understanding of contractual autonomy, into the present.  At the 
same time, the modern model is designated by its legal grappling with the 
                                                                                                                                              
reality of discrimination based on socio-economic status as endemic to a market economy.  In 
the South African context, such discrimination is exacerbated in the aftermath of erstwhile 
apartheid (and patriarchal) policies.  Indeed, racial (and gender) discrimination operates now in 
the guise of discrimination against the poor, (and especially women), and/or vulnerable sectors 
of South African society, where systemic, socio-economic barriers to meaningful participation in 
the market are not given sufficient credence.  See also Marius Pieterse ‘Beyond the welfare 
state: Globalisation of neo-liberal culture and the constitutional protection of social and 
economic rights in South Africa’ (2003) 14 Stell LR 3 at 18-19. 
47
 Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 6’ at 146-149, refers to the ‘fall of freedom of contract’; Gilmore op 
cit note 3, goes so far as to declare the ‘death of contract’; cf Fried op cit note 3, who defends 
the notion of ‘contract as promise’. 
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 Here, I refer to promise in the broader context of agreement.  See further, Fried op cit note 3 
especially at 7-21; Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 2’; ‘Essay 6’ at 140-141. 
49
 There seems to be support for a substantive concept of good faith, that embraces fairness 
and reasonableness – see the majority judgment of Ncgobo J (especially at para 80) in 
Barkhuizen supra note 17; see also the minority judgment of Sachs J especially at paras 151-
157.  Note further, the increased regulatory legislation that seeks to curb the reach of freedom 
of contract, for example, in relation to rent control and minimum wage.  In the South African 
context, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 are 
recent interventions of this nature.  Such legislative measures are beyond scope of this project. 
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practical and normative implications of the three issues listed above.  It is to 
each of these issues that I now turn. 
 
(a) An objective determination of contractants’ subjective states of mind 
As outlined earlier, the classical model of contract law places emphasis on the 
‘free wills’ of the parties and thus, contemplates (at least in theory), an ‘actual 
(subjective) meeting of the minds’, before a contract is validly formed. 
Briefly stated, this comprises the subjective ‘will-theory’ foundation of 
legal liability, upon the basis of subjective consensus.50  Explained further, the 
‘will theory’ ascribes contractual obligation on the basis of a ‘special choice’ that 
the contracting parties make when they consent voluntarily, to a particular 
arrangement of affairs, with the requisite animus contrahendi (i.e. serious 
intention to contract).51  In the classical era, this notion of ‘special choice’ was 
derived from the morally paternalistic canon that all seriously intended promises 
must be kept (pacta sunt servanda).  In modern times, this is retained and 
expressed as an intrinsically individualist value, rooted in the socio-economic 
policy of personal responsibility that must be assumed by the contracting self.52 
More significantly, in the modern era, there is an increased 
acknowledgement, that whilst, the theoretical emphasis must be on the 
subjective ‘meeting of the minds’, practically speaking, such determination of 
matching intentions is necessarily objective.  An individual’s subjective intention 
(animus contrahendi) is only ever really known to the individual him or herself.  
At best, another can make a logical inference of the individual’s intention from 
whatever relevant, extrinsic evidence is available.53  The classical model’s 
rules, delineating the valid exercise of autonomy, have always placed emphasis 
on contractants’ inner states of mind, as manifested outwardly through their 
objectively discernible actions.  For instance, the ‘offer and acceptance’ set of 
contract law rules which, upon application by the courts, determine the 
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 See Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereeniging v Friedman 1979 (3) SA 978 (A) at 993C-1000E; 
1002A-1002E; Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 2’ especially at 12-15; 25; 40-41; ‘Essay 6’ at 121-
122.  For a detailed exposition of the will theory, see Chris-James Pretorius ‘The basis of 
contractual liability (2): Theories of contract (will and declaration)’ (2005) 68 THRHR 441 at 
442-457. 
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 Pretorius op cit note 50 at 442-457; Collins op cit note 9 at 139-144. 
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 Collins op cit note 9 at 137 ffg. 
53
 See for instance, Maize Board v Jackson 2005 (6) SA 592 (SCA); Pitout v North Cape 
Livestock Co-operative Ltd 1977 (4) SA 842 (A). 
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presence of subjective consensus, is essentially objective, in nature.54  Modern 
contract law therefore, recognises expressly, that elements of the objective 
‘declaration theory’, which bases liability upon the objective, matching 
declarations of the parties, also form a part of contract law.55  Indeed, this 
objective approach is crucial for a modern legal framework, that is sufficiently 
certain, predictable and efficient. 
But herein lays the dilemma:  whereas the classical liberal model of 
contract law is grounded fundamentally, in the individual exercise of free will, it 
must be accepted also, that its essentially objective determination, by way of 
concretised legal rules, as applied by the courts, runs the risk of falling short of 
the contracting parties’ actual, subjective intentions.56 
In the modern era therefore, it is understood that the foundational ideal 
of subjective autonomy does not operate absolutely in contract law, but makes 
allowances necessary for associated, practical difficulties in determining the 
inner state of mind.  In other words, it relies on the objective manifestations of 
the subjective state of mind.57  Nevertheless, leading academics have also 
submitted, that such concession does not significantly undermine subjective 
freedom of contract, at least, not on an empirical level.58 
For one thing, whilst subjective consensus has to be determined 
objectively, it is only in a small percentage of cases that the question of actual, 
(subjective) consensus versus outwardly apparent, (objective) consensus59 
becomes relevant.  In the numerous contracts concluded daily, the contracting 
parties are said usually to be in subjective agreement and as a result, their 
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 For detailed discussion of the rules on offer and acceptance, see Van der Merwe et al op cit 
note 22 at chapter 3.  See also, the rules on caveat subscriptor and interpretation of contract 
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 Pretorius op cit note 50 at 447-452; Rakoff op cit note 43 at 1188; Beatson and Friedman op 
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 Pretorius op cit note 50 at 386-388 and the authorities cited there. 
59
 On reasonable reliance, a more detailed discussion follows in 2.2.3(b); 2.2.3(c); 2.3.3(c). 
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contracts are executed fully, without further ado.60  Additionally, the rules 
articulating an objectively determined consensus tend ordinarily, to reflect the 
parties’ actual contractual intentions, as contemplated by the underlying 
classical liberal theory – the risk of divergence is argued to be negligible.61  At 
least at the empirical level therefore, the classical liberal ideal of subjective 
‘freedom of contract’ and pacta sunt servanda, when invoked, remain materially 
intact and mostly undisturbed in the modern model of contract law, despite 
assertions to the contrary. 
 
(b) Reasonable reliance liability based upon so-called ‘apparent’ autonomy 
When looking at the normative underpinnnings of the foundational ‘freedom of 
contract’, the classical model’s emphasis on subjective consensus, (as per the 
‘will theory’),62 was not very forthcoming about alternate theoretical bases of 
contractual liability.  In contrast, modern contract law acknowledges expressly, 
the legal possibility of contractual liability upon alternate bases, especially that 
of ‘reliance theory’:63  an honest, dissenting contractant, acting in good faith, 
can be held bound to an apparent contract, by reason of the other contracting 
party’s reasonable reliance on the appearance of consensus.64 
The modern model admits further, that the interplay between the various 
theoretical bases, is crucial to a reasonably practicable, certain and balanced 
law of contract, that is able to deal effectively and fairly, with the risks attendant 
on subjective autonomy.  For instance, ‘reliance theory’ enables the law also to 
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 Pretorius op cit note 50 at 446; Chris-James Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability (4): 
Towards a composite theory of contract’ (2006) 69 THRHR 97 at 113-114; Robertson op cit 
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deal with the risk of a contractant, who invites (detrimental) reliance, carelessly, 
dishonestly or in bad faith.65 
In the end therefore, the modern law of contract accepts that it is 
underpinned by a combination of theoretical foundations and focuses rather, on 
the interplay between the respective contract legal theories, that comprise, (or 
at least, ought to comprise), the composite modern law of contract.66  I do not 
purport here, to engage with the specifics of this debate.  Instead, I adopt 
modern contract law’s well-established point of departure viz. that freedom of 
contract is entrenched primarily, in the ‘will theory’ and supplemented 
secondarily, by the ‘reliance theory’.67 
As already outlined above, the subjective ‘will theory’ ascribes 
contractual liability on the basis of a subjective ‘meeting of the minds’, (albeit 
objectively determined), which, in turn, is grounded in the personal 
responsibility theory of ‘choice’.  It is trite, that this represents the starting point 
of an enquiry into contractual autonomy:  If, upon application by a court, the 
contract law rules establish consensus, as per the will theory, the parties will be 
bound to their agreement, upon the basis of their subjective consensus, 
thereto. 
If, however, the presence of subjective consensus is brought into 
question before the court, the secondary basis of reasonable reliance liability 
will come into play.  Here, the supplementary reliance theory acts as an 
objective corrective to the subjective will theory – in the absence of subjective 
consensus, the reliance theory purports to impose liability upon the basis of a 
contractant’s reasonable reliance on the appearance of consensus.  
Significantly, the supplementary reliance theory is rooted in the distributive 
justice theory of ‘harm to interests’,68 with the result, that reliance theory 
purports to infuse a greater degree of distributive justice into the law of 
contract.69 
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 Pretorius op cit 12 at 274-275; Robertson op cit note 39 at 217; Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 2’ 
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At the most basic level of ‘harm to interests’ theory, “the law attempts to 
establish “patterns of acceptable relationships”, informed by “a moral idea of 
the proper kinds of contractual relations in modern society, one based on trust 
[and solidarity]”.”70  So, insofar as a party acts to his or her detriment, by 
concluding a contract in reliance on the other party’s appearance of consensus, 
such other party should be bound to his or her apparent consensus, in order to 
avert the (potential) harm that would otherwise result.71  This approach would 
embody a form of ‘liberalist harm to interests’ theory that was advocated for by 
John Stuart Mills,72 where the harm addressed, is limited largely, to the 
(potential) effects for the individual (non-mistaken) contractant, as opposed to 
that for the broader community.73 
It is important to note further, that the reliance theory also implicates a 
facet of personal responsibility, inasmuch as a party’s reasonable reliance on 
the appearance of consensus would, in most cases, denote reasonable 
foreseeability74 on the part of the party responsible for such outward 
appearance.  This has been interpreted as a ‘half-deliberate’ exercise of 
autonomy.75 
The result, is that the modern model of contract law recognises the 
reliance theory as an essential supplement to the primary ‘will theory’, that 
extends or curtails a party’s contractual autonomy, insofar as the relevant 
course of action would avert harm, or decrease the risk of (foreseeable) harm, 
at least, to his or her fellow contractants. 
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 Lubbe and Murray op cit note 15 at 242; Collins op cit note 35 at 112-113; 116; Collins op cit 
note 9 at 150; Hawthorne op cit note 18 at 443-444; 445-453.  I submit further, that reliance 
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of obligation.” See also Cockrell op cit note 18 at 47-49 and the discussion of the doctrine of 
mistake in 2.3.3(c) below. 
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(c) A greater degree of substantive contractual justice in the form of 
substantive fairness, reasonableness and good faith 
It is well-established, that in striving for legal justice, all law endeavours to strike 
the right balance between competing normative values that are either 
individualist or collectivist in nature.  The same is true for contract law, where 
the two sets of values can be represented along an underlying, normative 
continuum; a continuum, which extends from the one extreme of pure 
individualism (‘selfishness’), to the other extreme of total collectivism 
(‘selflessness’).76  The right balance between the two sets of values therefore, 
would be marked by contract law’s proper situating of contractual autonomy, 
along the continuum.  This, in turn, would be determined by the relevant policy 
considerations,77 that are emphasised by the classical and modern models of 
contract law respectively. 
As outlined earlier, the classical model emphasises a certain, predictable 
and efficient legal framework of contract law.  Accordingly, it espouses a 
strongly individualist principle of freedom of contract, operating against more 
limited conceptions of the collectivist norms of substantive fairness, justice and 
reasonableness, so that, the latter values have minimal impact.78  The classical 
model of contract law therefore, situates contractual autonomy fairly close to 
the individualism end of the normative continuum. 
Moving to the modern model of contract law, its adoption of the 
secondary ‘reliance theory’ (and therewith ‘harm to interests’ theory), has 
meant that contract law is able now, to appreciate more overtly, that contracts 
do not operate in isolation, but form part of the greater fabric of society.  In turn, 
this enables society, primarily by way of an established judiciary and 
legislature, to exercise greater social control over contractual autonomy, than 
its classical liberal, ‘will-theory’ counterpart.79  More specifically, it enables 
modern contract law to pay greater attention to substantive contractual justice, 
(as opposed to legal certainty),80 in its conception of contractual autonomy.  In 
other words, reliance theory’s greater emphasis on (socio-economic) 
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 Kennedy op cit 12 at 207-212; Pretorius op cit note 5 at 638-642; Cockrell op cit note 18 at 
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 See 2.2.1 above. 
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 Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 2 at 868. 
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distributive justice, facilitates a more collectivist, (as opposed to individualist), 
positing of autonomy, within the modern law of contract.81 
At present, the South African common law of contract expresses these 
collectivist-type adjustments to the classically individualist foundations, in the 
rules relating to procedural fairness, (i.e. those dealing with ‘mistake’, 
‘misrepresentation’, ‘(economic) duress’ and ‘undue influence’),82 as well as the 
doctrine of legality’s open-ended standards of substantive fairness, (like good 
faith, the boni mores, and the public interest), which determine whether a 
contract is against public policy.83  Notably, these open-ended normative 
standards have been identified, by academics and the judiciary alike, as a 
primary legal portal for the exercise of social control over contractual 
autonomy.84  They operate unavoidably, at a high level of abstraction, are 
innately fluid and pluralist in nature, and are not easily reduced to specific 
rules.85  Judges therefore, are required to do more than mechanically apply the 
rules of contract law here; they are required to invoke the relevant standard(s), 
to make value judgments, based upon all of the considerations, which they 
deem pertinent to the particular case.  Increased substantive fairness in 
contract law therefore, comes at the price of a reduced, (although still 
acceptable), level of legal certainty.86 
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All the same, the earlier-outlined, ‘Millian’-type, ‘liberalist harm to 
interests’ understanding of reasonable reliance,87 means that the resulting 
conception of contractual autonomy remains somewhat conservative.  For 
instance, the categories of improperly obtained consensus, although allowing a 
greater measure of collectivism to infiltrate contractual autonomy, continue to 
be dominated by the classical liberal understanding of strongly, individualist 
values.88  Likewise, the content and operation of the open-ended normative 
standards, within the doctrine of legality, although more receptive to 
considerations of substantive fairness, are, for the most part, still overruled by 
the classically individualist conception of freedom of contract.89  Accordingly, 
the modern model of contract law, although moving contractual autonomy 
further along the individualism-collectivism continuum, still leans strongly 
towards the individualism end of the continuum.90 
It is questionable therefore, whether the modern model of contract law 
strikes the optimal balance between the relevant individualist and collectivist 
concerns, that inform the operation of autonomy, (both actual and apparent), 
within contracts.  Indeed, the law of contract, the world over, remains 
notoriously vague as to such balance.  As a result, the precise content and 
scope of operation of contractual autonomy in modern contract law is uncertain.  
For the most part, it is submitted, that this can be attributed to the lack of clarity, 
in terms of what comprises the intended socio-economic, legal and political 
vision for the relevant society and the extent to which, this is meant to influence 
the manner in which modern contract law operates.91 
The modern economic analysis of contract law, for instance, confronts 
this very challenge in its delineation of the modern market.  In relation to private 
law, the generic ‘State’ seemingly still operates on the premise of conventional 
free market ideology, notwithstanding, increasing legislative and regulatory 
market interventions that are clearly ‘welfarist’ in nature.92  The generic 
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‘judiciary’, likewise tends to pay no heed to the reality of vacillating individualist 
and collectivist policies, as based on the norms that are implicated, (or at least 
ought to be implicated), by applicable contracts, according to the socio-
economic and political climate of the time.  Instead, the judiciary insists 
generally, on the private law’s veneer of certainty, by way of its steadfast 
invocation of the conventional ‘public-private’ divide, in terms of which, the 
private law (including the common law of contract), remains insulated largely, 
from the context within which it operates.93 
In South Africa however, the Constitution and, more especially, the Bill of 
Rights places our former dispensation’s ‘private’ common law of contract in a 
somewhat unique position.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
Constitution embodies the substantively progressive and transformative, socio-
economic goals of post-apartheid South African society, and furthermore, 
expressly subjects all law, including the common law of contract, to this 
vision.94  So, whilst our constitutional rights and values are open-ended, the 
South African constitution provides a clear, long-term vision of a substantively 
equal, free and dignified post-apartheid society, which the modern law of 
contract must also articulate.  Accordingly, the South African model of modern 
contract law has a fairly definitive set of constitutional parameters, for the 
striking of the optimal balance between the relevant individualist and collectivist 
concerns that must inform the fair operation of autonomy within contracts.  Yet, 
as will become evident below, the South African judiciary has not paid sufficient 
attention to the broader constitutional framework.95 
To sum up, in relation to the modern model of contract law, the judiciary 
continues largely, to see itself as a ‘referee’ that very much retains the classical 
hands-off approach, except when forced to deal with more substantive 
considerations, as delineated by the secondary reliance theory.  But even then, 
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the operational ‘harm to interests’ paradigm remains essentially liberalist in 
nature, with the result, that the outcomes produced by the modern model of 
contract law are relatively unchanged. 
 
2.3 CONTRACTUAL AUTONOMY UNPACKED:  THE INTERNAL ‘CONTENT’ AND 
EXTERNAL ‘REACH’ DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTUAL AUTONOMY 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Upon closer analysis, of the above-outlined (neo-) classical and modern models 
of contract law, what becomes apparent is that the concept of contractual 
autonomy is an intricate one that is determinative of our common law of 
contract. 
At the outset, the classical model articulated a strongly individualist, 
liberal concept of contractual autonomy, as the central cog of contract law.  In 
doing so, the classical model identified contractual autonomy’s basic legal 
function, with the facilitating of justice within the realm of contracts.  
Traditionally, this function has been expressed in the terminology of procedural 
fairness and substantive fairness, where the former, focuses on the fairness of 
the process by which contracting parties reach agreement, and the latter, on 
the fairness of the substance of what the parties contracted about.96  So, 
whereas the classical model, grounded in the classical liberal conception of 
autonomy, expressed the two legs of procedural and substantive fairness in an 
essentially classical liberal manner, the neo-classical and modern models have 
purported to temper the operation of each of these legs. 
My contention here is that the traditional terminology of procedural and 
substantive fairness, tends to obfuscate certain normative dimensions of 
contractual autonomy, that are implicitly at play, within the common law of 
contract.  Indeed, the neo-classical and modern models of contract law, as 
outlined above, still mostly presuppose the conception of individual autonomy 
embedded in classical liberalism and thus, end up effecting mainly cosmetic 
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adjustments, to the rules and standards articulating procedural and substantive 
fairness.97 
I propose therefore, to rephrase the current articulation of contractual 
autonomy, in autonomy terms, expressly.  At present, the procedural fairness 
leg of contractual autonomy comprises the rules and standards that express the 
doctrines of mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence and duress.  Further, 
as a precursor for a procedurally fair exercise of contractual autonomy, it is 
arguable, that this leg extends also, to the rules delineating the requirements of 
contractual capacity and, offer and acceptance or, at the very least, the 
application of these rules.98  Looking at these rules and standards together, I 
submit, that the question of procedural fairness translates into a direct enquiry 
of what comprises an exercise of contractual autonomy; when can it be said in 
law, that the contracting self has exercised his or her autonomy?  Stated 
differently, the focus is on, what I term, the internal content dimension of 
contract autonomy. 
Looking then, at the substantive fairness leg of contractual autonomy, it 
comprises the rules and standards that articulate the doctrine of legality.  As 
previously alluded to, the doctrine of legality is a primary portal, through which, 
the judiciary is able to exercise social control over contracts.  Accordingly, if the 
substance of a contract is found to be against public policy, it will be struck 
down as illegal.99  So, the substantive fairness leg purports to regulate the 
reach of autonomy, once it is exercised - it purports to regulate the extent to 
which, the contracting parties can regulate their relationship by contract.  For 
instance, an exercise of contractual autonomy will not be recognised by the 
courts, insofar as one party agrees to be the slave of the other – such exercise 
of autonomy will be regarded as an obscene excess, and the contract will be 
struck down, as against public policy.100  The focus in terms of substantive 
fairness therefore, translates directly into what I term the external reach 
dimension of contractual autonomy. 
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Having thus outlined what I term the internal (content)-external (reach) 
paradigm of contractual autonomy, I proceed to interrogate each dimension in 
turn, with a view ultimately, of developing a constitutionalised conception of 
contractual autonomy. 
 
2.3.2 The external reach dimension of contractual autonomy (the 
doctrine of legality) 
As outlined earlier, the classical model adopts a laissez faire approach, in terms 
of which, courts can overrule contracting parties’ freedom of contract, in 
exceptional circumstances only.  In other words, it fosters a fairly narrow 
doctrine of legality, in terms of which, courts strike down or refuse to enforce 
contracts, in extremely limited cases.  The contract’s content and/or basic 
tendency must offend competing public policy considerations to such an extent, 
that the paramount values of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda, (as 
sanctioned by the limited conceptions of ‘good faith’ and inherent equity),101 are 
outweighed.  In terms of the classical model of contract law therefore, the reach 
of contractual autonomy is fairly extensive, so much so, that contract autonomy 
and therefore, contract law has come to be hegemonic to other branches of 
private law.102  As will be discussed in the next chapter, parties can, for 
instance, regulate the consequences of a delict or a familial` relationship by 
way of contract. 
In contradistinction, the modern model of contract law recognises the 
need for a greater measure of substantive contractual justice.103  As explained 
earlier, with the modern model’s adoption of the secondary reliance theory, the 
courts have more room to reign in contracts that are substantively unfair or 
unreasonable.  Indeed, in the pre-constitutional dispensation, the courts had 
already begun to recognise, that the normative value of good faith had a more 
substantial role to play in the modern era; the somewhat narrow, classical 
liberalist interpretation being, but one dimension, of this multi-faceted value.104 
An important turning point in the modern era was the demise of the 
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exceptio doli.105  Subsequent to its demise, the connection between the 
normative value of good faith and the doctrine of legality became poignant.  In 
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes, the AD, (as it then was), invoked the value of good 
faith106 to introduce the doctrine of unconscionability, in terms of which, a 
contract that was so unfair as to be exploitative of a contracting party and thus, 
unconscionable, would be contrary to public policy, and invalid.  On the basis of 
good faith therefore, this doctrine provided an avenue for substantive fairness: 
“No court should therefore shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary 
to public policy when occasion so demands.  The power to declare contracts 
contrary to public policy should, however, be exercised sparingly and only in 
the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result from 
an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the power.  One must be careful not to 
conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms 
(or some of them) offend one’s individual sense of propriety and fairness.”107 
In the constitutional era then, this position was reiterated in the minority 
judgment of Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 
Saayman NO.108  Hutchison succinctly summarised the main points of Olivier 
JA’s discussion: 
“There is a close link … between the concepts of good faith, public policy and 
the public interest in contracting.  This is because the function of good faith has 
always been to give expression in the law of contract to the community’s sense 
of what is fair, just and reasonable.  The principle of good faith is thus an 
aspect of the wider notion of public policy, and the reason why the courts 
invoke and apply the principle is because the public interest so demands.  
Good faith accordingly has a dynamic role to play in ensuring that the law 
remains sensitive to and in tune with the views of the community.”109 
Subsequently, several other judgments also recognised the importance 
of good faith in the legality enquiry.110  Nevertheless, more recent SCA cases 
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have made it clear, that the mere presence of bad faith in a contract does not 
automatically render the contract against public policy, and illegal.  Bad faith is 
simply a factor to be taken into account, in carrying out the legality exercise.111  
Even so, the CC has since, (albeit in an obiter statement), aligned the value of 
good faith with the values of reasonableness and fairness, so that, substantive 
reasonableness and fairness are now factors, that a court should take 
cognisance of, in conducting an enquiry into the legality of a contract or a 
contractual clause.112 
Our contract law therefore, is shifting gradually in the direction of 
substantive contractual justice.  Moreover, with the advent of the Constitution, 
the courts have even more impetus to move beyond the conservative, ‘Millian’-
type, ‘liberalist harm to interests’ understanding of the secondary reliance basis 
of contract law.113 
Significantly, the judiciary has recognised, that in the constitutional era, 
the doctrine of legality must draw progressively on the objective normative 
value system, that is our Bill of Rights, as well as the underpinning, 
transformative socio-economic, policy goals for post-apartheid South Africa.114  
So, where a sanctioning of individual autonomy (actual and/or apparent), 
unduly impedes the foundational constitutional values and socio-economic 
policy goals of an increasingly ‘welfarist’, post-apartheid South African society, 
it should not be legally recognised.115  Taken further, individual autonomy 
(actual and/or apparent), should also be limited when it fails unreasonably and 
unjustifiably, to respect another’s competing fundamental rights or freedoms, as 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  Finally, there may also be instances where 
the Constitution requires the reach of individual autonomy (actual and/or 
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apparent), to be extended.116 
That the judiciary has begun the process of constitutionalising the 
common law of contract, (at least, through the portal of legality), is a step in the 
right direction.  Yet, in so doing, our judiciary continues to look at contracts 
mainly, through the individualist prism of the erstwhile classical liberal era, in 
terms of which, the laissez faire understanding of freedom of contract persists, 
as the foundational legal premise.  In fact, the judiciary has situated the 
classical liberal conception of autonomy, (as grounded in the will theory), within 
the Bill of Rights framework,117 so much so, that freedom of contract itself 
appears to have been elevated to being a constitutional value.118  In effect 
therefore, the operation of the will theory within the modern model of contract 
law, although seemingly mindful of the significantly altered constitutional 
context, continues largely to take its lead from the classical model’s strongly 
individualist leanings of self-interest, self-reliance and self-determination, in 
relation to contractual autonomy.119 
The classical conception of contractual autonomy therefore, still features 
in, and moreover, dominates the (constitutionalised) legality enquiry, as 
conducted by the courts, without any normative interrogation of what its content 
is, (and ought to be), in the constitutional era.  As a result, freedom of contract 
(and pacta sunt servanda) continues to prevail generally, against competing 
constitutional considerations, in the constitutional-legality cases that come 
before the courts.120 
 
2.3.3 The internal content dimension of contractual autonomy 
 
(a) Introduction 
At the outset of this chapter, I highlighted the importance of a holistic approach 
to contractual autonomy that takes cognisance, both of its external reach 
dimension, as well as its internal content dimension.  Yet, whilst the earlier-
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outlined neo-classical and modern models of contract law purport to deal 
rigorously with the external scope of operation of contractual autonomy, they 
still mostly presuppose an internal conception of individual autonomy 
embedded in classical liberalism.  They accept as implicit, that autonomy 
continues to comprise the free will of an atomistic individual, to make the basic 
(formal) choice of whether, with whom and on what terms to contract.121  The 
upshot is that the concept of autonomy itself has not received a lot of attention 
in modern contract law discourse,122 save perhaps, for the case of standard 
form contracts, where courts seem superficially to assimilate the classical form 
of autonomy and again, strive mainly, to control its external reach dimension.123  
At the risk of being tedious therefore, I preface my analysis of the internal 
dimension of contractual autonomy, with a re-tracing of its classical liberal 
origins and ensuing content. 
In the classical liberal era, laissez faire came to occupy primacy of place 
as the overarching organising principle of society.  Briefly stated, this entailed 
the State maintaining a ‘hands-off approach’ in relation to individuals’ 
arrangements of their private affairs; the main idea being, that the exercise of 
State power should not threaten, what was then, the newly devised individualist 
liberal ideal.  It was imperative, that all individuals be respected as the masters 
of their own destinies.  To this end then, as the State evolved into a fully 
fledged classical liberal State, it embraced a strict division between public and 
private matters. 
In terms of its public (constitutional) mandate, the State concerned itself, 
essentially with the governance of the country, in a manner that left individuals, 
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largely ‘free’ to realise their particular conceptions of the ‘good life’.124  
Admittedly, many parties’ vulnerable socio-economic position at the time, posed 
a risk to their attainment of such goals.  However, this was said only to be 
temporary.  It was argued, that for so long as all individuals were entitled to 
exercise their freedom, even if, on a substantively unequal footing at first, they 
could achieve their goals.  Significantly, this would require time, effort, 
education and commitment, especially of more vulnerable individuals.  In the 
end however, individuals would be able to work their way out of, what may be 
dire circumstances and, prevail.125 
So, the basic idea was that the liberal State would facilitate, (as opposed 
to compel), a substantive, socio-economic equality and freedom, by way of 
initial baseline recognition of a formal equality between private individuals and 
the ensuing freedom.126  The implication was that, only a lack of will on the part 
of a rational individual would prevent him or her from succeeding in life.  This 
meant that the classical self was responsible essentially, for him or herself and 
his or her life – he or she could rely only on him or herself, to determine and 
achieve, what was in his or her best interests.127  It is upon this basis then, that 
a distinct, laissez faire system of private common law emerged, where a 
negative conception of freedom was privileged. 
‘Individual autonomy’ in the classical liberal era was characterised by the 
negative touchstone of an ‘absence of coercion’,128 and more broadly speaking, 
a ‘freedom from obligation’, except for where personal responsibility could be 
ascribed, on the basis of fault or consent.129  As alluded to, earlier in this 
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chapter, this negative understanding of autonomy featured likewise in the 
classical model of contract law and later on, became naturalised in the neo-
classical and modern models of contemporary contract law. 
The essential difficulty however, is that unlike the law of delict, for 
instance, where the personal responsibility element of fault is subordinate to 
that of wrongfulness, autonomy comprises the central axis of contract law, even 
in relation to the limitations of its generally extensive reach, in terms of the 
doctrine of legality.130  Moreover, autonomy entails an actual (or apparent) 
voluntary undertaking for the creation of contractual obligations.  By definition 
therefore, the conclusion of a valid contract contemplates an actual (or 
apparent) exercise of autonomy, which ought ideally to be sourced in a positive 
conception of autonomy.131  Nevertheless, our law’s conception of contractual 
autonomy continues to be identified with laissez faire, and as such, is housed 
essentially in a ‘personal responsibility-consent exception’ to the negative 
conception of autonomy.  The net result, is a fairly thin conception of positive 
autonomy within our common law of contract. 
In the remainder of this section, I attempt to illustrate how our modern 
contract law continues to operate on an overly thin internal conception of 
contractual autonomy, and consider the implications thereof, for the modern 
contracting self.  I begin, by examining the rules delineating the legal 
requirement of contractual capacity for the valid exercise of autonomy.  I show 
how these rules continue to endorse the deficient, classical conception of the 
self that fails in the end, even to realise the substantive, socio-economic 
equality and freedom, originally advocated for, by classical liberalism itself.  I 
then move on, to assess the modern doctrine of mistake, where I ascribe the 
current jurisprudential difficulties to an impoverished internal conception of 
apparent autonomy, coupled with the lack of normative interrogation of its 
external reach dimension.  Finally, I look at the misrepresentation category of 
improperly obtained consensus, and show how it falls short of the modern self, 
exercising (actual or apparent) contractual autonomy. 
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(b) Contractual capacity 
In terms of our contract law rules, the legal pre-requisite for the parties’ positive 
exercise of autonomy is contractual capacity.  Articulated further, an individual 
must have the basic cognitive ability to appreciate the legal nature and 
significance of entering into a contract, and furthermore, must have the 
essential conative ability to act accordingly.132  Only then, can it be said that he 
or she has the requisite autonomy to negotiate, and voluntarily conclude, a 
legally binding contract. 
But such requirement of contractual capacity has proved so rudimentary, 
that it is rarely an issue between the parties.133  On the contrary, a contracting 
party who has reached majority age,134 and has not been declared the subject 
of a legal impediment, such as mental illness or prodigality, is presumed 
rebuttably, to have the required cognitive capacity.  In addition, an act is 
deemed voluntary, bar some force that physically overpowers the conative 
ability of a party, to the extent that, he or she cannot be said to have been 
acting at all (vis absoluta).135 
The point of departure therefore, is that all individuals are respected as 
(formally) equal before the law, and as such, are presumed basically, to be 
willing and able, both cognitively and conatively, to exercise their contractual 
autonomy positively, unless they can prove otherwise.  Notably, the element of 
contractual capacity does not distinguish between capacities to exercise actual 
versus apparent autonomy i.e. the capacity of a party actually to enter into a 
contract versus the capacity to act in a manner, which creates the impression 
that he or she is entering into a contract.136  Moreover, autonomy is framed in 
absolute terms as an ‘either-or’ question - an individual with presumed 
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respective abilities, as set out in the text.  I do not purport to venture into the scientific/medical 
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Louw and DJA Edwards Psychology: An Introduction for Students in Southern Africa (1993). 
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contractual capacity, either exercises his or her autonomy by the voluntary 
making of a choice,137 or not at all; there are no gradations, either of voluntary 
actions, or of choices exercised.  The net result, it is said, is an ease of 
adjudication by the courts which, as a matter of policy, promotes contractual 
certainty. 
In the final event, even if the question of contractual capacity does 
become relevant, contractual certainty again dictates that the factual enquiry 
remain limited strictly, to an atomistic determination of the individual’s cognitive 
capacity to exercise autonomy, and ensuing voluntary action in the abstract, 
without any reference, to the (potential) influence of the particular context in 
which such individual finds him or herself.138  At most, neo-classical economic 
analysis has admitted to a premise of rational individuals who, relying 
essentially on themselves, and absent any internal market failure (in the neo-
liberalist sense), can, and do act, always in their own best (subjective) 
interests.139  The modern model purports to go a little further, with attempts to 
bring in greater collectivist-type justice, through extant legal avenues of 
procedural fairness, vis-a-vis the exercise of contractual autonomy.140 
Nevertheless, contractual capacity’s delineation of autonomy remains 
essentially, classically liberal in nature.  It does not take account of pertinent 
socio-economic factors that are now considered integral to any meaningful 
understanding of (substantive) individual autonomy, in relation to the making of 
rational, voluntary, choices.  Most notably, it does not take account of his or her 
socio-economic status and privation, in terms of basic human needs and/or 
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 This includes the voluntary creating of an impression of making a choice.  Rakoff op cit note 
43 at 1180-1183, where the ‘Dimensions of Choice’ in relation to the terms of a contract are 
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wants,141 level of education,142 ‘naivety in business’ and/or access to 
information, and overall vulnerability to exploitation.143 
To boot, our law of contract fails even, to recognise the value of the 
broader liberalist context of an ‘autonomous life’, in which the ‘autonomous self’ 
and autonomy per se, are necessarily situated.  In identifying the ‘choosing 
self’, the law leans towards the ‘instantaneous discrete self’, present at the time 
of entering into the contract, as opposed to the more ‘continuous self who 
extends in time’, at least, for so long as the contract is in existence.  So, the law 
fails further to accommodate the ‘future self’ adequately, particularly in relation 
to the ability of the ‘contracting autonomous self’, properly to presentiate the 
‘future self’ and all attendant risks.  The ultimate liberal quest, for autonomy 
across an individual’s lifespan as a whole, (i.e. past, present and future), is 
thus, also undermined.144 
The upshot is that the element of contractual capacity, although meant to 
be the modern law’s initial guarantor of positive contractual autonomy, 
continues to be dominated, somewhat counter-intuitively, by erstwhile, laissez 
faire philosophy.  In effect, our law’s element of contractual capacity 
perpetuates a formal, negative conception of laissez faire contractual 
autonomy, which although legally certain in nature, fails in the end, even after 
the passage of well over a century, to realise the substantive, (socio-economic) 
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 Such, would at least include those needs, (like housing, water, education, etc.), as 
embodied by the socio-economic rights founded in our Bill of Rights. 
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 See for instance, the case of Bhikhagee v Southern Aviation (Pty) Ltd 1949 (4) SA 105 (E), 
where the contractant’s inability to read English was not considered an acceptable excuse. 
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 Hawthorne op cit note 121 at 61-62: 
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See also Hawthorne op cit note 2 at 170; Hawthorne op cit note 32 at 618-619; Atiyah op cit 
note 3 ‘Essay 7’ at 155; Smith op cit note 4 at 177, where he refers to such as the horizontal 
dimension of autonomy. 
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 Smith op cit note 4 at 177; Smith op cit note 32 at 258-260; Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 6’ at 
126.  See 2.2.1 above especially at note 21. 
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equality and ensuing (positive) freedom, as envisaged originally, by classical 
liberalism itself.145 
Contractual capacity’s thin conception of autonomy then, sets the stage 
for the legal rules that articulate procedural fairness in our law of contract.146  
To iterate, procedural fairness focuses firstly, on the legal nature and effect of 
apparent autonomy (by way of the doctrine of mistake), and secondly, on the 
legal propriety of certain processes through which consensus is obtained, (by 
way of the established categories of misrepresentation, duress, undue 
influence and bribery).147  It is to each of these issues, that I now turn. 
 
(c) The doctrine of mistake 
 
(i) The doctrine of quasi mutual assent and reasonable reliance in general 
The legal doctrine of mistake appears to function, as the main portal through 
which, the earlier-outlined, secondary theory of reasonable reliance, operates.  
As explained earlier, contractual autonomy in modern contract law can take the 
form of actual subjective autonomy or objectively apparent autonomy.  To 
expound, modern contract law grounds contractual liability primarily, in the 
classical will theory’s conception of contractual autonomy.  However, in cases, 
where the exercise of subjective, contractual autonomy of a party148 falls short, 
by reason that he or she has made a (legally relevant) mistake,149 the 
secondary reliance theory may still impose contractual liability, on the basis of 
the party’s apparent exercise of contractual autonomy.150 
At present, the doctrine of mistake is expressed in terms of two alternate 
sets of legal rules.  First, there is the set of legal rules that the contracting party 
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 Bhana op cit note 119 at 273-278. 
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 In our law of contract, there is no overarching category of improperly obtained consensus - 
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trying to enforce the contract, (i.e. the contract assertor/non-mistaken party), 
would invoke.  This set of rules comprises the doctrine of quasi mutual assent, 
that establishes whether the contract assertor, reasonably relied on the 
appearance of consensus, created by the other contracting party i.e. is the 
reliance by the non-mistaken party, on the apparent exercise of autonomy by 
the other (mistaken) party, reasonable, and therefore, legally protectable?  In 
essence therefore, the doctrine of quasi mutual assent implicates the element 
of reasonable reliance directly, in relation to the objective appearance of 
consensus.151 
Second, there is the alternate set of legal rules, that the contracting party 
trying to escape the contract (i.e. the contract denier/mistaken party), would 
invoke.  This set of rules comprises the justus error approach, which 
determines whether the mistake of the contract denier is reasonable, and 
therefore, legally excusable.  More specifically, a court employing the justus 
error approach would determine whether the non-mistaken party caused the 
mistake, or was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the mistake, or 
whether the mistake was otherwise excusable.152  In essence therefore, the 
justus error approach focuses on the mistake.  Still, in focusing on the mistake, 
a court assesses the reasonableness of the mistake, basically in terms of the 
non-mistaken party’s reasonable reliance on the objective appearance of 
consensus.153  Explained further, where the non-mistaken party caused the 
mistake, it cannot be said that he or she reasonably relied, on the apparent 
exercise of autonomy by the mistaken party.  Likewise, if the non-mistaken 
party was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the mistake, it cannot be said 
that he or she relied, or reasonably relied, on the appearance of consensus 
created by the mistaken party.  The only deviation from the reasonable reliance 
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yardstick appears to be, where a court considers the mistake ‘otherwise 
excusable’. 154 
With the exception of ‘otherwise excusable’ mistakes therefore, the 
doctrine of quasi mutual assent, and the justus error approach, are conversely 
correlative of one another,155 in their respective direct and indirect articulations 
of reliance theory’s conception of apparent contractual autonomy.  In other 
words, contractual liability, in terms of the narrower doctrine of mistake, 
appears to turn ultimately on the reasonable reliance by the non-mistaken 
contracting party, on the apparent exercise of autonomy by the mistaken 
contracting party.156  The pertinent question is why? 
As outlined earlier, the secondary reliance theory has been delineated 
basically, in terms of the (arguably conservative), ‘Millian’-type, ‘liberalist harm 
to interests’ theory.157  So, even though the courts have recognised that the 
concept of apparent autonomy must infuse a greater degree of distributive 
(collectivist) justice into the modern law of contract, they do so through the lens 
of classical liberalism:  By the doctrine of mistake focusing attention on whether 
there was reasonable reliance on the part on the non-mistaken party, the basic 
premise is that the non-mistaken party acted for him or herself, in the same 
manner that the classical contracting self would have acted i.e. in entering into 
the contract he or she relied on him or herself to determine, and achieve, what 
he or she considered to be in his or her best interests.158  As such, the non-
mistaken party should not suffer the (potential) harm flowing from the mistake 
of the mistaken party.  Conversely, the mistaken party cannot expect others to 
bear the consequences of his or her mistake – if he or she makes a (legally 
relevant) mistake when entering into a contract, the legal responsibility for such 
mistake is his or hers alone. 
The upshot is that in the modern context of the doctrine of mistake, the 
contracting self, whether non-mistaken (and therefore, exercising actual 
contractual autonomy), or mistaken (and therefore, exercising mere apparent 
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 See discussion under 2.2.3(b) above. 
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 i.e. the individualist underpinnings of self-interest, self-reliance and self-determination. 
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autonomy), continues largely to assume a classical liberal identity.159  However, 
given that the non-mistaken party would be most aligned with the classical 
liberal self, the doctrine of mistake effectively elevates the interests of the non-
mistaken party, above those of the mistaken party. 
 
(ii) The additional justus error ground of an ‘otherwise excusable’ mistake 
In South African contract law, the doctrine of mistake is complicated further, by 
the contentious added justus error ground, in terms of which, a mistaken party 
may be able to escape from a contract, on the basis that his or her mistake is 
‘otherwise excusable’. 
To begin with, it is contentious in our law, whether the ‘otherwise 
excusable’ ground of justus error is even a valid ground of mistake.  Whereas, 
the SCA has in at least two instances, held that the doctrine of quasi mutual 
assent is decisive,160 the courts have continued generally, to use the justus 
error approach and in some instances, even the ‘otherwise excusable’ 
ground.161  Indeed, the SCA itself purported recently, to reconcile this added 
justus error ground, with the doctrine of quasi mutual assent.162 
Additionally, the precise content of the ‘otherwise excusable’ ground of 
justus error is unclear.  Academics have identified two major considerations 
here.163  The first major consideration is the absence of fault, on the part of the 
mistaken party, in making, (and operating under), a mistake, and thereby, 
creating the impression of exercising actual autonomy in relation to the 
contract.  Presumably, the standard of fault, in this context, takes the form of 
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the delictual standard of non-negligence.164  An often cited example, of where 
there would be such an absence of fault, is when a third party causes the 
mistake of the mistaken party.165 
The second consideration relates to the absence of concrete harm or 
prejudice to the non-mistaken party.166  In terms of the doctrine of quasi mutual 
assent, the law does not require the non-mistaken party to prove harm or 
prejudice suffered; the non-mistaken party need only prove that he or she 
entered into the contract, whilst relying on the apparent exercise of autonomy 
by the mistaken party.167  However, in terms of the ‘otherwise excusable’ 
mistake category, there is room to accommodate the fact that the non-mistaken 
party had not, before discovery of the mistake, acted to his or her detriment, in 
reliance on the contract.  So, for instance, a (non-mistaken) building contractor, 
who is contracted by a (mistaken) landowner to build a house, would not have 
acted to his or her detriment if, at the time of discovering the landowner’s 
mistake, he or she had not yet taken any steps, or incurred any costs, in 
preparation of his or her performance in terms of the contract.168  In such 
circumstances, the argument is that the mistaken party should be allowed to 
escape the contract, on the basis that the mistake was ‘otherwise excusable’, 
given that there was no concrete harm to the non-mistaken party. 
What emerges from the above is that the ‘otherwise excusable’ ground 
of justus error, purports to shift the (somewhat exclusive) focus away from the 
reasonable reliance of the non-mistaken party, and to concentrate rather, on 
whether, and if so, why the mistaken party should be held legally responsible 
for his or her mistake.  The justus error’s ‘otherwise excusable’ category thus 
purports to distinguish the mistaken contracting self, from the classical 
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contracting self, and so, counter the doctrine of mistake’s liberalist privileging of 
the non-mistaken party, over the mistaken party. 
 
(iii) The internal content and external reach dimensions of apparent 
autonomy 
Taken a step further, the contention about the ‘otherwise excusable’ category of 
mistake, highlights the failure of the doctrine of mistake, fully to address the 
normative tensions that are, (and ought to be), at play, when dealing with the 
implications of a legally relevant mistake for the contracting self.  This is 
exacerbated by the current understanding of the doctrine of mistake, as an 
issue of procedural fairness.  The courts still focus their attentions mostly on the 
technical application of the relevant sets of rules, rather than the continued 
legitimacy of the underlying normative values, that must animate the concept of 
apparent contractual autonomy, within the post-apartheid, constitutional 
context. 
As our common law of contract currently stands, the above-outlined, 
(liberalist) reliance-based concept of apparent autonomy is recognised within 
the parameters of the doctrine of mistake.  Furthermore, once a court is 
satisfied that there was a valid (and therefore, a procedurally fair), exercise of 
apparent autonomy, in terms of the doctrine of mistake, the mistaken party is 
bound by the contract, for all intents and purposes.  The significance of the 
distinction between actual and apparent autonomy falls away.169  So, for 
instance, if there is an additional (substantive fairness) issue about the legality 
of the contract, the court will conduct its enquiry on the premise that freedom of 
contract (and pacta sunt servanda), has full blown application in its classical 
liberal form.  The potential normative role of reliance theory is thus, significantly 
undermined within the legality enquiry, and so too, within the rest of our 
contract law. 
Nevertheless, given that reliance theory constitutes the secondary basis 
of our common law of contract, it is crucial that the concept of apparent 
contractual autonomy, like that of actual contractual autonomy, is holistic and 
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legally sound.  For this purpose, it would be useful to re-cast our contract law’s 
principal reliance-based liability, (i.e. the doctrine of mistake), in terms of the 
internal ‘content’ and external ‘reach’ dimensions of apparent autonomy. 
 
(aa) The internal content dimension of apparent autonomy 
In terms of the internal content dimension of apparent autonomy, it is notable, 
that our contract law does not have a distinct requirement of capacity, on the 
part of the mistaken party, firstly, to make a mistake and further, to create an 
impression of consensus, whether with fault or otherwise.170  The presence of 
such capacity is simply assumed by the doctrine of mistake, presumably, 
because the element of contractual capacity ought to cover it. 
As pointed out earlier, the element of contractual capacity does not 
distinguish the capacity of a party, actually to enter into a contract, versus the 
capacity to act in a manner, which creates the impression that he or she is 
entering into a contract.  Nevertheless, the legal capacity to exercise apparent 
autonomy may be significantly different, especially if the delictual standard of 
fault is implicated, by the ‘otherwise excusable’ justus error category, of a non-
negligent mistake.171  The upshot is that contractual capacity’s earlier outlined, 
thin conception of autonomy, has set the stage similarly, for an impoverished 
internal conception of apparent autonomy too. 
Indeed, the traditional doctrine of mistake simply requires the mistaken 
party to create an impression that he or she is exercising contractual autonomy.  
As outlined above, the only normative parameter for the creation of such 
impression and thus, for what constitutes a valid exercise of apparent 
autonomy is that the impression created, must be one that is reasonably relied 
upon.  The emphasis therefore, is on the reliance, rather than the exercise, of 
apparent autonomy itself.  In addition, the standard of reasonableness is 
delineated in our contract law, in terms of the atomistic, independent, 
contracting self, operating in the abstract - it does not accommodate factors 
pertaining specifically, to the mistaken party, not even those relating to his or 
her state of mind and/or general vulnerability, in the particular context.  The 
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result, is that the doctrine of mistake invokes a conservative, liberalist form of 
reasonable reliance, that identifies the non-mistaken party and the mistaken 
party alike, with the classical contracting self. 
In contradistinction, the justus error’s ‘otherwise excusable’ category of 
mistake purports to invoke the absence of fault, on the part of the mistaken 
party, in order to distinguish the mistaken contracting self, from the non-
mistaken contracting self.  Indeed, the ‘otherwise excusable’ mistake category, 
highlights the need for a more contextual and material understanding of the 
reliance-based contracting self, who is an interdependent member of post-
apartheid, South African society and who may exercise apparent (as opposed 
to actual), autonomy. 
To sum up, the internal content dimension of apparent, contractual 
autonomy, like its actual autonomy counterpart, is fairly thin.  As such, it also 
needs to be normatively interrogated, in the constitutional context and 
developed, in a manner that moves beyond the mere recognition of an 
individual’s basic cognitive and conative abilities. 
At the very least, our contract law ought to adopt a fuller concept of 
capacity, that can anticipate fault, (or the absence thereof), on the part of a 
mistaken party.  In those cases, where the mistaken party acted without fault 
(especially, in the delictual sense of fault), the justus error’s ‘otherwise 
excusable’ ground of escape could be developed, with a view to enhancing 
modern contract law’s internal conception of apparent autonomy too, and so, 
find application.172 
Admittedly, such recognition of fault, (or non-fault as the case may be), 
in the contractual context may somewhat collapse the traditional distinction 
between consent and fault; fault being the common law’s other basic ground for 
the ascription of personal responsibility and which, for the most part is not 
considered relevant to contracts.  Nevertheless, a recognition (and 
development) of reliance theory’s personal responsibility facet of fault, within 
the ‘otherwise excusable’ category of the justus error approach, could lead 
eventually, to a fuller internal conception of apparent contractual autonomy.  
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Moreover, as previously mentioned, reliance theory implicates personal 
responsibility inasmuch as a non-mistaken party’s reasonable reliance on the 
appearance of consensus would, in most cases denote reasonable 
foreseeability and thus, a ‘half-deliberate exercise of autonomy’, on the part of 
the mistaken party who created such outward appearance.173 
So, in the end, it is submitted, that a fuller conception of the 
supplementary reliance theory and therewith, a fuller internal content dimension 
of apparent autonomy, could be the key to the balance in our contract law 
between the subjective (atomistic) extreme of actual autonomy, and the 
objective (solidarity) extreme of apparent autonomy. 
 
(bb) The external reach dimension of apparent autonomy 
Dealing finally with the external reach dimension of apparent autonomy, what 
should be evident is that the doctrine of mistake does not pay much attention to 
this dimension of apparent autonomy.  Indeed, save for the potentially tenuous 
application of the ‘otherwise excusable’ category of justus error, on the basis of 
an absence of concrete harm or prejudice to the non-mistaken party, the reach 
of apparent autonomy, once established, is not limited by the doctrine. 
Additionally, the doctrine of legality, as invoked by the courts, although 
accommodating reliance theory’s distributive justice underpinnings more 
generally, does not currently distinguish an exercise of apparent, as opposed to 
actual, contractual autonomy.  As a result, the normative interrogation of the 
external reach dimension of apparent autonomy is also deficient. 
Here, I would submit, that the external reach dimension of apparent 
autonomy, ought to be dealt with by the doctrine of legality.  Given that the 
reliance theory constitutes the secondary basis of our contract law, it ought, like 
the primary will theory, to permeate the entire body of contract law.  
Accordingly, the doctrine of mistake ought to focus exclusively, on the 
(normative) delineation of a fuller, internal content dimension of (reliance-
based) apparent autonomy, whilst the doctrine of legality should be mindful, 
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that it limits the scope of operation of actual and apparent autonomy, and that 
the respective forms of autonomy, may implicate different policy considerations. 
 
(d) Improperly obtained consensus – misrepresentation, duress, undue 
influence and bribery 
As regards the (procedural fairness)174 categories of improperly obtained 
consensus, our law of contract recognises certain impediments to a party’s 
ability, properly to exercise his or her autonomy.  Briefly stated, the concretised 
categories of misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and bribery, represent 
those sets of circumstances, in which one party, (the ‘guilty’ party),175 is 
considered in law to have elicited consensus from the other party, (the 
‘innocent’ party), in a legally wrongful (improper) manner.176 
At the outset, each category of improperly obtained consensus appears 
to be linked by the wrongfulness of the guilty party’s conduct.  Broadly 
speaking, the courts have delineated the operation of wrongfulness, in terms of 
the (potential) undermining of the classical liberal, individualist concerns of self-
interest, self-reliance and self-determination.177  Our common law of contract 
has thus, articulated the guilty contractant’s (procedurally) wrongful conduct 
with a deficient exercise of autonomy by the innocent contractant, where each 
contractant is held to the standard of the classical contracting self. 
On the one side, the classical self will not employ those ‘negotiation 
tactics’, as employed by the guilty party, that classical liberalism would regard 
as legally wrongful or improper.  On the other side, the classical self cannot be 
expected to deal with such wrongful ‘negotiation tactics’, as experienced by the 
innocent party, when exercising his or her contractual autonomy.  In the end 
therefore, the concretised categories of improperly obtained consensus that are 
recognised in our law, represent those cases of wrongful conduct identified by 
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classical liberalism, where the thin internal conception of contractual autonomy 
requires additional content, if the contract is to have full force and effect, 
against the innocent party.  Accordingly, where the innocent party’s exercise of 
autonomy falls short of the additional content threshold of contractual 
autonomy, as articulated by the relevant categories of improperly obtained 
consensus, the resulting contract ought to be rendered null and void.178 
Nevertheless, the basic consequence of such a deficient exercise of 
autonomy is that the resulting contract is voidable, rather than void.  This 
means that the innocent party can choose, either to invoke the restitutio in 
integrum to withdraw from (and avoid) the contract, or simply to continue with 
(and uphold) the contract.179  A withdrawing from the contract, leads to the 
contract being rendered void ab intio, (as if the contract never existed), whilst 
an upholding of the contract renders the contract fully valid and enforceable, 
(as if the wrongful conduct never occurred).180  It would seem therefore, that the 
innocent party’s initial exercise of autonomy is not completely nullified by the 
guilty party’s conduct.  On the contrary, whilst the remedy of restitutio in 
integrum provides for a fuller, internal conception of contractual autonomy in 
relation to the recognised categories of improperly obtained consensus, the 
innocent party can opt instead, for the lesser protection afforded by the initial, 
thin conception of autonomy, if he or she chooses to uphold the resulting 
contract. 
In essence, the remedy of restitutio in integrum gives the innocent party 
a second chance, properly to exercise his or her autonomy, (this time without 
the procedural unfairness), in relation to the question of ‘withdrawal’ from the 
contract.181  The basic idea is that this second opportunity will ‘cure’ the initial, 
deficient exercise of autonomy by the innocent party.  That said, and except for 
the category of duress, the availability of the restitutio in integrum is limited to 
cases where the other contractant is the guilty party - if the guilty party is a third 
party, the innocent party will be bound to the contract, notwithstanding, his or 
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her deficient exercise of autonomy.182  In this respect, the internal conception of 
autonomy remains wanting, even in terms of the strongly individualist values of 
classical liberalism.183 
More significant, is the generally liberalist manner in which the remedy of 
restitutio in integrum continues to operate in the modern law of contract.  Once 
it is established that the guilty party’s conduct was wrongful, in terms of one of 
the established categories of improperly obtained consensus, our law renders 
the objectionable conduct itself, null and void.  So, when the focus shifts 
thereafter, to the legal implications for the contract, the (procedurally) wrongful 
conduct of the ‘guilty’ contractant is no longer in issue.  Consequently, when the 
restitutio in integrum then affords the innocent party a second opportunity to 
exercise his or her autonomy, the objectionable conduct is implicitly and 
automatically regarded as having been ‘removed’ from the contracting situation. 
Insofar as one is dealing with a misrepresentation or a bribe that 
subsequently comes to light, it may be arguable that the approach of simply 
nullifying the wrongful conduct is acceptable, as the innocent party would be 
privy to the relevant information, the second time around, and as such, would 
no longer be acting in terms of the misrepresentation or bribe.  Still, in modern 
contract law the legal conception of the innocent party remains aligned with the 
classical contracting self who, once the misrepresentation or bribery is 
removed, reverts to the atomistic, independent contracting self, as entrenched 
in the individualist values of self-interest, self-reliance and self-determination. 
This shortcoming is highlighted by the categories of duress and undue 
influence, where the relevant threat or influence is more likely to have a 
lingering effect on the innocent party’s subjective state of mind.  In such a case, 
would the law’s removal of the objectionable conduct, in the classical liberal 
tradition, suffice for purposes of ‘curing’ the deficient exercise of autonomy? 
At present, the courts are fairly formalistic in their application of the rules 
articulating the established categories of improperly obtained consensus.  Yet, 
the rules remain so entrenched in classical liberalism, that there does not seem 
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to be much room to accommodate, even individualist concerns relating to the 
evolution of the contracting self, (in relation to the doctrines of duress and 
undue influence, for instance), let alone competing collectivist concerns.  To be 
sure, the prevailing categories of improperly obtained consensus fail even to 
distinguish between actual and apparent autonomy, and the distinct 
considerations, that attach thereto.  Hence, the difficulty in contemporary South 
African contract law, when it comes to the recognition and development of new 
categories of legally wrongful negotiation tactics, most notably, economic 
duress and more broadly, an abuse of unequal bargaining power, that 
significantly undermines the real-life contracting self’s ability, properly to 
exercise his or her autonomy.184 
So, whilst the categories of improperly obtained consensus have 
purported to endorse a more substantive, internal concept of autonomy in our 
law, its normative delineation continues to be linked intrinsically to classical 
liberalism.  As such, the element of contractual consensus, as it currently 
operates in our law, fails effectively to take account of pertinent socio-economic 
factors that are integral to any meaningful, present-day understanding of 
(substantive) individual autonomy.185 
To expound, the law’s ‘deemed removal’ of the guilty party’s 
objectionable conduct mechanically sweeps away with it, all systemic external 
factors and resulting inequalities of bargaining power, too.186  In this manner 
therefore, the broader socio-economic context is sanitised, when it comes to 
the ‘entering-into’, of contracts.  Likewise, both the innocent and guilty 
contracting parties are atomised, in the sense that the law presumes 
essentially, that the innocent (more vulnerable) party is able actually to rectify 
his or her deficient exercise of autonomy, once the particular product of the 
guilty (stronger) party’s internal power is neutered.  The role of systemic 
external factors, for all practical purposes, goes unnoticed.187 
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In similar fashion, our law of contract’s internal conception of autonomy 
is deficient also, when it comes to the ideal of an ‘autonomous life’;188 non-
commercial contracts; (long-term) relational contracts; (potential) changes in 
the circumstances of contracts and the ability, realistically and properly, to 
presentiate these risks upon conclusions of contracts.189 
To sum up, the internal conception of individual autonomy, as embedded 
in our law of contract, continues to foster a classical liberal philosophy, so much 
so, that the ‘real-life contracting self’, by and large, is unable meaningfully to 
realise his or her vision of the ‘good life’.  Moreover, the above-outlined thin 
conception of contractual autonomy is likely to be obstructive of bona fide 
efforts to measure up to the ideal of the ‘constitutional contracting self’, 
operating in a substantively progressive and transformative post-apartheid, 
South African society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
2.4 AUTONOMY AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
2.4.1 The triage190 of foundational constitutional values:  Freedom, 
dignity and equality 
The common law of contract, and in particular, contractual autonomy, must now 
find a legal home in the Bill of Rights.  In the absence of an express right to 
freedom of contract, (or a comparable right to free economic activity),191 both 
the CC and the SCA have purported to situate freedom of contract, within the 
foundational triage of what are now, the fundamental constitutional values of 
freedom, dignity and equality.  In this respect, the key is to appreciate the basic 
shift from the pre-constitutional, classical liberal articulation of freedom, dignity 
and equality (in their formal, atomistic conceptions of individual autonomy, good 
                                                                                                                                              
Atiyah op cit note 3 ‘Essay 7’ at 155; Trebilcock op cit note 38 at 82-88; 91-93; Pieterse op cit 
note 122 at 563-567; 570-572. 
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 Notably, the constitutional right to freedom of trade, profession and/or occupation was 
significantly broader under s 26 of the interim Constitution as compared with the corresponding 
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faith and inherent equity respectively), to the post-apartheid, substantively 
progressive and transformative, constitutional conceptions of these values.192 
At the outset, it is important to outline the manner in which this 
foundational constitutional triage is meant to articulate the ideal of the 
‘constitutional self’, both fundamentally, as well as in relation to the specifically 
enumerated rights.  To begin with, the values of freedom, dignity and equality, 
in and of themselves, are innately fluid and multi-faceted.  Indeed, the 
respective internal facets of each value are associated with competing legal 
and political philosophies that extend beyond the pre-constitutional classical 
liberal ideology espoused by our common law and as such, can be diverse and 
not necessarily congruent with one another.193  Moreover, the Constitution does 
not, at the outset, demand that a specific internal facet of a value, predominate.  
Much depends on context.  Furthermore, in terms of s 8(2), the enquiry should 
be informed, inter alia, by the nature and scope of those enumerated right(s) 
that may be applicable.  In this respect, it is also important to remember that the 
specifically enumerated rights, as set out in the Bill of Rights, are grounded 
likewise in the values of freedom, dignity and equality and accordingly, must 
comport finally, with the overarching progressive and transformative vision of 
the Constitution i.e. to realise a substantively equal, free and dignified, post-
apartheid, South African society.194 
The further crucial dimension of this analysis, relates to the interplay 
between the values of freedom, dignity and equality, as a sort of open-form 
triage, where again, in contrast to the pre-constitutional common law’s 
steadfast privileging of (classical liberal) freedom, there is no set formula as to 
the relative weight to be accorded to each value in a particular case, save for 
looking at the particular context, the nature and scope of any enumerated 
right(s) implicated, and the broader parameter of realising the Constitution’s 
basic vision for South African society. 
In other words, what the Constitution envisages for the construction of 
the autonomous self and autonomy generally, is a comprehensive delineation 
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and appreciation of the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity 
and equality, both individually and jointly,195 all the while, being informed by 
context and those enumerated rights that may be applicable.  The basic idea is 
that the fluid legal intra-action, (within each value respectively), and inter-action, 
(between the values), must occur in such a manner that, in each case, the 
resulting concept of autonomy, although a necessarily shifting concept, 
plausibly articulates or works toward (or at the very least, is not inconsistent 
with), the Constitution’s substantively progressive and transformative 
ambitions.196 
With this framework in mind, I proceed to discuss the values of freedom, 
dignity and equality, insofar as they animate the constitutional conception(s) of 
contractual autonomy. 
 
2.4.2 The foundational constitutional value of freedom 
To begin with, the earlier discussion of the common law of contract makes clear 
the classical liberal elevation of the value of freedom, (above equality and 
dignity), in its legal conception of contractual autonomy.  Accordingly, freedom 
of contract appears naturally, to be most at home with the foundational 
constitutional value of freedom.197  Nevertheless, as just discussed, the (pre-
constitutional) private law’s essentially negative conception of individual liberty 
can be, but one (formal) dimension of freedom and the foundational triages’ 
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conception of autonomy.  Most importantly, autonomy must operate now, within 
a constitutionalised law of contract that is meant likewise to work towards the 
realisation of a substantively equal, free and dignified, post-apartheid, South 
African society.198 
That said, the value of freedom itself has been the subject of 
interrogation by the CC and the SCA, in relatively few instances.  To date, the 
leading CC case to speak expressly to the foundational value of freedom, 
(albeit in the context of the interim Constitution and with reference to the right to 
freedom and security of the person), remains that of Ferreira v Levin.  Here, the 
differing understandings of the constitutional value of freedom, by the 
respective members of the Ferreira Court, served essentially to highlight the 
multi-faceted nature of freedom and therefore, autonomy too.  So, whereas 
Ackermann J reaffirmed the broader, pre-constitutional, classical liberal 
conception of freedom and individual autonomy, Sachs J emphasised the need 
for a more substantive conception of freedom which, in its articulation of 
autonomy, must incorporate the reality of human interdependence, as well as 
those pre-conditions integral to its actual enjoyment.199  Chalskalson P and 
Mokgoro J, in turn, focused more narrowly on the physical integrity dimension 
of the right to freedom and security of the person, with Chaskalson P, although 
accepting that there was scope for a broader meaning of freedom in relation to 
this enumerated right,200 was largely agnostic about it.201  On the other hand, 
Chalskalson P was explicit in rejecting Ackermann J’s articulation of freedom, 
on the basis that it may well impede ‘regulation and redistribution’ (read 
transformative) policies of the post-apartheid, ‘social welfare’ State.202 
Looking more closely at the judgment of Ackermann J, it reiterated that 
individual freedom continues to be a ‘core right’ in the constitutional era, by 
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reason of its essential interaction with human dignity; the latter value being 
identified as the central axis of our constitutional democracy.203  To this end, 
Ackermann J submitted: 
 “Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom personal 
development and fulfillment are not possible. Without freedom, human dignity is 
little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are inseparably linked. To 
deny people their freedom is to deny them their dignity…[So] an individual’s 
right to freedom must be defined as widely as possible, consonant with a 
similar breadth of freedom for others.”204 
Ackermann J, then drove the point home by way of a contrast, with the 
systematic denial under the apartheid regime, of the basic “freedom to choose 
or develop one’s own identity…to be fully human”.205  Nevertheless, in the 
generous delineation of the right to freedom of the person, Ackermann J relied 
mainly on the work of leading (classical) libertarian, Isaiah Berlin, to privilege 
the negative ‘liberty’ dimension of constitutional freedom, and furthermore, to 
abstract and distinguish the legal concept of autonomy, from the material 
conditions required for its exercise.206  Hence, the right to freedom of the 
person was defined as “the right of individuals not to have ‘obstacles to 
possible choices and activities’ placed in their way by the…State.”207  At the 
same time, Ackermann J conceded that the State would need to curb the 
dangers of unlimited freedom, by way of a justifiably limiting, law of general 
application, as contemplated by the limitation clause of the interim Bill of 
Rights.208 
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In effect therefore, Ackermann J, although starting out with an ostensibly 
new appreciation of dignity, as the key to our post-apartheid, constitutional 
dispensation, ended up collapsing dignity wholly into its pre-constitutional 
conception of liberty, so that, ultimately the classical liberal dimension of 
freedom (and autonomy), with a corresponding affinity for individualism, 
prevailed.209  Freedom’s potential interplay with the foundational value of 
equality did not even feature.  On the contrary, Ackermann J went so far as to 
rely on Kant to aver that freedom comprises the “only one innate right” of all 
human beings.210  Nevertheless, this was somewhat counter-intuitive in light of 
the judgment’s simultaneous espousal of the atomistic, Berlinian understanding 
of autonomy, as opposed to the contemporary, more full-bodied, ‘human 
agency’ understanding of Kantian philosophy, as derived from its central tenet 
of “treating persons always as ends in themselves as opposed to mere 
means”.211 
The upshot is that Ackermann J’s conception of the right to freedom of 
the person, as enumerated in the Bill of Rights, presumably is broad enough to 
accommodate the extant, common law right to freedom of contract, as a 
residual (economic) freedom right, that resonates with our classical liberal, 
common law of contract.  So, according to Ackermann J’s hypothesis of 
freedom, the constitutionalised conception of contractual autonomy should not 
deviate significantly, from its pre-constitutional conception.  At most, there could 
be minor constitutionally prompted adjustments, on the fringes of contractual 
autonomy’s external reach dimension.212 
Dealing then, with the judgment of Sachs J, he was more mindful of the 
dangers of too expansive, an interpretation, of the s 11(1) right to freedom of 
the person.213  To begin with, Sachs J made it clear that the negative, laissez 
faire conception of individual liberty is far from consonant with the modern 
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reality of people’s lives.  On the contrary, positive action on the part of the State 
is necessary, both for the protection against (the potential abuse of) private 
power, as well as for the realisation of autonomy in substance.  Sachs J 
submitted: 
 “[G]overnment is required to establish a lawfully regulated regime outside of 
itself in which people can go about their business, develop their personalities 
and pursue individual and collective destinies with a reasonable degree of 
confidence and security…The reality is that meaningful personal interventions 
and abstinences in modern society depend not only on the State refraining from 
interfering with individual choice, but on the State helping [positively] to create 
conditions within which individuals can effectively make such choices.”214 
So, Sachs J took as the point of departure, differing conceptions of 
autonomy, which operate, presumably, on a continuum.  This continuum 
extends from the negative, atomistic extreme of laissez faire, in relation to an 
individual’s personal arrangement of his or her affairs, to the positive, 
contextual extreme of full blown, active State involvement in the individual’s 
exercise of autonomy in substance.  In this respect, Sachs J placed particular 
emphasis on the increasing reality of human interdependence and its 
corresponding affinity with the collective, as integral to a constitutional 
conception of autonomy.215 
Sachs J then proceeded to situate this fluid understanding of autonomy, 
within the broader constitutional framework, as grounded in the values of 
freedom and equality.216  Here, Sachs J was able to appreciate firstly, the 
internal fluidity of each of the values of freedom and equality, so that, they can 
“at one and the same time [be] in tension with each other, and mutually 
supportive.”  Moreover, the interplay between the values of freedom and 
equality is also fluid, with neither value necessarily being dominant, and much 
depending on context and the fundamental right(s) implicated.  Even so, an 
important constraint in striking the balance between freedom and equality is 
that neither value should ever be sacrificed wholly, in the name of the other.217 
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The upshot is that autonomy can no longer defend the general 
hegemony of its pre-constitutional, classical liberal conception, upon the basis 
merely, of the residual right to freedom of the person, or even the broader, 
foundational value of freedom, without something more.218 
For purposes of the case before the court then, Sachs J delineated the 
right to freedom and security of the person as a right, which protects an 
individual from undue (State) interference and most notably, encompasses 
freedom from physical restraint and other freedoms that are analogous to 
physical freedom.219  More importantly, the recognition within s 11(1), of the 
right not to incriminate oneself, was held ultimately to depend on time, place 
and context, as well as on the general (countervailing) interest of the 
community in the fight against crime.220 
In the end therefore, Sachs J’s approach to freedom is most aligned with 
my earlier outlined framework comprising the multi-dimensional constitutional 
values of freedom, dignity and equality, both individually and jointly.  Indeed, if 
carried forward into the law of contract, it would articulate a fluid internal 
conception of (contractual) autonomy, as exercised by the ‘constitutional self’, 
who is now situated squarely, within the broader South African community, as 
ensconced in ubuntu (‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’).221 
Nevertheless, subsequent cases have not followed through with Sachs 
J’s approach.  The Supreme Court of Appeal has adopted an approach to 
freedom of contract that resonates rather, with Ackermann J’s understanding of 
freedom.  In Brisley v Drotsky,222 Cameron JA (as he then was) purported to 
situate our common law of contract within the Bill of Rights.  Cameron JA 
explained that our common law of contract is now subject to the Constitution,223 
which means that ‘public policy’, as applied to contracts, is now grounded in the 
Constitution and its foundational values of freedom, human dignity, and 
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equality.224  In terms of the broader constitutional framework, the values of 
freedom and human dignity embrace the fundamental principle of freedom of 
contract, save for any ‘obscene excesses’.225  In other words, the SCA held that 
the constitutional values of freedom and dignity re-legitimate the classical 
liberal notion of autonomy of individuals, to govern their own lives by contract, 
for so long as their ‘self-respect and dignity’ are not undermined.226  
Presumably, like Ackermann J therefore, the SCA anticipates that the 
Constitution will prompt mostly minor adjustments, on the fringes of contractual 
autonomy’s external reach dimension.  Indeed, this is borne out by Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom where, as mentioned earlier, the SCA further 
elevated the status of the common law principle of freedom of contract, to a 
constitutional value itself.227 
So, the pre-constitutional, internal conception of autonomy appears not 
to have been disturbed by the Constitution.  On the one hand, the SCA has 
since recognised the impact of the constitutional value of equality (and dignity), 
on contractual validity, at least, insofar as it acknowledges that a court must 
take cognisance of inequalities in bargaining power, in order to ensure, that 
parties are not “forced to contract…on terms that infringe…dignity and 
equality”.228  On the other hand, the SCA continues to conceive of dignity and 
equality, essentially in the classical liberal tradition, with not much being said 
about the competing, (more positive/substantive) conceptions of these 
values.229  Likewise, the enumerated rights that have been implicated in the 
various cases, whether civil, political, economic, socio-economic or cultural in 
nature, seem not to have had any significant bearing on the ideal of a ‘full and 
integrated…[constitutional] self’, in any particular case.230  Indeed, the SCA, in 
ascertaining the constitutional compliance of individual exercises of contractual 
autonomy, simply assumes that the implicated enumerated right(s), as 
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grounded in the foundational constitutional triage of values, works essentially 
with the classical liberal conception of autonomy.231 
In any event, the SCA has yet to take account of alleged inequalities in 
bargaining powers.  Apparently, this has been due to the failure, thus far, of the 
relevant contracting party to bring evidence that would satisfy the court that he 
or she was in a weaker bargaining position.  The basic classical premise that 
parties contract on an equal footing thus prevails.232  Additionally, the SCA 
contemplates that (potential) deficiencies in the internal conception of 
autonomy, can be cured solely, by contract law’s external legal policy, (now 
constitutional), corrective.  In terms of this corrective, the relevant terms may be 
invalidated for being contrary to public policy.233  But such approach would be 
flawed.  As previously alluded to, the external reach dimension of autonomy 
remains grounded in the thin, (classical liberal), internal conception of 
autonomy.  The earlier-outlined difficulties pertaining to the strongly individualist 
leaning of the public policy enquiry, as well as the deficient, formalistic 
categories of improperly obtained consensus, therefore, continue to manifest 
within the constitutional context, too.234 
The result, is that the common law of contract is ‘constitutionalised’, 
almost exclusively, in the negative liberty image of the values of freedom, 
dignity and equality and accordingly, appears to survive constitutional scrutiny, 
largely intact and undisturbed.  Moreover, such approach seems to have taken 
root in further SCA judgments, as well as the first CC judgment, dealing with 
the constitutionalisation of contract law.235 
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In Barkhuizen v Napier, the CC was presented with an opportunity to 
pronounce on the constitutionalisation of our common law of contract.  In 
particular, it was asked to decide on the constitutionality of a contractual time 
limitation clause.  So, the primary focus of the enquiry was on public policy, as 
the external constitutional corrective, for our common law of contract.236  Still, in 
examining the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy, the CC 
needed first, to re-position the common law of contract, as a whole, within the 
framework of the Bill of Rights.237  It stands to reason therefore, that Ncgobo J 
(as he then was), writing the majority judgment for the CC, took as his point of 
departure, the quintessential doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, it being, the 
embodiment of freedom of contract and contractual autonomy.  At the same 
time however, the CC endorsed the approach to freedom of contract, as 
adopted by the SCA.238  So, whilst the CC expressly recognised that pacta sunt 
servanda is not a ‘sacred cow’, but is subject to constitutional control, it applied 
its mind only to the external reach dimension of autonomy.  Moreover, like the 
SCA, it did so, only in the classical liberal image of the values of freedom, 
dignity and equality.239 
Yet, pacta sunt servanda is premised on a holistic conception of 
autonomy that has both an internal and an external dimension.  An acceptable 
‘constitutionalisation’ of this doctrine therefore, would require a more rigorous 
interrogation of its classical liberal, negative autonomy grounding, both 
internally and externally, especially in light of the largely unsatisfactory results 
yielded thus far, by the SCA’s essential maintenance of the pre-constitutional 
position, in relation to contracts. 
Be that as it may, the CC assumed, as the SCA had done, that the 
parties validly consented to the term in question.  Admittedly, the CC did allude 
to the internal content dimension of autonomy, by way of a reference to “the 
extent to which the contract was freely and voluntarily concluded” as a ‘vital 
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factor’, that must inform the operation of the foundational constitutional triage.  
The prospect of a more fluid internal conception of autonomy, thus finds some 
measure of support.  In addition, the CC acknowledged the relevance of 
inequalities in bargaining power, “in a society as unequal as ours.”240  
Nevertheless, the CC again, took its lead from the SCA, in dealing with these 
factors firstly, on the basis of a lack of evidence and secondly, as factors 
pertinent purely to the external (public policy) reach dimension of contractual 
autonomy, without a concrete grasp of its innate connection with its internal 
content counterpart.241 
On a final note, the CC did go further than the SCA, in relation to the 
autonomy-limiting considerations of contractual fairness and justice – it 
introduced a second, subjective stage to the public policy enquiry, in terms of 
which, a court must determine whether enforcement of the time-limitation 
clause would be reasonable, in the particular circumstances of the case.  
Presumably, the CC subjectivised the public policy enquiry in this manner, in 
order to deal with the shortcomings yielded by its failure sufficiently, to 
distinguish the internal content dimension of autonomy.242 
The minority judgment of Moseneke DCJ then, picked up on the difficulty 
with the majority judgment’s subjectivisation of the public policy enquiry.  
According to Moseneke DCJ, the subjective yardstick incorporating the 
particular circumstances of the contractants perverts the long-established 
practice of determining whether a clause is contrary to public policy, on the 
basis of its tendency, rather than its actual proved result.243  This is because, it 
effectively collapses the more steadfast (objective) notion of fairness, as 
measured by general public norms, into a more variable (subjective) notion of 
individual fairness, that is dependant on the contracting parties’ particular 
circumstances, their experience thereof and, in the end, their ability to prove 
this.244  This does not make for good contract law, as it “renders whimsical the 
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[fairness /] reasonableness standard of public policy.”245  Moseneke DCJ then 
proceeded to apply the objective public policy test, and held, in concurrence 
with Sachs J, that the time limitation clause in casu, was unreasonable and 
unjust, in its failure to provide “a((n) objectively) reasonable and adequate 
opportunity to access the courts”.  Accordingly, he concluded that the clause 
was contrary to public policy and of no force or effect.246 
Whether one agrees with Moseneke DCJ’s analysis or not, it is at the 
very least, symptomatic of the failure of the majority court, to recognise the 
particular circumstances of the contracting parties as more appropriate, (at 
least initially), to the internal, rather than the external dimension of contractual 
autonomy and the legal rules appertaining thereto; legal rules that must foster a 
fuller, internal conception of freedom of contract, along the lines of Sachs J’s 
approach, in Ferreira.247 
This then brings us finally, to Sachs J’s minority judgment in Barkhuizen.  
To begin with, Sachs J recognised the reality of the standard form contract and 
that the time limitation clause in casu, did not form part of the terms of the 
contract that were actually negotiated by the parties.248  Indeed, Sachs J 
carefully exposited the evolution of contracts, from the 19th century, laissez faire 
tradition, modeled on arms’ length negotiation between parties of roughly equal 
standing, to the modern proliferation of the standard form, presented on a ‘take-
it-or-leave-it’ basis, where in effect, one party’s will is imposed on the other.  To 
this extent therefore, Sachs J purported to tackle the internal content dimension 
of autonomy.249 
Nevertheless, as previously alluded to, the law’s treatment of the 
standard form contract has been mainly to assimilate artificially, the classical 
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internal dimension of autonomy and to focus instead, on the external reach 
dimension, for potentially onerous, one-sided and/or unreasonable clauses.250  
Accordingly, Sachs J also situated the analysis of the time-limitation clause 
within the parameters of the common law public policy enquiry, as espoused by 
Moseneke DCJ.  Within our constitutional context, this meant that such clause 
had to be assessed in terms of the foundational constitutional triage of freedom, 
dignity and equality.251  In this respect, Sachs J was particularly mindful, on the 
one hand, of the reality of private power, parties’ compromised freedom and the 
potential injustice, in relation to imposed standard form terms.252  On the other 
hand, pacta sunt servanda in the classical liberal sense, contractual certainty 
and the economic need for such contracts were also held to be relevant.253  In 
the end, Sachs J held that the time-limitation clause should not be enforced 
against the insured.254 
The upshot is that the judgment of Sachs J goes further than the 
judgments of Ncgobo J and Moseneke DCJ respectively, in its initial 
examination of the internal content dimension of autonomy.  Unfortunately, 
Sachs J does not follow through with such examination because, whilst he 
acknowledges the deficiency in the actual (subjective) exercise of autonomy, he 
too, fails in the end, to maintain the distinction between the internal content 
dimension and the external reach dimension of autonomy.  Like the SCA 
therefore, Sachs J relies ultimately on public policy (being the external legal 
policy corrective), coupled with its salient classical liberal understanding of 
internal autonomy, to address the deficiencies of this very conception, as 
manifested in the context of the standard form contract!  This is somewhat 
perplexing, given Sachs J’s earlier judgment in Ferreira, where he rejected 
expressly, the classical liberal understanding of autonomy, in favour of a more 
fluid conception, that would be exercised by the ‘constitutional self’, as situated 
within South African society and rooted in the foundational constitutional triage 
of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
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Significantly, the SCA has since interpreted the Barkhuizen judgment, 
fairly narrowly.  Indeed, in Bredenkamp the SCA interprets the majority 
judgment’s two-staged public policy enquiry, in a manner which resonates 
rather, with the judgment of Moseneke DCJ; the argument being, that fairness 
(or reasonableness) per se cannot suffice to refuse to enforce a contract.  In 
other words, fairness must be delineated in terms of public policy and 
implicated constitutional values, if any.255  The subjective fairness stage of the 
Barkhuizen public policy enquiry therefore, appears to be limited to time-bar 
clauses that implicate s 34 of the Bill of Rights.  The scope for the external 
reach dimension of autonomy, potentially to remedy the deficiencies of its 
internal classical liberal counterpart is thus, significantly reined in.  At the same 
time, however, the SCA failed to appreciate sufficiently, the actual import of the 
internal content dimension of autonomy.  The reality of the standard form 
contract, and unequal bargaining powers between the bank and the customer, 
in casu, were not even mentioned.  Even so, the SCA reconfirmed Bredenkamp 
in the later case of Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd.256 
 
2.4.3 The foundational constitutional value of equality 
 
(a) Equality as a substantive, transformative value 
The equality jurisprudence of our constitutional era is wide ranging and much 
has been written about it.257  In this section, I do not purport to conduct an in-
depth analysis, but engage the equality jurisprudence, only in so far as it 
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impacts on the judicial understanding of the notion of constitutional autonomy, 
in relation to contract law. 
In contradistinction to the classical model of contract law, the 
constitutional value of equality extends beyond the recognition of mere formal 
equality, in the sense of “sameness of treatment”.258  Indeed, the Constitution 
emphasises a more substantive conception of equality, which must focus 
instead, on ‘context’ and ‘equality of outcome’, and take proper cognisance of 
unfair discrimination, including ‘systemic group-based inequalities’ and 
‘entrenched patterns of structural disadvantage’, that continue to be 
experienced both, at an individual, and a collective, level.259  This broader 
understanding of equality is underscored by the Constitution’s substantively 
progressive and transformative mandate for South African society.  In other 
words, the value of substantive equality interacts inevitably with freedom and 
dignity, as part of the foundational constitutional triage’s broader legal project, 
of transforming the socio-economic landscape of South Africa. 
Furthermore, the value of equality recognises that the responsibility for 
the constitutional conception of autonomy can no longer be that of the 
individual alone.  Nor can it be shouldered by the State, exclusively.  Indeed, 
the Constitution envisages a post-apartheid South African society, which strives 
for social justice and equality, where an individual member primarily finds 
meaning, not in an atomistic conception of the self, but rather, in the collective, 
as a situated, social being.  Indeed, the constitutional self, even if most private 
in outlook, would accept the context of an aspirant egalitarian community, 
ensconced in ubuntu, at least, insofar as he or she will do to, or expect of and 
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for others, only that which he orshe would have done to, or would expect of and 
for himself or herself.260 
That said, there have been instances in which the CC, somewhat 
curiously, has employed (neo-) classical choice analysis in the course of its 
equality judgments.  The CC has done this, notwithstanding, its express 
rejection in Ferreira v Levin of Ackermann J’s classical liberal conception of 
freedom.  In relation to long-term domestic partnerships and sex work, for 
instance, the CC, by and large, has ascribed the lack of legal protection 
afforded to women, on the basis of their (formally) autonomous choices not to 
marry or to partake in sex work respectively.  So, in this manner, individual 
autonomy was atomised, responsibility privatised and systemic socio-
economic, religious and cultural factors, which are pertinent to South African 
society and, to poor women especially, have been rendered extraneous to the 
enquiry.261 
Critics have therefore, bemoaned the failure of the CC, generally to 
recognise a more substantive conception of freedom (and thus, also of 
individual autonomy), as crucial to the transformative value of substantive 
equality (as complemented by socio-economic rights), that would enable every 
South African to live his or her vision of a dignified ‘good life’.262 
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(b) Equality and the constitutional self (internal content of autonomy) 
As a function of constitutional autonomy therefore, (substantive) equality must 
engage with, and inform, autonomy’s internal content and external reach 
dimensions. 
Dealing first, with the internal content of autonomy, equality 
contemplates a more positive exercise of a real choice by the individual; a 
choice that is sensitive to the material (social and economic) conditions, which 
advance, or hinder, the individual’s ability to develop his or her potential fully, 
and so, realise his or her vision of the good life.263 
At a broader level therefore, substantive equality envisages a 
‘dismantling’ of those ‘(unequal) power relations and (institutional) hierarchies’, 
which unduly constrain the extant legal conception of individual choice (or 
human agency).  At the very least, this must entail an unmasking and 
addressing of those systemic and structural inequalities that impede the true 
capability for meaningful exercise of choice, by many South Africans in their 
everyday lives.  However, I submit that the value of equality would go further, to 
inspire and establish ‘new norms and conditions’ that, like freedom, will foster a 
‘transformative meaning’ of autonomy.264  Presumably, the goal is to enable 
genuine participation, by all South Africans, on a substantively equal footing, in 
the ‘political, economic, social and cultural spheres of our democracy’.265  In 
this manner, all South Africans will be able materially to shape their own 
identities and ultimately their own lives. 
So, looking through the lens of substantive equality, the constitutional 
contracting self necessarily differs from the liberal contracting self.  In contrast 
to the acontextual, atomistic classical self, the constitutional self necessarily is 
a more contextual self, situated within an interwoven network of social and 
economic power structures.  Accordingly, a constitutionalised law of contract 
can no longer abstract the contracting self, from the context in which 
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contracting parties actually operate.  The law must be more alert to the impact 
on autonomy, of the lived social and economic realities of contracting parties.266 
Importantly, in accepting a more contextual, (and therefore, more 
positive) conception of the self, it must be appreciated that the self is 
necessarily more complex.  In the words of Marius Pieterse, 
“Human identities are multidimensional, fluid, unpredictable, often contradictory 
and always evolving.  Moreover, social constructs such as gender, race, sexual 
orientation and class, as well as the power structures that accompany them, 
shape individuals differently in different contexts.  Individual experiences of 
power, disadvantage, oppression or harm are therefore varied, contingent and 
particular, both within and across social groups…Furthermore, 
individuals…often experience compounded disadvantage, flowing from 
discrimination or marginalisation that relates to more than one aspect of their 
complex identities.  This phenomenon is often referred to as intersectional 
discrimination and requires us to appreciate the multiplicity of particular 
contexts within which the impact of discrimination is felt.”267 
Accordingly, a constitutionalised law of contract, as grounded in 
substantive equality, must accommodate a more complex, multi-dimensional 
self, where different aspects and/or configurations of the self, may come to the 
fore in different situations.  Indeed, the social and economic vulnerability, (and 
disadvantage), or conversely, privilege, of the self, manifests in different ways 
in different contexts.  So, whereas an individual contractant may be considered 
privileged in one context, he or she could be less privileged, or more 
vulnerable, in a different context. 
In addition, it must be borne in mind, that the law of contract regulates 
the legal relationship between two or more contracting parties.  As such, the 
law must be concerned, not only with the broader social and economic context 
(i.e. the systemic and structural inequalities affecting the contracting parties), 
but also, with the power dynamic between the contracting parties.  Most 
notably, courts need to be mindful of the relative nature of this power dynamic 
in their assessment of how it impacts on contractual autonomy.  To illustrate, in 
Barkhuizen v Napier, Mr Barkhuizen was profiled by the CC essentially, as a 
white middle-class man who drove a BMW motor vehicle.268  As such, he was 
considered implicitly to be a socially and economically, privileged individual 
who, like the classical contracting self, was able to look after his own interests.  
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That Mr Barkhuizen was, in the context of the contract, also a typically 
vulnerable consumer of insurance, from an insurance company, which was far 
more resourced than he was, and moreover, had the weight of the insurance 
industry behind it, was not taken into account.  The argument was that there 
was a lack of evidence of this.  Nevertheless, in ignoring this reality, a 
significant aspect of Mr Barkhuizen’s identity effectively was ignored by the 
court.  By presuming rather, that there was an equality of bargaining power 
between the parties, the power dynamic between Mr Barkhuizen and the 
insurance company, in terms of the contract – i.e. Mr Barkhuizen’s relatively 
weaker position - was rendered invisible.269 
Accordingly, the value of substantive equality provides impetus for a 
constitutionalised contract law’s development of a fuller internal content of 
autonomy, particularly, in terms of the relative bargaining powers of contracting 
parties.  Obviously, not every instance of unequal bargaining power can mean 
that the exercise of autonomy by the weaker party is deficient.  Conversely, a 
powerful, private contractant cannot be saddled with absolute responsibility for 
his or her more vulnerable, co-contractant.270  Still, the implications of unequal 
bargaining power for the constitutional self must be investigated further, and 
autonomy developed as a more positive conception, having a content, that is 
normatively in line with and advances, the broader constitutional goal of a 
substantively equal society.271 
 
(c) Equality and the external reach of constitutional autonomy 
Moving on, to the external reach of autonomy, equality contemplates a society 
in which unfair discrimination is not privatised.  As submitted in an earlier article 
by Marius Pieterse and myself,  
“The value of equality…aides the transformation of South African society into 
an ultimately more egalitarian one through measures which may, to varying 
extents, limit a variety of individual liberty interests.  In the contractual realm…, 
such liberty-limiting measures include provisions of the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 which declares the 
imposition of contractual 'terms, conditions or practices' that have the effect of 
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perpetuating the consequences of past unfair discrimination, as well as the 
unfair limiting or denial of contractual opportunities, as practices which may 
amount to (prohibited) unfair discrimination. (Item 9b of the Schedule to the Act 
read with s29 thereof.  See also ss 7-8.)” 
In other words, absent compelling individualist considerations, a (private) 
contract, which promotes unfair discrimination within our more ‘welfarist’, post-
apartheid society, ought to be struck down for being unconstitutional and 
against public policy.  Likewise, there may now be a duty also, to enter into a 
contract, where the basic reason for refusing to contract with the other party, 
constitutes unfair discrimination.272 
At the very least, this means that the common law of contract’s 
automatic liberalist privileging of freedom, above equality, can no longer apply.  
Rather, in light of the substantively progressive and transformative mandate of 
our Constitution, it is more likely that the value of substantive equality will carry 
more weight, especially within the doctrine of legality’s public policy exercise.273  
Accordingly, the external reach of a constitutionalised contractual autonomy 
can be curbed, (or extended), significantly more than its classical liberal 
counterpart.274 
 
(d) The SCA and CC’s approach to equality in contract law cases of the 
constitutional era 
As outlined earlier, the CC and the SCA have both accepted that our common 
law of contract is subject to the Constitution.  Nevertheless, in so doing, they 
have continued to emphasise the classical liberalist conceptions of freedom 
and dignity.  At the same time, they have significantly downplayed the 
(potential) role of substantive equality within a constitutionalised contract law.275 
To begin with, in Brisley v Drotsky Cameron JA (as he then was) held 
that the value of equality was not relevant to the case at hand, because the 
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contractual principle in issue, (i.e. the Shifren principle),276 protects both the 
‘stronger’ and the ‘weaker’ contracting parties in the same manner.277  
Nevertheless, in so holding, Cameron JA did not take sufficient cognisance of 
the relative contexts of the parties in casu, and how the Shifren principle would, 
in reality, affect each party differently.278 
This aside, what is more significant, is that Cameron JA failed even to 
appreciate, that the value of substantive equality must, at least, have an 
“indirect impact on the matter”, lest the classical liberal conception of 
contractual autonomy continue to operate undisturbed.279  As should be evident 
from the above discussion of equality, a conception of autonomy that is 
moderated by the value of equality, (both internally and externally), is crucial to 
aligning our common law of contract with the substantively progressive and 
transformative goals of our Constitution.  The continued operation of the 
classical liberal conception of contractual autonomy, unmoderated by the value 
of equality, is untenable, insofar as it entrenches the status quo in the private 
sphere and thereby, privatises the systemic inequalities and patterns of 
disadvantage, as fostered by apartheid and patriarchy. 
Admittedly, the SCA and the CC have indicated subsequently, that 
equality has a role to play in a constitutionalised contract law, insofar as 
contracting parties can prove the presence of unequal bargaining power.  All 
the same, the courts are yet to interrogate the implications of such power 
dynamic between contracting parties, ostensibly due to a lack of evidence of an 
inequality of bargaining power in the first place, even in the context of standard 
form contracts.280  The classical liberal premise, of parties contracting at arms 
length, on a (formally) equal footing, thus remains intact. 
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2.4.4 The foundational constitutional value of dignity 
As previously alluded to, the value of human dignity appears to be linked 
fundamentally, to Kantian philosophy’s moral ideal of treating a human being 
“never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end”.281  Indeed, 
the common point of departure is that every individual has intrinsic worth, by 
reason of their basic human dignity, and as such, are worthy of equal concern 
and respect.282  As a function of autonomy, this conception of human dignity 
translates into two essential components viz. dignity as empowerment and 
dignity as constraint.283  In an earlier article, Marius Pieterse and I 
conceptualised each of these components.  Briefly stated, we defined ‘dignity 
as empowerment’ as that conception of dignity, as espoused by Ackermann J 
in Ferreira, which “enhances individual liberty by locating dignity in ‘capacity for 
autonomous action’ and accordingly holding that dignity is enhanced by the 
protection of autonomous choices.”284  In turn, ‘dignity as constraint’ was 
defined as that conception of dignity, which constrains liberty, “by implying that 
society should not tolerate exercises of autonomy that affront human dignity.”285  
We submitted further, that whereas, the classical liberal (internal) conception of 
contractual autonomy appeared to dovetail with dignity as empowerment, it 
seemed inimical to dignity as constraint.286 
Upon further reflection however, I submit, that dignity as empowerment 
and dignity as constraint are not inconsistent conceptions.  On the contrary, 
they must, and in fact, do, work together within our contract law.  Indeed, 
whereas, dignity as empowerment necessarily relates to the internal content 
dimension of autonomy, dignity as constraint must inform its external reach 
dimension.  That said, the connection between dignity and classical liberalism 
needs to be revised, with a view ultimately, to align the value of dignity with the 
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foundational constitutional triage’s broader, legal project of (substantively) 
transforming the socio-economic landscape of South Africa.287 
Looking more closely at the classical conception of autonomy, dignity as 
empowerment, as discussed and adopted by Ackermann J in Ferreira, captures 
the notion of the individual as an autonomous, moral agent, capable of self-
actualisation and governance, the upshot being that respect for one’s 
autonomous choices means respect for one’s dignity.  In the same tradition 
then, dignity as constraint, limits the exercise of autonomy, only in those rare 
cases where the contract is said to offend the conception of dignity, as 
articulated by the classically limited doctrine of legality.288 
This understanding of dignity goes someway to explaining the approach 
of the SCA to the constitutionalisation of contractual autonomy.  In Brisley, 
Cameron JA (as he then was) interpreted dignity in the classical liberal 
tradition, so that, a contractant’s dignity remains grounded in his or her freedom 
to govern his or her own life, by deciding for him or herself whether, and if so, 
with whom and on what terms to contract.289  In addition, as outlined earlier, the 
value of (substantive) equality was said to have no relevance.  The effect of 
Cameron JA’s interpretation therefore, is that the constitutional value of dignity 
simply re-affirms the classical understanding of the atomistic, independent, 
(negative-liberty based) contracting self.  In relation to the external reach 
dimension of autonomy then, Cameron JA made it clear that ‘obscene 
excesses’ of autonomy must be rejected as counter-intuitive to individual dignity 
and self-respect.290  Even so, in light of the contracting self’s classically liberal 
point of departure, it would appear that the notion of ‘obscene excess’ implicitly 
would privilege a classically liberal delineation of individualist and collectivist 
considerations. 
In subsequent cases, the SCA, and even the CC, have confirmed 
Cameron JA’s classical articulation of dignity operating in the constitutional 
era.291  Nevertheless, such a thin conception of dignity would undermine the 
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(potential) role of the value of human dignity, which, together with freedom and 
equality, must foster a constitutional ‘transformative meaning’ of autonomy 
(both externally and internally). 
In fact, contemporary Kantian thinking on human dignity (as 
empowerment), contemplates a more positive, capabilities-based approach that 
must be alert to those material conditions,292 necessary for the effective 
development and exercise of human potential and agency.293  Moreover, dignity 
as empowerment ought to extend beyond the individualist notion of self-worth 
and self-respect, to recognise the collective, insofar as individuals, engaged in 
the process of shaping their own lives, value their essential interconnectedness 
(social and otherwise) with fellow human beings, so much so, that it is 
considered constitutive of their very own identities.294 
This fuller conception of dignity as empowerment would then set the 
stage, for a more substantive conception of the ‘dignity as constraint’ 
component.  Indeed, the emphasis ought to be on dignity as a collective good, 
grounded in ubuntu and espousing a basic threshold for the living of a dignified 
life, in a socially democratic South Africa.295  As such, dignity as constraint must 
inform the external reach dimension of a ‘transformative’ conception of 
autonomy.  In other words, those exercises of autonomy that are offensive to 
the dignity of the collective and therefore, the dignity also, of the particular 
individuals concerned, cannot be countenanced.  In the context of contract law, 
this means that agreements, which undermine or transgress such dignity, 
would constitute an ‘obscene excess’ of autonomy that must be struck down as 
contrary to public policy.  Presumably, the content of dignity would be informed 
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primarily, by the value of substantive equality, as well as the enumerated socio-
economic rights.296 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I interrogated the concept of autonomy, both as it actually 
operates within our common law of contract, and as it ought to operate within 
the post-apartheid, constitutional era. 
At the outset, I traced the development of the common law’s conception 
of contractual autonomy, from the classical, to the neo-classical and modern 
models of contract law.  From this analysis, it emerged that the classical liberal 
understanding of the solitary, atomistic, contracting self, as grounded in the 
strongly individualist values of self-reliance, self-interest and self determination, 
continues to dominate our contract law.  To be sure, neo-classical economic 
analysis uses the free-market-economy rationale (albeit in an instrumentalist 
manner), essentially to bolster the classical conception of contractual autonomy 
within the modern era.  Further, the modern model, although highlighting the 
increasing tension between individualist and collectivist considerations, in terms 
of the secondary reasonable reliance basis of contract law, remains rooted 
primarily, in the classical liberal foundations of contractual autonomy.  At best, 
the modern model tempers the classical liberal foundations, somewhat 
conservatively, by way of a restrained shift in emphasis to ‘apparent (reliance-
based) autonomy’ and collectivist-type normative considerations, such as 
fairness, reasonableness and good faith. 
From this analysis then, I highlighted contract autonomy’s delineation of 
contractual justice, in terms of procedural and substantive fairness, and 
translated this into, what I term, the internal and external dimensions of 
contractual autonomy.  In essence, the internal dimension is identified with the 
content of contractual autonomy, as exercised by the contracting self, and the 
external dimension, with the reach of such exercise of autonomy. 
On this basis, I completed my analysis of contractual autonomy by 
examining contemporary contract law’s articulation of the external (reach) and 
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internal (content) dimensions of autonomy respectively.  In relation to the 
external reach dimension, I argued, that whilst the modern model of contract 
law had the potential to facilitate a greater degree of collectivist-type justice, in 
the form of substantive fairness and/or reasonableness, the courts have 
continued to invoke a Millian-type, liberalist ‘harm to interests’ understanding of 
reasonable reliance.  Indeed, even with the advent of the Bill of Rights and its 
foundational values, the courts continue to look through the individualist prism 
of the erstwhile classical liberal era, so that, the laissez faire understanding of 
freedom of contract persists as the foundational legal premise. 
I then unpacked the internal content dimension of contractual autonomy 
and illustrated how its laissez faire (negative-liberty based), atomistic 
conception, still permeates the modern law of contract.  In particular, I 
examined the pre-requisite of contractual capacity and showed how it continues 
to articulate a fairly impoverished conception of contractual autonomy and the 
contracting self.  It fails to take account of any socio-economic and other (more 
personal) factors that affect people’s decisions, in reality, as to whether, with 
whom and on what terms to contract. 
Beginning with the element of contractual capacity, it fails even to 
capture the distinction between an actual and an apparent exercise of 
contractual autonomy, let alone the notion of an ‘autonomous life’, in which the 
contracting self, who continues on beyond the conclusion of the contract, is 
necessarily situated.  Moreover, this thin, classical liberal conception of 
autonomy is mirrored in the context of an apparent exercise of autonomy, as 
per the doctrine of mistake.  Finally, the categories of improperly obtained 
consensus, even though purporting to endorse a more substantive, internal 
concept of autonomy in our law, fails to do so effectively, for it remains linked 
intrinsically to classical liberalism. 
The pertinent question in the post-apartheid constitutional era then, is 
whether the classical liberal conception of contractual autonomy is in line with 
conception(s) of autonomy, contemplated by Chapter Two of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa.  To this end, I focused specifically on the 
foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality and 
considered how they articulate with the common law of contract’s concept of 
autonomy. 
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In essence, I argued here that the fixed (neo-) classical understanding of 
contractual autonomy is liable to fall short of what the Constitution requires.  
The foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality are multi-faceted, and 
their interplay, multi-dimensional.  Accordingly, a constitutionalised conception 
of the substance of contractual autonomy, which is grounded in these values, is 
necessarily a shifting one that, at once, needs to be sensitive to the factual 
context, any applicable substantive rights, as well as the broader, constitutional 
vision of a substantively progressive and transformative South Africa. 
Focusing then, on each foundational value, I began with freedom.  Here, 
I argued that the substantive notion of freedom, held forth by Sachs J, in the 
leading CC case of Ferreira v Levin,297 is best suited to a constitutional 
conception of the contracting self.  Importantly, this fuller, constitutional 
conception of autonomy reflects a more concrete interaction between 
individualist and collectivist considerations and envisages more movement, 
toward the collectivist end of contract law’s normative continuum.  Indeed, this 
is likely to facilitate the realisation of the broader, constitutional vision within our 
common law of contract.  To this end, I argued, that a more substantive 
conception of the values of equality and dignity must work with the value of 
freedom, where their impact in cases must depend also, on the particular 
context of the parties before the court and any substantive right(s) that may be 
implicated. 
To sum up, freedom, dignity and equality both in their intra-action, and 
inter-action, lean toward a more full-bodied, substantive conception of legal 
autonomy, with the constitutional self, being grounded essentially, in the 
broader transformative project of South African society.  Accordingly, if such an 
understanding of autonomy is carried forward into the law of contract, it would 
be able effectively, to address the earlier outlined constitutional deficiencies 
(both external and internal) of the extant conception of contractual autonomy.  
Indeed, not only is it sufficiently fluid to facilitate real contractual justice in every 
case, it is also definitive enough, for the transformation of the law of contract 
itself into an essential constitutional tool for the enabling of individuals to realise 
their respective visions of the good life. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGAL METHODOLOGY (JUDICIAL METHOD)  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The politics of judging is underscored by the constitutional mandate of doing 
public law justice in private law matters, including those matters traditionally 
governed by the common law of contract.1  A most crucial aspect of this, relates 
to a systematic realisation within contract law of the substantively progressive 
and transformative aims of the constitution.  Indeed, in the two previous 
chapters I canvassed the broader goal of constitutionalising the common law of 
contract and considered the substantive content and reach of contractual 
autonomy (actual and apparent), that operates, (or at least, ought to operate), 
in post-apartheid South Africa.  In doing so, I argued that the substance of 
contract law must transcend its classical liberal underpinnings and be re-
legitimated within the foundational constitutional triage’s conception of legal 
autonomy, as exercised by the constitutional self.2 
In this chapter, I suggest that the accepted legal method, in terms of 
which, the legal concepts of contract law are applied by judges within the 
established common law framework, likewise needs to be assessed 
constitutionally and, if necessary, adjusted.3  Articulated further, I argue that 
judicial method is as imbedded in legal culture as is ideology, so that it plays a 
significant role in shaping the outcome of a case.  In fact, academic 
commentators have questioned the use by South African judges of 
conservative methodology, even to realise substantively progressive and 
transformative constitutional aims,4 and this is what is interrogated here: the 
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implication of traditional method for the determination of both the internal and 
external dimensions of contractual autonomy, as contemplated by the 
foundational constitutional triage. 
I begin by outlining briefly the politics of adjudication.  Here, I discuss the 
manner in which legal culture and the imbedded (liberal) ideology, generally 
permeates method.  On this basis then, I proceed to examine the methodology 
employed by judges enforcing the common law of contract and to show how 
this has influenced the determination of the content and traditional reach of 
contractual autonomy.  This is followed by a discussion of the methodology that 
should be employed in the application of the Bill of Rights to contracts.  To this 
end, I refer back to the horizontality debate traversed in Chapter One, with a 
view to determining the appropriate constitutionalised approach to contractual 
autonomy.  Finally, I consider the methodology employed in key constitutional-
contract law judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal, (hereinafter referred to 
as the SCA), and the Constitutional Court, (hereinafter referred to as the CC), 
to exemplify the basic theme of this chapter. 
 
3.2 LEGAL CULTURE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ADJUDICATION 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Broadly speaking, legal culture comprises the umbrella under which a legal 
system operates.  To quote Karl Klare, it is the “cultural or social-psychological 
dimension” of law,5 that encompasses the various attitudes and understandings 
of law, as it actually operates, and ought to operate, within a particular society.  
These range from the highly theoretical legal conceptions put forward by 
jurisprudential scholars, to “the professional sensibilities, habits of 
mind[,]…intellectual reflexes”6 and ensuing standard practices of judges and 
lawyers, and even the more pragmatic perceptions of bureaucrats and lay 
                                                                                                                                              
South African Land Claims Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 511 at 533-536.  See also Luanda 
Hawthorne ‘Legal tradition and the transformation of orthodox contract theory: The movement 
from formalism to realism’ (2006) 12-2 Fundamina 71; Alfred Cockrell ‘Substance and form in 
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persons.7  All of these attitudes and understandings are interconnected in fluid 
and complex ways.  For instance, the legal scholar’s conception, if it is to have 
credence, would be one that necessarily pays attention (albeit in differing 
degrees) to the general outlook of the legal profession and judiciary, as well as 
that of the State and society in general.  Likewise, the legal professional’s 
experience of the law, simultaneously draws upon, and feeds into, (even if only 
subconsciously), familiar legal traditions in which judges and lawyers generally 
have been schooled.  The same can be said of the layperson’s understanding 
of law which, again, must find some resonance with the practice and/or theory 
of law.  A case in point would be the populist image of the blind-folded ‘Lady 
Justice’; an image which pegs the traditionalist (classical) notion of the law and 
judges as (politically) neutral arbiters.8  I do not purport here to examine the 
nature of these various connections in any detail.  Suffice to say, that legal 
culture is all-pervasive and multifaceted. 
At the same time, it is important to appreciate that a unifying element of 
any legal culture comprises its basic (substantive) constitutionalist ideology, 
especially as it pertains to the separation of powers of the legislature, executive 
and judiciary, and the rule of law’s delicate balance between ‘legal constraint’ 
and the ‘need for [constitutional] justice’.9  This is most pertinent for a legal 
system’s ‘judicial’ legal culture, in the narrower form of its fundamental judicial 
ideology (i.e. how the culture understands the roles of judges, the judiciary and 
judicial mindset within our legal system), and attendant judicial method (i.e. the 
decision making process of how judges adjudicate).10  This is what I focus on 
here, specifically in relation to our private common law of contract. 
In the discussion that follows, I assess our ‘judicial’ legal culture’s 
ideology and method, (both as ‘perceived’ and ‘actual’), under the respective 
pre-1994 apartheid and post-1994 constitutional dispensations, at least insofar 
as they relate to South African contract law.  In the course of doing so, I also 
                                                 
7
 Roux op cit note 4 at 531; Klare op cit note 4 at 166-167. 
8
 Roux op cit note 4 at 531-534; Klare op cit note 4 at 157; Marius Pieterse ‘Coming to terms 
with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 at 398-399. 
9
 Klare op cit note 4 at 149-150; 160. 
10
 To the extent that extra-judicial aspects of legal culture influence the judicial aspect of legal 
culture, see Roux op cit note 4 512-516; 531 ffg. 
  121 
highlight the essential links between judicial ideology and method, and their 
impacts on the substance of legal outcomes.11 
 
3.2.2 The pre-1994 dispensation 
Briefly stated, South African law, before the advent of the interim Constitution, 
rested upon the constitutional system of parliamentary sovereignty, as inherited 
from the colonial British regime.  Intrinsic to the legal culture inculcated in terms 
of this regime, was the attendant classical liberal laissez faire ideology, 
grounded in the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th century.12 
So, under the apartheid era, South African law (as a whole) operated 
within the received classical liberal framework, where the legislature had the 
final say.  It was to this end, that the law demanded a strict separation of 
powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary, with the judiciary essentially 
deferent to the (policy) decisions of its counterparts, especially within the realm 
of public law.  Note however, that in reality, the distinction between the 
legislature and the executive was blurred, so much so, that judicial deference to 
the legislature was tantamount to deference to the executive.13 
Moreover, the rule of law proceeded from the fundamental premise that 
the law, together with its classical liberal underpinnings, is ‘neutral’, and further, 
that the legal enterprise must be respected as being objective and distinct from 
politics.  In the realm of private law, this premise of neutrality and judicial 
deference translated to a laissez faire ideology, where the judiciary deferred to 
the individuals’ arrangements of their private affairs; the main idea being, that 
the exercise of State power should not threaten the seemingly neutral (read 
‘naturalised’) individualist liberal ideal.14 
In terms of the public-private divide, classical liberalism manifested in a 
minimal body of public common law consisting of largely procedural principles 
of administrative and constitutional law; there having been no substantive 
human rights discourse in public law.  This stands to reason, given that 
classical liberalism was rooted in the strongly individualist values of self-
reliance, self-determination and self-interest, which focused principally, on the 
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liberty of the individual.  The State’s public law role was limited, in large part, to 
respecting such individual liberty, basically by not interfering unduly, in the 
(private) individual’s realisation of his or her particular conception of the ‘good 
life’.  So too, in relation to private law, the State mirrored its minimalist, laissez 
faire, public law role.  Indeed, the classical liberal public law discourse fore-
grounded South African law’s extensive body of private common law principles, 
which was, (and still is), delineated similarly, in terms of a non-interventionist, 
legal (‘non-political’) standard of formal justice.15 
Significantly, the ‘hands-off’ outlook of the State and following thereon, 
the law, including the private law, at the same time facilitated a strict dichotomy 
between the public and private spheres.  As discussed in Chapter One, the 
public-private divide came to be regarded as a solid wall, where public law 
norms (even if evolving), could not infiltrate (and/or do justice within) the private 
law.16  In this manner therefore, the judiciary was able to maintain the veil of 
judicial neutrality within the private sphere and continue to insist on the 
cautious, conservative, private law adjudication method. 
South Africa’s ‘judicial’ legal culture, at that time, was embedded in 
classical liberalism.  Indeed, the general Hartian-type (legal positivist/formalist) 
attitude towards law culminated in a judicial ideology termed ‘liberal legalism’.17  
In terms of ‘liberal legalism’, the adjudicative role ascribed to judges envisaged 
an exercise, purely in deductive legal reasoning, as constrained by a 
conservative, (classical liberal) conception of the rule of law.  In other words, 
the work of the judge strictly was to interpret and apply the law, but not, (at 
least not overtly), to make the law.18  More importantly, judges had to be 
vigilant at all times, not to permit personal and/or political ideologies, values 
and sensibilities, to feature in the adjudication process. 
In relation to the common law of contract then, these concerns were said 
to translate into a cautious judicial method, in terms of which, analysis that was 
“highly structured, technicist, literal and rule bound” was to be preferred.19  That 
is to say, that the strict notion of legal constraint was meant to be authoritative 
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 Klare op cit note 4 at 157. 
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 Klare op cit note 4 at 149; 157. 
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 Klare op cit note 4 at 168. 
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in the performance of adjudicative work.  What was contemplated therefore, 
was a more formal application of the law by way of an abstract rules-based 
analysis, with minimal judicial discretion; the idea being that judges simply 
would feed the ‘hard facts’20 of problems into the ‘common law of contract 
machine’21 and the machine, in turn, would spit out the ‘logically correct’, (and 
therefore formally just), legal solutions. 
The emphasis was on a certain and coherent body of legal principle, 
where hard-and-fast rules as applied to hard facts were preferred to the more 
pliable, open-ended standards invoked in relation to broader (competing) 
normative/policy concerns.22  Articulated further, the contract law machine was 
made up mostly of rules, that judges could apply mechanically, and relatively 
few standards which, in contrast to rules, required judges to conduct more 
contextual enquiries and exercise discretion to make value judgments.  So 
whilst rules promoted certainty and efficiency, standards were better able to 
facilitate contractual justice and fairness.  Hence, the contract law machine’s 
emphasis on rules.  Indeed, the imperative of a substantively just legal 
outcome, by way of a more flexible, purposive style of adjudication, on the 
basis of open-ended normative standards or values, remained subordinate.23  
In this manner therefore, judges could emerge as neutral in the carrying out of 
their adjudicative function. 
Nevertheless, judges (including those of the apartheid era) did not 
adjudicate in a vacuum, nor were they automatons.  This remains the case.  In 
fact, ‘liberal legalism’ itself reflected, and continues to reflect, preference for a 
particular value-system for the determination of meaning, viz. legal positivism.24  
Further, the underlying classical liberal ideology, (although ‘naturalised’ within 
our common law legal culture), necessarily reflects a particular, pro-individualist 
set of values that is ultimately political in nature.25  To be sure, laissez faire’s 
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espousal of a negative conception of autonomy reveals a partiality for the 
independent (atomistic) individual, rather than his interdependent (collectively 
situated) counterpart.26 
Such proclivity has rendered classical liberalism more amenable to the 
above-outlined formalist reasoning, rather than to purposive adjudication.27  In 
other words, the preference for formalist (rules-based) reasoning has led to a 
somewhat automatic ‘legalising’ of individualist policy considerations,28 largely 
at the expense of competing, collectivist-type policy concerns; the latter being 
viewed as largely ‘non-legal’ in nature and thus, articulated as a relatively 
limited set of sub-ordinate standards.29  In the end, therefore, even the ‘contract 
law machine’, with its delineation mostly in terms of rules rather than standards 
of contract law, although seemingly neutral, is likewise loaded ideologically in 
classical (legal) liberalism. 
The result is two-fold:  the preferred classical liberal ideology has 
informed the applicable judicial ideology and (conservative) method.  In turn, 
these have been made to appear neutral and thereby, have relieved judges 
basically, from having expressly to articulate their policy preferences.  In fact, 
over time this (traditional) ‘judicial’ culture of our legal system has become so 
instinctive, that participants doing legal work in present-day South Africa, 
arguably, take it for granted.  They may even be oblivious to its very existence, 
or at least, to how it impacts on their approach to, participation in, and/or 
outcomes of the adjudicative process.  Legal participants may thus be oblivious 
to the fact that their way of ‘doing’ law entrenches and promotes classical 
liberalism. 
That said, the reality of adjudication, within the pre-1994 context, is quite 
revealing of the consciousness of this paradox at the time, especially by 
progressive (‘enlightened’) judges.  Judges seemed to have appreciated 
acutely, the veneer of neutrality, for the purposes of negotiating the (unjust) 
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‘extra-legal’ effects of apartheid policies, principles and practices.30  This is 
understandable, given that all judges would have needed, at the very least, to 
reconcile themselves with their function as adjudicators of laws, operating 
within an essentially, unjust legal framework.  Indeed, this calls to mind the 
famous debates on the moral and ethical dimensions of ‘judging during 
apartheid’.31 
So, on the one hand, the strict formal operation of legal constraint within 
a classical liberal legal system seemed largely to release the judiciary, (and 
particularly pro-apartheid judges), from complicity with regard to the political 
and socio-economic injustices facilitated by the apartheid State.32  On the other 
hand, more progressive judges, whilst still observing the formal strictures of 
legal constraint, tended to operate more along its margins, exploiting 
opportunities to effect justice wherever there were gaps, ambiguities or room, 
otherwise, for substantive development of the law and, at times, even in the 
method of application of established legal rules to the facts.33  The legal 
developments within administrative law, towards the end of the apartheid era, 
provide a good example of such judicial activism.34 
At the same time however, the judiciary was fastidious in the classical 
liberal divide between public law and private law; the argument being that the 
common law of obligations, in particular, should operate within an essentially 
sterilised, laissez faire context, that was distinct from, and impervious to, 
apartheid South Africa.  Accordingly, in the context of the (private) common 
law, even progressive judges, working from within the ‘liberal legalist’ 
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framework, were largely at ease with the hard-line distinction between law and 
politics, and the ensuing formalist approach, for one of two reasons:  Either, 
because they failed to appreciate the links between public and private injustice 
or, because of how their political neutrality in public law blinded them to private 
injustice. 
Still, if these judges were faced with sanctioning an unjust, albeit 
‘rational’ legal outcome in terms of the ‘legal machine’, they would sometimes 
manipulate the formal framework, by discriminating covertly amongst the 
relevant ‘interpretive’ tools and ‘decision-making’ strategies, in a manner that 
would best ameliorate the extra-legal consequences of a seemingly sterile 
common law of contract, operating in an apartheid State.35  Arguably, the 
approach of the court in Du Toit v Atkinson’s Motors Bpk,36 in purporting to get 
around a harsh exclusion clause, as incorporated by the long-established 
principle of caveat subscriptor, is an example of such manipulation.37 
In this creative (albeit woolly) manner, therefore, those navigating 
treacherous legal terrain were able to effect a level of substantive justice and, 
all the while, observe the formal, non-interventionist integrity of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty’s authoritarian separation of powers and basic rule of law.  In the 
final event however, the scope for judicial activism by progressive judges too, 
was limited. 
 
3.2.3 The post-1994 era 
With the abolition of apartheid and the concomitant replacement of 
parliamentary sovereignty with a system of constitutional supremacy, one 
would anticipate a significantly altered judicial legal culture.  Indeed, we now 
have a justiciable Bill of Rights, which contemplates a movement from ‘a culture 
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of authoritarianism to a culture of justification’.38  Moreover, it seeks to bind, not 
only the State, but also, the judiciary and private individuals.39  The upshot is 
that our substantively progressive Constitution now comprises the basic legal 
constraint for post-apartheid adjudication.  As such, it updates the approach to 
separation of powers, the public-private divide40 and the rule of law.  For one 
thing, the legislature and the executive are more distinct in democratic South 
Africa, so that, an executive-minded judiciary is no longer appropriate.  On the 
contrary, the judicial function has been elevated to that of ultimate guardian and 
promoter of the supreme Constitution and its values. 
In terms of s 8(3), (read with s 172(1)), and s 39(2), (read with s 173), of 
the Constitution, judges now bear an express responsibility to test, strike down, 
(re-) interpret and/or develop all South African law, including the common law of 
contract, so that it does not contravene, but accords with, and gives effect to, 
the Bill of Rights.  Further, judicial activism is advocated for expressly insofar as 
the judiciary must work likewise towards the realisation in law of the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, these being the foundational legal 
constraints of post-apartheid South Africa.41 
So, whilst still subject to legal constraint, judges must adjudicate now, in 
a more realist medium, which explicitly mandates transformation of the civil, 
political, social and economic order, by way of a constitutionalised system of 
law.  In other words, South African law operates now, in terms of a 
‘transformative constitutionalism’ ideology, where a more full-bodied 
constitutional self, as grounded in the basic values of freedom, dignity and 
equality, is able to realise his or her vision of the ‘good life’.  Accordingly, 
judges can no longer camouflage the essentially political nature of the 
underlying judicial ideology.  They are necessarily subject now, to a ‘more 
plastic’ legal constraint in the performance of their adjudicative function and 
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accordingly, ought palpably, to be more amenable to a ‘policy-oriented and 
consequentialist’ approach, rather than the predominantly formalist approach.42 
Liberal legalism therefore, as received from the apartheid era, presents 
an uneasy fit with our substantively progressive and transformative 
constitutional framework.  Nevertheless, the South African legal fraternity has 
continued in this conservative approach to adjudication.  Those doing legal 
work continue to invoke technical ‘interpretive’ tools and ‘decision-making’ 
strategies, so that legal outcomes appear, or at least, are made to appear, as 
logical deductions (or more-or-less self-evident truths) from the relevant legal 
materials.43  This stands to reason, given that those doing legal work, for the 
most part, were schooled within this legalist tradition.  Further, judges, (even 
those with a progressive bent), also conform to the traditional legal culture, in a 
quest for professional respect amongst their peers and within the broader legal 
order.44  Just as under apartheid however, the legal fraternity tend to perceive 
and acknowledge this in relation to the public sphere only, but not when it 
comes to private injustice.  Those doing legal work remain resistant therefore, 
to the role of the Constitution in relation to the private realm. 
Yet, South Africa is still grappling with the aftermath of the ‘legal’ 
policies, principles and practices of the apartheid regime.  As outlined earlier, 
the classical liberal ideology largely represented the normative foundations of 
what are now regarded as established legal principles, with ensuing rules and 
standards.  At the same time however, it must be remembered that the 
classical liberal ideology was complicit in masking the substantive injustices 
that it facilitated, by way of the attendant judicial ideology and method.  As part 
of the post-apartheid transformative legal project therefore, it is crucial that the 
entire legal fraternity (i.e. judges, practitioners and academics), critically reflect 
on the underlying judicial legal culture derived from the apartheid era.45 
At the very least, those undertaking legal work must be alert to the 
prevailing conservative legal culture as it features in their ‘professional beliefs 
and practices’ and ensure that it does not undermine, (not even incidentally), 
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the process of the substantive constitutionalisation of our common law.46  For 
contract law, this would mean that the judicial commitment to legal principle 
(especially pacta sunt servanda) and the resulting ‘contract law machine’, also 
must be justifiable in terms of our substantively progressive and transformative 
constitution and in particular, in terms of the foundational constitutional triage of 
freedom, dignity and equality.47 
Accordingly, the common law of contract necessarily faces a transitional 
process, in terms of which, the contract law machine itself must be 
constitutionally assessed and, if necessary, re-configured.  At minimum, this 
entails a prefacing of the ‘business as usual’ application of rules (and/or 
standards) to facts, with an assessment of the content of the pertinent rules 
(and/or standards), against the foundational constitutional triage’s conception of 
contractual autonomy.48  But in addition to this, we need to assess whether, the 
legal articulation of a particular constitutionalised contract law principle better 
lends itself to a rule (that can be applied by judges in a fairly deductive manner, 
with relative certainty), a standard (that would require judges to conduct a more 
contextual enquiry and make a value judgment), or some combination thereof 
(as in the case of the doctrine of mistake, for instance, which comprises a set of 
rules that at the same time incorporates a standard of reasonableness).49 
Presumably, the flexible, purposive style of adjudication, as embraced by 
the open-ended contract law standards, will have an elevated role, especially in 
light of the more fluid, constitutional concept of contractual autonomy, as 
grounded in the foundational constitutional triage.  But this is not to say, that 
rules no longer have a place in the constitutionalised law of contract.  Indeed, 
the historically celebrated organic nature of our extant common law of contract 
means that, over time, it will evolve into a constitutionalised contract law, with 
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an apposite constitutionalised set of standards and rules, operating within the 
contract law machine.  The upshot is that, the shift to a constitutional culture of 
justification contemplates a (potential) re-balancing of the configuration of rules 
and standards.  In addition, there may be adjustments to the manner in which 
such rules and standards operate in the ‘contract law machine’, so that, their 
underlying judicial ideology and attendant method, are likewise aligned with the 
Constitution.  For instance, the standard of reasonableness, as it currently 
operates within the doctrine of mistake, may assume a more open-ended role, 
at least during the transitional constitutionalisation period, with a view to 
adjusting the now-concretised rules of mistake, (or apparent autonomy), in a 
manner that better reflects our revised constitutional ethos.50 
To sum up, because legal method is imbedded in legal culture and 
ideology, it actually informs the substantive development of the law itself.51  
Consequently, in fulfilling the mandate of constitutionalising the common law of 
contract, it is important to be conscious, not only of the South African legal 
culture and its preferred ideology, but also, of the influence of the established 
legal methods of our common law, on the attainment of the Constitution’s 
substantively progressive aims. 
It is with this in mind, that I turn to assess how the legal methods, 
currently employed by the common law of contract, influence the internal 
content and external reach dimensions of contractual autonomy. 
 
3.3 TRADITIONAL LEGAL METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE INTERNAL 
(CONTENT) AND EXTERNAL (REACH) DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTUAL 
AUTONOMY 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Contract law has generally been understood as the means by which to regulate 
socio-economic relationships in the private sphere.  More specifically, contract 
law is the mechanism meant to regulate market relations.52  In doing so, its 
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foundations in 18th and 19th century classical liberal theory buttress 
contemporary neo-liberal policies for macroeconomic growth, where there is 
continued emphasis on, and respect for, the (negative) autonomy of individuals 
participating in the market.  In fact, contract law has been referred to as the 
‘present day private law…of the “busy entrepreneur”’, where it is more 
‘economically correct’ to link freedom of contract to freedom of enterprise.53 
What seems to be most attractive about our system of contract law is 
that, by virtue of the attending judicial ideology of liberal legalism, it provides a 
certain, predictable and efficient conceptual framework, within which, judges 
can adjudicate contracts.54  This has been ascribed to the alleged intrinsic logic 
of the underlying ‘doctrinal system of thought’,55 where individual autonomy and 
good faith comprise the cornerstone legal principles.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, these principles are expressed very basically in the legal 
concepts of consensus, pacta sunt servanda and (formal) equity which, in turn, 
articulate a fairly thin internal conception of contractual autonomy (both actual 
and apparent),56 in simple, robust and seemingly ‘value-neutral’ rules.  These 
rules are then accompanied by a restricted set of open-ended standards (or 
values), that are meant primarily to reign in the ‘external reach’s’ (obscene) 
excesses of freedom of contract, within a relatively contained doctrine of 
legality.  The contract law machine thus constitutes a neat formal network of 
coherent legal principles, comprised predominantly of concise, yet, fairly robust 
legal rules, which, by virtue of their self-styled common sense, apply somewhat 
automatically to voluntarily assumed, private relationships.57  In contrast, 
normative engagement, in terms of open-ended standards, is kept to a 
minimum, so that, freedom of contract is still dominant.  In this manner, the 
potential range of answers that can be produced by the contract law machine is 
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carefully controlled.  The contract law machine is thus able, to maintain a high 
level of legal coherence, predictability and certainty. 
The downside, however, is that contract law’s foundations in classical 
liberal theory have been ‘formalised’ into the legal culture, to the extent that, 
they feature as ‘natural’ or ‘value neutral’ in the contract law machine.  Yet, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, contract law’s central axis of autonomy, in 
itself reflects a particular conception of the ‘good life’ and resultant market 
order.58  It advocates for a far-reaching individualist order, that promotes self-
interest, self-determination and self-reliance, with minimal State interference.  
To articulate this further, it is assumed essentially, that the market is able to 
commodify the elements of the ‘good life’, so that, the role of contract law 
simply is to ensure that individuals are free, (at least, in terms of its formal legal 
rules),59 to participate in the market, to achieve the quality of life to which they 
aspire.  As a result, freedom of contract has inveigled its way into vital aspects 
of an individual’s life, ranging from basic rights to housing60 and other essential 
goods,61 to freedom of association, labour relations and even, religion.62 
In light of the above, I examine two main aspects of the contract law 
machine, in relation to the internal content and external reach dimensions of 
contractual autonomy.  First, I consider how the contract law machine continues 
to bolster the thin, (classical liberal) internal content dimension of contractual 
autonomy.  Here, I show how the machine continues formalistically, to apply the 
relevant established rules, within the sterilized, laissez faire context of 
(business) parties, negotiating at arm’s length, on a more-or-less equal footing.  
Nevertheless, in reality, such rules are being applied increasingly outside of this 
naturalised individualist paradigm, with the result that, classical contract law’s 
individualist underpinnings themselves, are increasingly (at risk of) being 
undermined. 
Second, I interrogate the role of the contract law machine in the law of 
contract’s purported accommodation of the more modern, (post-apartheid) 
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collectivist leanings that embrace a fair measure of altruism.  As argued in the 
previous chapter, the latter is necessary to augment what must now be a 
constitutional conception of the ‘self’, and the succeeding ideal of the ‘good 
life’.63  Yet, the contract law machine’s circumspect attitude toward normative 
reasoning (purposive adjudication), and concomitant preference for deductive 
reasoning, may be leading courts, to continue to apply the relevant rules 
abstractly, to socio-economic relationships,  This may further explain why the 
courts fail to deal adequately, with the (traditionally deemed) extra-contractual 
policy concerns, that ought to feature in a constitutionalised contract law. 
In the final event, I consider the impact of residual default rules and 
decision-making strategies that also form part of the contract law machine. 
 
3.3.2 The implication of traditional legal method for the determination of 
the (internal) content of contractual autonomy 
As set out above, the contract law machine and therefore, the legal 
methodology employed in the determination of the internal content dimension of 
contractual autonomy, remains entrenched in classical liberalism and the 
resulting legalist judicial ideology. 
To illustrate, the starting point would be the element of contractual 
capacity.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this element operates 
essentially, in terms of a rebuttable presumption, in favour of a contractant 
having the requisite capacity - the onus is on the party wishing to escape the 
contract, successfully to dispute this element.  This enquiry therefore, is tipped 
to the side of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda.  Moreover, such 
approach would be defended by the contract law machine as a purely factual 
and accordingly, ‘value-neutral’ enquiry.  Indeed, the adjudication of a 
contractual capacity issue would appear to entail a straight-forward, objective 
determination of whether, the cognitive and conative abilities of the contractant 
concerned, were negated, as per the formal contract law rules, that articulate 
the legally recognised instances of ‘no capacity’.64 
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Nevertheless, the factual enquiry still takes place within the established 
classical liberal framework.  Accordingly, the judicial methodology of focusing 
on a limited set of objectively ascertainable facts, as processed by the capacity 
element of the ‘contract law machine’, continues to draw on, and feed into, the 
erstwhile laissez faire ideology, with its principally negative conception of 
freedom.  In effect therefore, judges are able, by invocation of the established 
‘contract law machine’, to sidestep, what is perceived as the legal quagmire of 
a more substantive, contextually driven, positive conception of contractual 
autonomy.  In other words, the veneer of an apparently value-neutral judicial 
methodology enables our judges essentially, to avoid pertinent normative 
concerns, which would now contest or, at the very least, temper the classical 
liberal conception of autonomy, operating within a post-apartheid constitutional 
context.65 
That said, on at least one occasion, the SCA did sense a deficiency in 
the capacity rules’ conception of autonomy.  In the case of Eerste Nasionale 
Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO, the court was presented with an 
eighty-five-year-old mother, who was hard of hearing and almost blind, at the 
time when she signed as surety for her son’s debt to the bank.  At first glance, 
these facts do not appear to fit with any of the established instances of ‘no 
capacity’.  Yet, the majority court did not propose a normative interrogation of 
the capacity rules.  Instead, it invoked the ‘contract law machine’ and in effect 
forced a fit of the relevant facts with the formal ‘no capacity’ rule relating to 
mental illness, and thereby, yielded a substantively just legal outcome.66  The 
classical liberal underpinnings therefore, remained intact. 
Interestingly enough, the minority judgment yielded a similar result, but 
called upon the competing collectivist normative dimension, to do so.  In 
particular, it relied on the principle of good faith, as it features in the doctrine of 
legality, to hold that the contract was unenforceable, on the grounds of public 
policy.67  Notably, the minority judgment rejected the classical liberal ‘mental 
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illness-no capacity’ route, on the basis that there was insufficient evidence 
pointing to this.68  Be that as it may, the SCA subsequently criticised the 
minority judgment’s use of good faith as methodologically unsound; it being an 
underlying value, as opposed to an established rule, of contract law.69  
Admittedly, the approach of the minority judgment is open to such critique, 
especially if what the majority judgment meant to say, was that any matter 
pertaining to the internal dimension of autonomy, ought not to be situated within 
the doctrine of legality.70  Even so, this should not detract from the more 
important point that needs to be made here i.e. that the majority judgment 
effectively circumvented, all and any, normative interrogation of the internal 
content of contractual autonomy, as articulated by the extant contract law rules.  
The upshot is that the non-interventionist, formal (albeit sometimes creative) 
tendencies of judges, operating within the apartheid era, still commands the 
delineation of the internal content dimension of contractual autonomy, in post-
apartheid adjudication.  In this manner, the classical liberal conception of 
autonomy is able to continue to dominate, largely untested, against the 
constitutional conception(s) of contractual autonomy.71 
Taken further, the extant approach to the determination of contractual 
capacity, sets the stage for a comparable methodology employed, in terms of 
the rules of offer and acceptance, the doctrine of mistake, as well as the legally 
recognised instances of improperly obtained consensus i.e. misrepresentation, 
duress, undue influence and bribery.  Once again, the rules articulating each of 
these areas of contract law, dress up the relevant enquiries as formally 
objective, ‘value-neutral’ factual enquiries.  Yet, the individualist policy concerns 
inherent to classical liberalism are weaved likewise into the very fabric of the 
rules that are meant to discern the relevant facts from the irrelevant facts, as 
well as their method of application. 
Looking at the doctrine of mistake, for instance, it remains the exclusive 
portal through which, the supplementary reliance theory’s conception of 
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apparent autonomy, finds application.72  As such, the doctrine comprises the 
articulated rules that purport to give effect to the factual, as well as normative, 
dimensions of apparent autonomy.  So when a ‘mistake case’ comes before a 
court, the court would first invoke the rule, which determines whether there is in 
fact an appearance of consensus and conversely, whether the mistake 
excludes actual consensus.  Thereafter, the court would invoke those rules, 
which determine whether there is a legally protectable (i.e. reasonable) reliance 
on the appearance of consensus and conversely, whether the mistake is legally 
excusable (i.e. justus or reasonable).73  Notably, the capacity to create the 
appearance of consensus, and conversely, the capacity to rely thereon, is 
presumed; arguably, irrebuttably so, there being no express rules relating 
thereto.74 
The upshot is that the standard of reasonableness is an integral part of 
the doctrine of mistake.  As such, the doctrine of mistake ought to 
accommodate a normative style of adjudication.  To be sure, the supplementary 
reliance theory, as well as the foundational constitutional triage, calls for a more 
fluid, contextual assessment, that can take better cognisance of important, 
collectivist-type policy considerations.75  Furthermore, such type of adjudication 
would better facilitate a proper balancing of collectivist considerations, against 
both traditional and modern individualist considerations.76  This would yield a 
more full-bodied, internal concept of apparent autonomy.  Yet, an essentially 
rules-based framework, as founded in classical liberalism, is employed.  On the 
one hand, the rules articulating reasonable reliance and justus error purport to 
resolve the relevant normative tensions, in terms of whether, the will of the non-
mistaken party or the mistaken party, ought to triumph.  On the other hand, they 
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fall short, at least, to the extent that the reasonable reliance and justus error 
approaches do not always yield the same result.77  In the end therefore, an 
(over-)emphasis on the rules of mistake (and classical liberalism), undermines 
the collectivist-based, normative facet of the internal content dimension of 
apparent autonomy.  To boot, it undermines the individualist facet itself, in light 
of pertinent socio-economic realities, that face the modern contractant, but that, 
as of yet, have not been taken into account, for the purposes of determining 
whether a mistake is justus. 
Even so, the mistake enquiry continues to be presented basically, as an 
objective enquiry of hard fact, to which, the established rules must be applied in 
order to deduce the legally ‘correct’ answer.  The normative dimension of 
reasonableness is subordinated.  As such, a thin, (classical liberal) internal 
conception of apparent autonomy is preserved, notwithstanding the lack of 
scrutiny of the potential implications of the constitutional concept of apparent 
autonomy.78 
Finally, in relation to the concretised categories of improperly obtained 
consensus, the extant rules likewise tend to underplay the need firstly, for a 
fuller internal conception of autonomy in our law and secondly, for normative 
engagement with pertinent policy considerations, both individualist and 
collectivist in nature, for the purposes of determining a basic legal (albeit fluid) 
threshold of actionable (positive) contractual autonomy.  To be sure, the 
conservative categorisation approach, coupled with the elevation of the 
traditional rules (as entrenched in classical liberalism), go some way to masking 
the general reticence of judges, to engage with present-day socio-economic 
realities.  These realities include those that undermine post-apartheid 
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individualist considerations, such as those inherent in abuses of unequal 
bargaining power.79 
To sum up, contract law adjudication remains steeped in the erstwhile, 
liberal legalist judicial ideology, coupled with the formalist judicial method, 
appertaining thereto.  However, as illustrated above, such approach plays a 
significant role in covertly naturalising the classical liberal conception of 
autonomy, which then, mostly avoids rigorous normative interrogation of the 
internal (content) dimension of contractual autonomy, in terms of the 
foundational constitutional triage of freedom, dignity and equality.80 
 
3.3.3 The implication of traditional legal method for the determination of 
the (external) reach of contractual autonomy – the public policy 
(legality) exercise 
 
(a) The (objective) tendency of the clause (the broader policy context) 
In contrast to the internal dimension of contractual autonomy, the external 
reach dimension engages expressly with the normative facet of contract law.  
Indeed, in delineating the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy, 
the point of departure is that contract law, although disinclined to collectivist 
ideology and purposive adjudication, does recognise it, at least, within the 
parameters of the contractual doctrine of legality. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is a rule of contract law that a 
contract that is against public policy will be illegal and therefore, null and void.81  
In other words, even if a court is satisfied, that the parties did in fact exercise 
their autonomy in relation to the relevant contract, (as per the internal content 
dimension of contractual autonomy), it may refuse to recognise such autonomy, 
on the basis that the contract is against public policy and therefore, illegal. 
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At the outset therefore, it is important to appreciate that when invoking 
the doctrine of legality, a court implicitly takes as its point of departure, that the 
requirements pertaining to the internal content dimension of contractual 
autonomy, properly have been fulfilled.  As such, the doctrine of legality 
necessarily has a built-in gatekeeper valve, which preliminarily limits the 
normative considerations that can be taken into account – only those 
considerations, which presume (and/or are informed by) a proper exercise of 
(internal) contractual autonomy, are relevant.  So, for instance, those 
considerations relating to a deficient exercise of autonomy, by reason of an 
abuse of unequal bargaining power or economic duress, simply cannot feature. 
That said, judges articulate public policy as a set of open-ended, (albeit 
preliminarily, (and essentially limited)) normative standards, (such as 
reasonableness and good faith), that contemplate purposive adjudication, on 
their part.82  In the post-apartheid context, the CC and the SCA have both 
recognised that public policy is grounded now, in the Constitution and the 
fundamental values that it enshrines.83  The content of the open-ended 
normative standards therefore, must be informed now, by the substantive rights 
and underlying values of the Bill of Rights.84 
Without a doubt, this recognition of the Constitution and its role in the 
public policy exercise, marks a significant step in the process of 
constitutionalising the common law of contract.  Nevertheless, judges also 
continue, at the same time, to employ a particular method, as rooted in 
classical liberalism, of applying the competing (collectivist) values to the 
concept of public policy.  This is reflected in the ‘all or nothing’ approach to 
public policy. 
In terms of the ‘all or nothing approach’, the tendency of a contract (and 
its clauses) is tested against public policy (expressed, in terms of the broader, 
classical liberal legal context) and is declared either valid or void, for all intents 
and purposes.85  There is no middle ground.  Importantly, the starting point of 
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this enquiry is that the relevant contractual clause is valid and enforceable, with 
the responsibility on the party wishing to escape the clause, to show why it 
should be otherwise.86 
What emerges is that although the public policy enquiry is executed by 
way of a balancing exercise, it is not a straightforward balance.  It is a balance 
according to a method, which impacts on the substantive outcome of the case.  
What this highlights, is that the kind of scale that is used in conducting the 
balancing exercise, is just as important as what one actually balances on the 
scale.  Here, the kind of scale contemplated by the public policy enquiry is not a 
balanced one, but one that, at the outset, is tipped to the (individualist) side of 
freedom of contract.  As a result, the application of contract law, and thus, the 
external reach of contractual autonomy, is fettered only in the clearest and most 
extreme cases.87 
The public policy scale itself thus, vociferously guards the borders of 
contract law.  Accordingly, public policy’s power to curb the contract law 
machine’s approach to the application of the autonomy-based rules of contract 
law is diminished.  The net result, is an extension of contract law’s reach into 
socio-economic relationships, that may not be suited to laissez faire, market-
based regulation.88  This phenomenon has been described as the hegemony or 
privileging of contract law, in relation to other branches of the common law.89 
For instance, in family law, parties are free to regulate their matrimonial 
property regime, by way of an antenuptial contract.  In such a case, the normal 
rules of contract law apply, where emphasis is placed on the individualist 
conception of autonomy, applicable to commercial contracts.  The result, is that 
freedom of contract prevails over the particular concerns meant to be 
addressed by family law.  This is because, contract law’s tipped public policy 
scale, takes inadequate account of the non-commercial ‘context and reality’ of 
the intimate and vulnerable nature of the family relationship, as well as the 
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societal pressures and expectations, which attach to the institution of 
marriage.90  Moreover, the traditional ‘all or nothing’ methodology is unable to 
accommodate the particular (changed) circumstances, that the parties find 
themselves in, when the antenuptial contract is actually enforced.  The 
legislature has recognised as much, by making provision for a ‘forfeiture of 
benefits’,91 as well as ‘a limited judicial discretion to redistribute assets upon 
divorce’.92  Nevertheless, these legislative measures operate in very limited 
circumstances, and are generally insufficient, to address the socio-economic 
concerns that are normally raised in this context.93 
A further instance of contract law’s seeping into family law relates to the 
invocation of classical contract law, as the mechanism for extending the 
common law rights and duties attendant on traditional marital status, to those in 
relationships that have been excluded from such status.94  Once again, 
however, contract law methodology has not been adapted in these contexts, to 
take proper cognisance of the concerns specific to family relationships.  The 
outcome is that the freedom to contract, or not to contract, as the case may be, 
will generally outweigh the competing values underpinning family law.95 
Likewise, in relation to the law of delict, contract law has occupied a 
privileged position.  With the contract-delict law interface, a primary concern is 
that the contract should not be circumvented by a delictual claim.  The basic 
argument is that the parties have, by an exercise of their autonomy, isolated 
and allocated the general risks of their bargain and accordingly, planned their 
affairs within the contract law paradigm.  They therefore have a reasonable 
expectation that their contractual arrangement will be respected, and the law of 
delict should not be allowed to frustrate this.96 
The law’s treatment of exclusion clauses comprises an archetype of 
such preferencing of contract, over delict.  Although the courts are circumspect 
of contractual exclusions of delictual liability, they nevertheless, proceed from 
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the premise, that such practice is valid, in principle.  Once again, the tipped 
public policy scale, articulated in the ‘all or nothing’ approach, means that the 
common law rights stemming from the law of delict, are generally outweighed 
by freedom of contract.97 
The same pattern can be identified in relation to the common law of 
unjustified enrichment, estoppel and in certain cases, even administrative law.98  
Ultimately, the primacy of open market relations, as articulated by the pre-
constitutional, common law framework of contract, means that once the 
element of autonomy features, the court does not have to deal with competing 
substantive rights, on an equal footing.99  This is notwithstanding, the fairly thin 
(internal) conception of positive autonomy, within our common law of 
contract.100 
To compound matters, within contract law itself, if a party is to be bound 
to a contract, on the basis of apparent autonomy (as per the supplementary 
reliance theory articulated by the doctrine of mistake), the public policy scale is 
not in any way adjusted, so as to accommodate those concerns inherent to 
reliance-based liability.  The tipped public policy scale, is still used, 
notwithstanding, the reality of a ‘half-deliberate’ exercise of autonomy.  As a 
result, the significance of those ‘collectivist-type’, (distributive justice) policy 
concerns, that are specific to the external reach dimension of apparent 
autonomy (and therefore, reliance theory), are underplayed, or even 
overlooked, whilst freedom of contract, in its classical liberal sense, continues 
to dominate.101 
The significance of the ‘all or nothing’ approach to public policy then, is 
that it complements the deep-level, commercial commitment to the classical 
liberal conception of contractual autonomy; notwithstanding, the advent of 
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transformative constitutionalism, in terms of the Bill of Rights.102  At the same 
time, it inadvertently conflates actual and apparent autonomy, and so, endorses 
the conservative legal culture, which respects the intricate nature of our 
contract law rules, that have developed, over time, basically in terms of the will 
theory (but with a thin, essentially negative conception of autonomy), in order to 
achieve a balance between legal certainty and the pre-constitutional 
(individualist) conception of fairness.103 
To iterate, the traditional public policy scale, operating in terms of the 
doctrine of legality, at the very outset, carves down the external normative 
factors, that can even be put onto the scale - logically speaking, only those 
factors that are congruent with the essential premise of the parties having 
actually exercised contractual autonomy, (though presently, only in the classical 
liberal sense), can effectively be taken into account.  To boot, in relation to 
those factors/competing considerations, that manage actually to pass through 
this initial gatekeeper (entry) valve, the very nature of the public policy scale 
itself becomes relevant.  The scale’s liberal bias (to the side of freedom of 
contract), as articulated in the above-outlined ‘all or nothing’ approach to 
contracts, significantly minimises the (potential) role that can be played, by 
what are, (and ought to be), relevant competing considerations, within the post-
apartheid constitutional era.  In other words, the scale itself, (as opposed 
simply, to what can be put on it), may further undermine the extent to which 
competing factors/considerations can disrupt the laissez faire outcomes, that 
our contract law machine still prefers to produce. 
 
(b) The (subjective) enforceability of the clause in the particular 
circumstances (at the time of enforcement) 
The notable departure from the ‘all or nothing’ approach relates to contracts in 
restraint of trade, where the common law has recognised, that the issue is 
primarily one of the enforceability of the restraint, as opposed to its validity.  
Briefly stated, restraint contracts are prima facie valid and enforceable, but 
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may be unenforceable, if contrary to the public interest.104  So, whilst still 
premised on classical liberalism, a court determines whether the covenant in 
restraint of trade is contrary to the public interest, by taking cognisance firstly, 
of the factual circumstances prevailing between the parties, at the time of 
enforcement of the contract, and secondly, the broader policy interests.  What 
is important to note, is that the courts have carefully developed the legal 
doctrine relating to restraint of trade agreements in a systematic manner, so 
that, over time, a concrete set of guidelines have emerged, as to when it 
would be unreasonable to enforce a restraint of trade agreement.105  In the 
case of Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd106, the SCA 
confirmed the step-by-step approach, as outlined originally in Basson v 
Chilwan:107 
“In Basson v Chilwan Nienaber JA identified four questions that should be 
asked when considering the reasonableness of a restraint:  (a) Does the one 
party have an interest that deserves protection after termination of the 
agreement?  (b) If so, is that interest threatened by the other party?  (c) In that 
case, does such interest weigh qualitatively and quantitatively against the 
interest of the other party not to be economically inactive and unproductive?  
(d) Is there an aspect of public policy having nothing to do with the relationship 
between the parties that requires that the restraint be maintained or rejected?  
Where the interest of the party sought to be restrained weighs more than the 
interest to be protected, the restraint is unreasonable and consequently 
unenforceable.  The enquiry which is undertaken at the time of enforcement 
covers a wide field and includes the nature, extent and duration of the restraint 
and factors peculiar to the parties and their respective bargaining powers and 
interests.” 
So, the courts generally regard the standard of reasonableness of the 
restraint, inter partes (as it relates to the enforceability of the clause), as 
decisive.108  Further, it would seem that the reasonableness of the restraint, as 
per the broader public interests (the so-called tendency of the clause), is 
invoked in the last instance.  In practical terms, this means that the latter 
‘tendency’ enquiry would be invoked, only in those instances, where the former 
‘enforceability’ enquiry does not render the restraint of trade unenforceable. 
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The methodology applied to restraint of trade agreements therefore, 
represents a relaxation of the ‘all or nothing’ approach because, in addition to 
the tendency of the clause, it focuses on the outcome of enforcement, in the 
particular circumstances.  Here too, a scale that at the outset is tipped in favour 
of freedom of contract applies - the onus is on the party wanting to escape the 
restraint to prove his case.  However, because the focus is principally on the 
enforceability as opposed to the validity of the restraint, the scale is not as 
heavily tipped, as in the case of the ‘all or nothing’ approach.  Also, the 
methodology bolsters the level of purposive adjudication, in that each case, 
ultimately must be decided on the basis of the particular circumstances, in 
which the parties find themselves, at the time of enforcement.  In other words, 
the sterilised, laissez faire approach gives way to a more realist-type, 
contextual approach, so that, the potential range of answers that can be 
produced by the ‘contract law machine’, although still contained, is somewhat 
broader. 
The basic reason for the traditionally differentiated approach to restraint 
contracts is that such contracts, impinge on a legally recognised competing 
economic right, that, depending on the circumstances, courts accept can be 
more important than the right to freedom of contract.  Just as freedom of 
contract is an integral part of an individual’s right to engage in economic life, so 
too, is freedom of trade.109  It is in the interests of society, that its members are 
productive and this would usually require that they are able to engage in the 
economy, by way of their chosen trade, occupation or profession.  
Consequently, where freedom of contract and freedom of trade conflict, a judge 
has to balance the competing considerations and exercise a value judgment.  
In effect therefore, the reach of contractual autonomy is somewhat re-defined, 
by the employment of a differing methodology. 
As mentioned above, the approach developed by the courts, in relation 
to restraint of trade agreements, exhibits analytical rigour.110  As a result, an 
acceptable measure of certainty is preserved.  Moreover, whilst the approach to 
restraint contracts was formulated by the pre-constitutional common law of 
contract, it resonates strongly with the limitations analysis of s 36(1) of the Bill 
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of Rights.111  In terms of s 36(1), a court must assess whether the implicated 
substantive right, (which, in the case of a contract in restraint of trade, would be 
the s 22 freedom of trade, occupation and profession), is reasonably and 
justifiably limited by the law (i.e. the common law of contract), in the particular 
circumstances of the case.  Most significantly, s 36(1) contemplates a 
balancing exercise, that is grounded in the foundational constitutional triage, 
with no particular value automatically privileged, and where the right(s) must be 
balanced against competing societal objectives, including those pertaining to 
“(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation 
and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.”112 
To sum up, in terms of the common law of contract, the particular 
methodology employed by a court, in solving a particular contractual dispute, 
plays a pivotal role in defining the external reach of contractual autonomy.  In 
this respect, the public policy scale endorses contractual autonomy, as the 
predominant consideration, that will be trumped in exceptional circumstances 
only.  In relation to contracts in restraint of trade, however, the scale has been 
adjusted to accord greater weight to the competing economic right.  It is thus 
possible, that justice may be served best by adjusting the scale, rather than 
simply what we put on it,113 or throwing out the scale.114 
Taken a step further, I submit that, in principle, a constitutionalised 
doctrine of legality, which is meant to determine the external reach of the more 
fluid, constitutionalised conception of autonomy, would at least require, that the 
enforceability dimension of legality’s restraint of trade scale, be extended to all 
contracts.115  Accordingly, the constitutionalised public policy scale should 
comprise two levels.  First, there should be the original ‘tendency level’ of the 
scale, which must continue to assess the tendency of the clause/contract, in 
terms of broader normative/policy considerations, as they pertain to the 
external reach of contractual autonomy.  Second, there should now be an 
added, ‘enforceability level’, which must assess whether the clause/contract 
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should be enforced in the particular circumstances, that the contracting parties 
find themselves in, at the time of enforcement. 
In the final event, I submit that, in line with the recent case of Barkhuizen 
v Napier,116 and in contrast to the extant approach to restraints of trade, a court 
ought instead, to invoke the more objective, ‘tendency level’ of the public policy 
scale, first.  Further, a court ought to proceed to the more subjective, 
‘enforceability level’ of the scale, only if, the contract/clause passes legal 
muster on the initial tendency level of the scale.  The basic reason for 
proposing this staged approach is that the initial tendency level of the enquiry, 
necessarily, operates at a more abstract (and objective) level, and as such, is 
more amenable to the gradual development of clear guidelines, for this level of 
the legality enquiry.  At the same time, the tendency level of the scale can 
serve as an additional valve, that will, at once, frame the enforceability level of 
the enquiry, and control, which of the (subjective) circumstances of the parties, 
may legitimately be placed on the enforceability level of the scale.  In this 
manner therefore, a fair degree of legal certainty can still be maintained within 
the doctrine of legality. 
 
3.3.4 The public policy scale and the internal dimension of contractual 
autonomy 
Upon perusal of the post-apartheid contract law cases, one gets the impression 
that the normative dimension of contract law (as a whole), is limited strictly to 
the doctrine of legality; the classical liberal underpinnings being naturalised and 
therefore, all other spheres117 of our contract law, seemingly value-neutral.118  
In other words, if there is a normative conflict, the doctrine of legality would 
appear to be the appropriate, and indeed only, portal to address the issue.  
Drawn to its logical conclusion, it is assumed, that if the substance of the 
doctrine of legality and the attendant adjudicative method are constitutionalised, 
the common law of contract (as a whole), will be constitutionalised. 
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But such an assumption is erroneous.  As just discussed, the doctrine of 
legality traditionally has operated, only in relation to the determination of the 
external reach dimension of contractual autonomy and furthermore, assumes 
that the internal content dimension of autonomy has been satisfied.  
Accordingly, the law still needs first, to engage normatively with the internal 
content dimension of autonomy.  Without a doubt, a failing by the law, even to 
recognise the need for such engagement, will mean that normative 
considerations are allowed to permeate, only certain parts, of the overall 
contract law machine i.e. those parts relating to the external reach component 
of contractual autonomy.  This is not tenable. 
All the same, as discussed earlier, the lack of normative interrogation of 
the rules (and standards) articulating the internal (content) dimension of 
contractual autonomy, has led to a constitutionally deficient concept of 
contractual autonomy.  So, the pertinent question is whether, it is appropriate 
now, to house the normative interrogation of autonomy’s internal content 
dimension, also within the doctrine of legality.  Indeed, the SCA has alluded to 
this question in its submission, that the presence of unequal bargaining power, 
if proved, would be a relevant factor in conducting the legality enquiry.119 
The point of departure must be that a remedying of the thin internal 
dimension of contractual autonomy does not fit easily within the doctrine of 
legality.  For one thing, the doctrine of legality proceeds from the premise, that 
the contractants act with full-blown contractual autonomy, insofar as they do not 
fall short of the extant rules (and standards), which determine the presence of 
autonomy.  This is principally sound, if the doctrine of legality is to deal purely 
with the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy, whether in terms of 
broader policy considerations (i.e. on the tendency level of the scale), or the 
circumstances of the parties at the time of enforcement (i.e. on the 
enforceability level of the scale).120  In contrast, the nature of what would be put 
on the scale, if the normative facet of internal contractual autonomy were to be 
dealt with under the doctrine of legality, would not only be fundamentally 
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inconsistent with what is currently put on the scale, but it would also contradict, 
the very premise upon which, the public policy scale operates, and ought to 
operate. 
Arguably, this hurdle could be overcome by introducing an added 
preliminary level to the scale that can address the normative aspect of the 
internal content dimension of autonomy.  The idea would be that this 
preliminary level of the scale would preface the tendency and enforceability 
levels of the scale, and their attendant premise, of parties having acted with 
contractual autonomy.  As such, once a court is satisfied, regarding the 
normative delineation and exercise of the internal content component of 
autonomy, the tendency and enforceability levels of the scale could come into 
play.  The latter levels then, would deal still, only with autonomy’s external 
reach dimension and as a result, the doctrine of legality would remain 
significantly intact.  At the same time, the internal content dimension of 
autonomy would be normatively interrogated, without any major disturbance, to 
the extant operation of the contract law machine. 
But such approach, would lead to a somewhat, illogical separation of the 
classical legal principles, as they pertain to the doctrines, rules and standards, 
that currently articulate the internal content dimension of contractual 
autonomy,121 from the more modern policy concerns, both collectivist and 
individualist, in nature, which necessarily affect these principles.  Indeed, rather 
than reviewing and updating the relevant classical doctrines as required by the 
Constitution, an analysis, in terms of the extant classical legal principles, may 
well have to be supplemented artificially, by an application of the added 
preliminary level of the legality scale.  Such approach would be completely out 
of step within a common law that is renowned for the organic nature of its 
incremental development, over time, responding as it must, to the changing 
needs and mores of the society, in which it operates. 
Furthermore, judges would have to be alert, at all times, to the real 
danger of inadvertent conflation, and/or misallocation, of the respective 
considerations, as they relate, to the internal content and the external reach 
dimensions of autonomy respectively. 
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In the final event, the envisaged preliminary scale’s emulation of a more, 
open-ended public policy exercise may not be suited sufficiently, to identify, 
distinguish and/or take appropriate cognisance, of all normative considerations 
relevant to the particular internal autonomy enquiry.  Indeed, as alluded to 
earlier, a hybrid form of legal reasoning would be more appropriate, for a 
holistic development of a more full-bodied, internal conception of 
constitutionalised contractual autonomy, within the relevant doctrines, rules and 
standards, that currently articulate the internal content dimension of contractual 
autonomy.122  The upshot is that a housing of the normative aspect of internal 
autonomy, under the doctrine of legality, would be cumbersome, tedious and 
possibly, still ineffective. 
At best, the thin internal conception of autonomy, coupled with the reality 
of this for a particular contractant (upon conclusion of a contract), may be a 
factor that reinforces his/her apparent vulnerability or substantive hardship, at 
the time of enforcement of a contract.123  Anything further than this, must be 
situated within the relevant internal autonomy doctrine.124  In other words, a 
deficiency in the legal conception of internal autonomy cannot be cured by the 
doctrine of legality. 
 
3.3.5 Further changes required to the contract law machine 
In this section, I have shown that the legal methodology employed by our 
common law of contract is also ideologically loaded.  In particular, I have shown 
how the specific methodologies, as attached to the internal content and the 
external reach dimensions of contractual autonomy respectively, influence their 
relevant normative delineations. 
The lesson is that the post-apartheid determination of the internal 
content and external reach dimensions of contractual autonomy (both actual 
and apparent), must take appropriate cognisance of the implications of the 
applicable methodologies, themselves.  In other words, it is insufficient, simply 
to advocate for a blanket, indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights,125 
where the focus is on constitutionalising the substance of contract law alone, 
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and the common law framework finds indiscriminate application, absent any 
critical reflection.  It is just as crucial, that the internal and external paradigms of 
contract law are developed, simultaneously.  They too, need to reflect a 
constitutionalised contract law methodology and culture that is most suited to 
the articulation of the applicable constitutional right(s), and/or underlying 
values, together with the foundational triage’s conception(s) of contractual 
autonomy. 
At this juncture, it is important to take note, also of the operation of 
general default rules and decision-making strategies, which transcend the 
internal content and external reach dimensions of contractual autonomy, within 
our common law of contract. 
In relation to default contract rules and decision-making strategies, the 
theme appears to be that, which can be imputed reasonably, to ‘the intentions 
of the parties’; this notwithstanding, the absence of any actual intention, in 
terms of the relevant matter.126  So, default rules, for example, are justified on 
the basis that consensus can be inferred from the lack of any indication of a 
contrary intention.  At the same time, these rules have no bearing to what was 
actually contemplated by the parties, at the time of contracting.  Rather, they 
have been based traditionally, in equity and good faith.  Further, the default 
rules have been said to have the effect of “nudg[ing] people to ultimately make 
improved decisions and reach beneficial results.”127  As Hawthorne explains,  
“…[the] identification of contract law’s choice architecture found in the [default] 
rules which have the effect of nudging a contracting party towards making a 
better decision…are ubiquitous and extremely powerful…the main reason 
[being]…that most people tend to accept the status quo. Furthermore, 
ignorance, transaction costs, strategic bargaining and economic power also 
favour the status quo, with the result that usually only the well-informed, 
wealthy and powerful will contract out of the default option in a case where the 
default option would be to their detriment.”128 
In light of this reality therefore, it is imperative that default rules, as 
formulated in the pre-1994 era, are re-assessed in terms of the Constitution, so 
that, they do not accord simply with the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, 
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but also, nudge contract law in the direction of promoting actively, the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
The same would apply in relation to the rules of interpretation,129 as well 
as the permeating ‘construction’ techniques which, being tied to the artificially 
imputed ‘intention of the parties’, has proved capable of manipulation, 
according to the preferred legal outcome of the judge.  However, the scope for 
such manipulation can be reduced significantly, if the ‘construction technique’ is 
tied instead, to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  This would 
facilitate a more holistic, normative interrogation and would dovetail, with the 
post-apartheid nudging efforts of the constitutionalised default rules of contract 
law. 
I would submit further, that the strategy of nudging should be integrated 
consciously, also in the broader constitutionalisation of the internal and external 
dimensions of contractual autonomy. 
In the final event, the courts have on occasion employed an ‘evidence 
technique’, in terms of which, they are said to avoid dealing with a particular 
issue, because of a lack of evidence, in relation thereto.130  Yet, this technique 
would be legitimate, if done in a principled and consistent manner.  To this end, 
I would suggest that judges distinguish clearly between, what I term, ‘hard facts’ 
and ‘soft facts’.  ‘Hard facts’ would be those facts that are specific to the 
particular contracting parties.  In contrast, ‘soft facts’ would be those broader 
normative/policy concerns, that apply more generally to contracts, operating in 
the South African constitutional context.  So, it stands to reason, that the former 
must be proved concretely with evidence, whereas the latter, ought to be 
brought into play, regardless.131  Further, if this distinction is appreciated and 
observed uniformly, both by judges and litigants, the scope for seemingly 
fortuitous invocations of the evidence technique, will be reduced significantly. 
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3.4 BILL OF RIGHTS’ LEGAL METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE INTERNAL 
(CONTENT) AND EXTERNAL (REACH) DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTUAL 
AUTONOMY 
As outlined in Chapter One, the horizontality debate has focused largely on 
whether a direct or indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is to be 
preferred.132  However, upon closer examination of sections 8 and 39(1) and (2) 
of the Bill of Rights, it becomes apparent that horizontal application transcends 
the direct-indirect horizontality paradigm.  The focus rather, is on the scope133 
and form134 of application, of the relevant constitutional rights and underlying 
values, including the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality, to the 
common law of contract. 
In this respect, I re-iterate the importance of assessing, and if necessary 
updating, not only the substance of contract law, but also, the contract law 
machine (with its methodology), so as to reflect, the new constitutional ideology 
and what ought to be, an altered legal culture. 
To illustrate, if the existing contract law machine were to be adopted, 
without question, the classical liberal internal conception of autonomy would be 
naturalised and the tipped public policy scale too, would be adopted.  But as 
shown above, the classical liberal philosophy may no longer be appropriate.  
Further, to adopt the tipped public policy scale blindly could, on the basis of its 
classical liberal bias and resulting common law hegemony of freedom of 
contract, diminish the significance of the implicated constitutional rights and 
values.  So, the constitutionalisation of the public policy scale, for instance, 
would require that it be adjusted in such a way, that it facilitates a more 
balanced, systematic engagement with the relevant constitutional rights and 
values, as flowing from a fuller internal conception of contractual autonomy.  
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For the reasons outlined earlier, I contend that this would, at least, require the 
addition of an ‘enforceability level’ to the scale.135 
In addition, judges will have to question whether, there is a need further, 
to differentiate and adapt the common law framework and attending 
methodologies, depending on the nature of the substantive constitutional right, 
that is implicated.  There may be a need also, to develop supplementary 
frameworks, in order to ensure a systematic approach to the determination of 
which rights ought to be horizontally applicable, and more importantly, how to 
determine the relative impact/weightings of the different rights and values of the 
Bill of Rights, in relation to the relevant internal and external conceptions, and 
operations, of a constitutionalised contractual autonomy. 
At the very least, when so constitutionalising the contract law machine, 
judges will draw principally, on the intricate s 8 and s 36(1) methodologies, as 
set out in the Bill of Rights, given that these methodologies have been designed 
specifically, for normative engagement with the Bill of Rights.136 
Having thus outlined what needs to happen in order to constitutionalise 
the methodology employed by our contract law machine, I will now evaluate the 
ways in which our courts have, thus far, attempted to do this. 
 
3.5 SELECTED POST-CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
 
3.5.1 Cases of the SCA (Pre Barkhuizen v Napier (CC)) 
As discussed in the previous chapters, in Brisley v Drotsky, Cameron JA 
situated contract law within our constitutional dispensation, where he relied on s 
39(2), essentially to infuse contract law with the founding values of our Bill of 
Rights.137  Subsequent cases have thus, supported the horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights, essentially via the portal of public policy.138 
Nevertheless, the conservative legal culture of the SCA continues to 
dominate their approach to the constitutionalisation of contract law.  The basic 
premise appears to be, that the pre-constitutional common law public policy 
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framework is the appropriate platform for engaging with the foundational 
constitutional triage, as well as with substantive constitutional rights and their 
underpinning values, because it fits neatly with the neo-liberal economic 
policies that permeate the South African market.139 
 
(a) The SCA’s approach to the external reach dimension of contractual 
autonomy 
In terms of the external reach dimension of autonomy, the SCA has been 
especially cautious in its conception of the ‘unacceptable excesses’ of 
contractual autonomy, where a fairly high threshold of unfairness is prescribed.  
The court has maintained consistently, that the mere fact ‘that a term is unfair 
[or unreasonable] or may operate harshly’ cannot outweigh freedom of contract, 
to render the term unconstitutional and thus, against public policy.140  In Brisley, 
Cameron JA stressed, that judges must exercise ‘perceptive restraint’, lest 
contract law becomes unacceptably uncertain.141  Clearly, this is an articulation 
of the traditional common law position, where the tipped public policy scale 
effectively gives primacy to the thin, (classical liberal) conception of contractual 
autonomy.142  According to the SCA therefore, the public policy scale and 
attendant methodology are to remain unaffected, even where a substantive 
constitutional right is implicated.143 
To illustrate the point, in Napier v Barkhuizen, the SCA effectively 
preserved the pre-constitutional common law rule on time-bar clauses, by way 
of a legalistic approach to the issue.  It held that the clause did not implicate s 
34 of the Bill of Rights, because the right to insurance in that case stemmed 
from the contract alone and, as such, freedom, dignity and equality endorsed 
the common law rule.144  The court thus avoided any critical engagement with s 
34, in relation to contractual time-bar clauses and did not even have to invoke 
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the public policy scale.  Yet, its necessary premise was, that contract law’s 
classical liberal articulation of freedom of contract trumped the substantive, 
constitutional right of access to court.145 
This is not to say, that s 34 has not found application in the realm of 
contract law.  In Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc and Others v National Potato 
Co-operative Ltd,146 s 34 was invoked to extend the external reach of freedom 
of contract, by recognising that champertous agreements are no longer, 
contrary to public policy.  Likewise, in SA Bank of Athens Ltd v Van Zyl,147 s 34 
influenced the re-definition of parate eksekutie, so that, such clauses per se, 
are no longer against public policy.  Finally, in Bafana Finance Mabopane v 
Makwakwa, the SCA clearly held that a contractual clause, which restricts a 
debtor’s statutory right to seek judicial redress, (in the form of an administration 
order), is against public policy, as informed by the values underpinning the Bill 
of Rights, including s 34.148  Nevertheless, in all of these cases, the traditional 
public policy scale, accompanied by the ‘all or nothing’ approach, found 
application and, for the most part, simply bolstered its classical liberal 
underpinnings and so, extended the reach of contractual autonomy. 
In dealing with a socio-economic constitutional right, the SCA in Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom, accepted that, the values underpinning the s 
27(1)(a) constitutional right of access to health care services had to be taken 
into account, when determining the legality of an exclusion clause, that 
excluded a hospital’s liability for the negligence of its nursing staff.149  
Nonetheless, when the public policy scale, together with the ‘all or nothing’ 
methodology was applied, it was found that the public interest in freedom of 
contract and pacta sunt servanda remained paramount.150  Accordingly, the 
clause was held to be valid and enforceable. 
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In the final event, the SCA, in Johannesburg Country Club v Stott, dealt 
with the implication for contracts, of the constitutional right to life, embodied in s 
11 of the Bill of Rights.  In this respect, the SCA was more forthcoming, where it 
alluded to the possibility of an exclusion clause, that purports to exclude liability 
for negligently causing another’s death, as being against public policy, because 
this would be contrary, not only to the common law’s high regard for the 
sanctity of life, but also, to the spirit of s 11.151  Yet, here too, there is no 
suggestion of a more progressive transformative legal culture, with an altered 
public policy scale.  At the very least, the traditional public policy scale would 
need to be adjusted so that it is able, effectively to address the outcome of 
enforcement, in the particular circumstances of the contracting parties.152  
Indeed, as explained earlier, to put those considerations, pertaining to 
enforceability on the original ‘tendency’ scale, would be largely ineffective, and 
would inadvertently, convolute the public policy enquiry itself.153 
To sum up, the methodology that emerges from these cases, embodies 
the pre-constitutional, common law public policy framework, with the caveat 
that the values underpinning the applicable substantive constitutional rights 
(including the foundational values), must be taken into account.  Nevertheless, 
the SCA still employs the tipped public policy (tendency) scale, with the 
traditional ‘all or nothing’ common law approach, which also limits when, where 
and to what extent these constitutional values may infiltrate.  As a result, 
contractual autonomy remains the predominant consideration, which generally 
trumps competing public interest and constitutional values, including those, 
which underpin substantive constitutional rights.154  Thus far, contractual 
autonomy has only been bolstered by constitutional values; it has not been 
trumped, save in the exceptional circumstances, as identified by the pre-
constitutional common law.  This is why commentators have mostly lambasted 
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the judiciary’s approach to the constitutionalisation of our common law of 
contract.155 
Notwithstanding, the advent of the Constitution, the SCA continued, 
somewhat exclusively, to promote the classical liberal notion of freedom of 
contract, and the attending commercial certainty, as intrinsic goods.  Yet, what 
should be apparent from the earlier discussion of the public policy scale, is that 
the confidence in the common law public policy framework, and its 
understanding of the generally ‘hegemonic’156 (external) parameters of classical 
contractual autonomy, ultimately undermines the relevant constitutional rights 
(and underlying values), as it prevents a more evenhanded, and thus, 
sufficiently rigorous balancing exercise from taking place. 
 
(b) The SCA’s approach to the internal content dimension of contractual 
autonomy 
As outlined earlier, the SCA’s approach to contract law’s pre-constitutional 
articulation of the internal content dimension of autonomy, for the most part, 
remains unchanged.  To be sure, the legal methodology employed by our 
contract law machine, to the established internal dimension of autonomy,157 still 
fosters the thin (classical liberal) conception of autonomy; devoid of any 
constitutional interrogation.158  At the same time, however, there has been a 
movement that began in Afrox, which purports to situate the relevant 
constitutional, normative interrogation of internal autonomy, within the doctrine 
of legality. 
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(i) Case of the SCA:  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 
In Afrox Healthcare and Napier, the SCA contemplated taking cognisance of an 
inequality in bargaining power, in relation to an exclusion clause, that appeared 
in a standard form contract.  However, the court contemplated placing it on the 
traditional public policy scale, with a view to ensuring that parties are not 
“forced to contract…on terms that infringe…dignity and equality”.159  In other 
words, the court contemplated an invocation of the original, public policy 
tendency scale, to remedy a deficient, internal conception of contractual 
autonomy. 
That aside, the SCA held that in any event, there was no evidence of 
unequal bargaining power between the parties, in casu.  As a result, the 
potential deficiency, in the internal content of a constitutionalised contractual 
autonomy, was a non-issue. 
This approach of the SCA is problematic on a number of levels.  To 
begin with, the envisaged normative interrogation of the internal content 
dimension of contractual autonomy upon the traditional public policy scale, 
would, as explained earlier, be unsound in terms of legal principle.  It would 
also needlessly convolute the basic function of the doctrine of legality.160 
Moving on, to the ostensible lack of evidence of unequal bargaining 
power, here, the SCA clearly invoked the earlier outlined evidence technique, 
apparently to avoid the question of unequal bargaining power.  Nevertheless, 
this has led to considerable confusion, in terms of the nature of the 
contemplated ‘public policy’ enquiry.  For instance, does the SCA contemplate 
looking at unequal bargaining power, as a broader normative consideration, or 
rather, with a view to curing a factual deficiency in the internal content of 
autonomy, as exercised by a particular contracting party?  Alternatively, does 
the SCA contemplate looking at unequal bargaining power, only insofar as it 
may impact on the question of substantive contractual unfairness, at the time of 
enforcement of the contract? 
Clearly, these are distinct questions which implicate different scales (or, 
at the very least, different levels of a particular scale), and therewith, different 
rules regarding evidence.  So, as a broader normative consideration, the issue 
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of unequal bargaining power ought to be recognised as a ‘soft fact’, that does 
not require evidence.  Moreover, such ‘soft fact’ would relate necessarily, and 
primarily, to the normative dimension of the internal conception of autonomy.  In 
other words, the doctrine of legality, with its ‘tendency level’ of the public policy 
scale, relating as it does to the external reach dimension of autonomy, would 
not be the appropriate portal for the normative enquiry.  Rather, the relevant 
doctrine pertaining to internal autonomy ought to come into play.  But given that 
the internal autonomy framework, as it currently stands, does not accommodate 
inequalities in bargaining power, it would have to be developed accordingly, 
both in terms of where, specifically in the contract law framework, to situate the 
issue of unequal bargaining power, as well as, how, best to articulate it, in 
terms of legal principle (and ensuing rules and standards), and the attendant 
judicial methodology. 
In contrast, if unequal bargaining power becomes an issue, that is 
specific to particular contracting parties too, then it ought to be recognised, also 
as a ‘hard fact’, that must be proved by evidence.  More importantly, a judge 
needs to be clear, as to the function of unequal bargaining power, in the 
particular context.  If it is meant to cure a factual deficiency in the internal 
content of autonomy, then the doctrine of legality would obviously not be the 
appropriate portal.  Rather, it would again need to be situated, within the 
internal autonomy dimension of the contract law framework, as developed, to 
accommodate the question of unequal bargaining power. 
At best, if the fact of unequal bargaining power is meant to be a mere 
factor in determining whether, it would be reasonable in the circumstances, to 
enforce a particular contract, then the ‘enforceability level’ of the public policy 
scale, would be appropriate.  Still, it is highly unlikely, even in this context, that 
unequal bargaining power can ever comprise a relevant factor, and/or have a 
material impact.  This is because, the gatekeeper entry valve, for the external 
reach enquiry, is that the parties did, in fact, exercise their autonomy fully, in 
relation to the relevant contract. 
Arguably, the failure to appreciate these methodological nuances, has 
contributed materially to the general voice of dissatisfaction with the SCA’s 
application of the evidence technique, to the issue of unequal bargaining 
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power.161  Even so, the SCA still falls short, insofar as it purports to situate the 
question of unequal bargaining power, within the doctrine of legality, as 
opposed to the relevant doctrine(s) articulating the internal dimension of 
autonomy. 
 
3.5.2 Case of the CC:  Barkhuizen v Napier 
The Barkhuizen judgment is significant because it constitutes the CC’s first, 
direct engagement with the common law of contract.  For this reason, I will 
begin, by outlining the reasoning of the majority judgment and thereafter, 
provide a critique. 
 
(a) Barkhuizen v Napier: Majority judgment by Ngcobo J; Minority 
judgments by Moseneke DCJ and Sachs J 
Briefly stated, Barkhuizen was an appeal against the SCA judgment, referred to 
above.  The appellant argued, that the 90 day time bar clause in a short-term 
insurance contract amounted to an unreasonable and unjustified limitation of 
the constitutional right of access to court, enshrined in s 34, and was therefore, 
contrary to public policy and unenforceable.162 
At the outset, Ngcobo J, delivering judgment for the majority of the 
Court, endorsed Cameron JA’s broader conception of the law of contract, in the 
autonomy-based (empowerment) image of the values of freedom, dignity and 
equality.163  The court therefore, accepted as its starting point, that the 
Constitution likewise requires contractants to honour contractual obligations 
that were freely and voluntarily undertaken.  Freedom of contract thus, remains 
a predominant consideration.  In accepting this position however, the court was 
also alert to the limits of the external reach of contractual autonomy: it stressed 
that the ‘obscene’ or ‘unacceptable excesses’164 of freedom of contract must be 
curbed.  As a result, the contractual principle of pacta sunt servanda, although 
primarily supported by the Constitution, is ultimately subject to constitutional 
control.165  In other words, the efficacy of the constitutionalised conception of 
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contract law must depend on, what constitutes an ‘unacceptable excess’ and, 
more importantly, how to determine such. 
In this respect, the court provided important indicators when it dealt with 
the question of the specific implications of s 34 for contract.  Notably, the court 
opted for an indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights.  It held that, as 
between private contractants, the proper approach to a constitutional challenge 
of a contractual term, on the basis of a substantive fundamental right, is to 
determine whether the term is contrary to the common law standard of public 
policy, which must now, be informed by the constitutional values that underlie 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights.166  According to the court, this approach 
‘leaves space for the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda to operate, but at the 
same time allows courts to decline to enforce contractual terms that are in 
conflict with the constitutional values even though the parties may have 
consented to them.’167 
The court thus, rightly invoked the portal of legality, to assess the 
external reach dimension of contractual autonomy.  In doing so, it opted also for 
the traditional public policy scale, where the values underpinning freedom of 
contract were balanced against the values underpinning the s 34 constitutional 
right of access to court.168  Articulated further, the court held that, in relation to s 
34, the question was whether the time bar clause afforded the contractant a 
reasonable, just and fair opportunity to access the courts.169  The fringe of the 
external reach of contractual autonomy was thus located at the point, where the 
time bar clause crossed the threshold of fairness, justice and reasonableness. 
In terms of how to locate this fringe, in relation to s 34, the CC developed 
a two-stage public policy approach.  Firstly, the court must determine whether 
objectively speaking, the time bar clause is contrary to public policy i.e. is the 
clause itself unreasonable?  In other words, the court must first assess the 
‘tendency’ of the clause.  Secondly, if the clause is found to be objectively 
reasonable, the court must then decide whether the clause should be enforced 
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in light of the circumstances, which prevented compliance with the clause i.e. is 
it subjectively reasonable, in the circumstances, to enforce the clause?170 
On the facts, the court held that the clause itself was not unreasonable 
because the appellant had all the information required to issue summons, at the 
commencement of the ninety day period.171  Furthermore, there was no 
evidence, that the applicant was in a weaker bargaining position, or that he had 
not freely and voluntarily entered into the contract, or that he was unaware of 
the time bar clause.172  In essence therefore, in the court’s application of the 
first stage of its approach, it defined the reasonableness of the time bar clause, 
in terms of the presumed, internal autonomy of the applicant.  In other words, 
the lack of evidence of a deficiency, in the internal (content) dimension of 
autonomy, meant that the classical liberal articulation of the traditional public 
policy scale, tipped to the side of freedom of contract, played a definitive role in 
the outcome of the case. 
In relation to the second stage of the court’s approach, it could not be 
said, according to the court, that it was unfair or unreasonable to enforce the 
time bar clause, in the circumstances, primarily, because the appellant had 
failed to explain his non-compliance with the clause.173  The court therefore, 
held that the time-bar clause was valid and enforceable. 
In contrast to the majority judgment, the minority judgments of Moseneke 
DCJ and more especially, Sachs J, conducted a rigorous interrogation of the 
internal content dimension of contractual autonomy, given that the contract in 
question was a standard form contract.  Nevertheless, both judgments 
purported to situate such interrogation, within the doctrine of legality.  
Furthermore, they did so upon the traditional ‘tendency’ public policy scale; the 
‘enforceability’ dimension being rejected.174 
 
(b) Critique of Barkhuizen v Napier 
From the above exposition of Barkhuizen, it is clear that within our 
constitutional dispensation, freedom of contract and the attendant pacta sunt 
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servanda, remain the twin dowels that hold the principles, doctrines and rules of 
contract law together.  Furthermore, in terms of s 39(2) of the Bill of Rights, a 
constitutionalised doctrine of legality is the platform for determining the limits of 
the external reach of contractual autonomy, in relation to the substantive right in 
s 34 of the Bill of Rights.  The essential premise therefore, is that freedom of 
contract can, and must be balanced, against the values of fairness, justice and 
reasonableness, as they underpin the s 34 constitutional right of access to 
court i.e. fairness, justice and reasonableness, in terms of access to court, must 
curb the unacceptable excesses of the reach of contractual autonomy.175 
Moreover, the CC adjusted the framework within which the ‘access to 
court-public policy’ enquiry takes place.  Whereas, the ‘all or nothing’ common 
law approach focuses only on the clause in question,176 the CC also drew 
attention to the particular circumstances of the contractants and therefore, the 
particular outcome of the case.  In doing so, it is submitted, that the CC infused 
elements of s 8(2) and s 36(1), to guide the constitutional adjustment of the 
common law methodology, contemplated by s 39(2).177  Further, this resonates 
with the methodology applied by the common law, to contracts in restraints of 
trade.178  The net result, therefore, is a shift along the continuum, from a 
completely abstract, tendency-based analysis of a contractual term, to a more 
concrete, outcomes-based analysis.  Arguably, this was an attempt to create a 
more evenhanded approach to contractual autonomy, so as to afford greater 
recognition to the substantive constitutional right implicated by the time-bar 
clause179. 
Broadly speaking, this development is to be welcomed.  Nevertheless, 
the Court was not sufficiently rigorous in its identification and interrogation of 
considerations specific to the external reach dimension of contractual 
autonomy; it being a legality issue.  Nor was it careful, in its allocation of the 
relevant considerations, to the respective levels of the scale.  Indeed, the Court 
held, that 90 days was not a ‘manifestly unreasonable period’, without much 
interrogation.  Objectively speaking, a mere comparison of 90 days to a ‘24 
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hour period’ cannot suffice.180  Yet, the Court did not explain why it used a ‘24 
hour period’ as its objective benchmark.  Furthermore, the Court did not draw 
effectively from its s 34 jurisprudence, on this issue.  The enquiry simply 
collapsed into an assessment of the circumstances of the particular parties 
before the court, in the sense of their exercise of autonomy, on conclusion of 
the contract, and in light thereof, the reasons for non-compliance with the time-
bar clause.181  In the end therefore, the classical liberal conception autonomy, 
as entrenched by the established doctrines and rules articulating internal 
autonomy, remained decisive in determining whether the clause was 
unreasonable, both objectively and subjectively.182 
To sum up, the majority court failed fully to appreciate and/or express 
the nature and effect of the various considerations i.e. whether they implicate 
the external or internal dimension of contractual autonomy or both, and 
furthermore, how, and to what extent, do they do so?  For instance, does a 
particular consideration operate as a broader normative/policy concern, or is it 
more in the nature of a ‘hard fact’, that is specific to particular contracting 
parties and needs proof, by way of evidence?  Alternatively, does the 
consideration implicate some combination of policy (‘soft facts’) and legal 
principle (as applied to ‘hard facts’)?  Yet, these questions are crucial, 
especially in the context of the transitional process of constitutionalising the 
common law of contract. 
Looking briefly, at the approach of the minority judgments then, although 
far more rigorous than the majority judgment, they failed sufficiently, to 
distinguish between the internal and external dimensions of contractual 
autonomy.  Indeed, they purported to resolve deficiencies of internal autonomy 
upon the traditional public policy scale; a scale which is designed essentially to 
deal with the external reach dimension of autonomy.  The basic function of the 
doctrine of legality was thus, ultimately confused.  Moreover, the façade that 
the doctrines and rules articulating internal autonomy are ‘value neutral’ was 
perpetuated. 
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3.5.3 Cases of the SCA (Post Barkhuizen v Napier (CC)) 
The most significant case after Barkhuizen, is that of Bredenkamp v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd.  In this case, the SCA purported to clarify the impact 
of Barkhuizen on our common law of contract.  In particular, it appears to have 
accepted the two-level public policy scale, at least, where the s 34 right of 
access to courts is implicated.183  Nevertheless, whether the SCA will apply the 
subjective enforceability level of the scale, in relation to other constitutional 
rights and values, is unclear. 
To begin with, the court emphasised that values such as fairness and 
reasonableness are not constitutional values in the abstract, and furthermore, 
cannot be determined on the basis of individual perceptions of what is fair.  
Rather, it must be tied concretely to relevant “public policy consideration(s) 
found in the Constitution or elsewhere...”.184 
To this extent, I would agree with the SCA.  It is imperative that the 
reasonableness of a contract, and/or its enforcement, always be determined in 
terms of a methodical, (constitutionalised) public policy exercise, in accordance 
with concrete guidelines, that are established, over time.  To illustrate, neither 
the tendency, nor the enforceability, of contracts in restraint of trade, has been 
the subject of judges’ individual whims or fancies, as to what is fair or 
reasonable,185 when they have made value judgments.  Nor has this area of 
law been rendered unacceptably uncertain, by the nature of the purposive 
adjudication that it fosters.186 
Nevertheless, in highlighting the point that concepts of 
fairness/reasonableness are not free-floating, the SCA did so, upon the basis of 
the long-established, liberal legalist approach to adjudication.  In the words of 
the SCA, 
“A constitutional principle that tends to be overlooked, when generalised resort 
to constitutional values is made is the principle of legality.  Making rules of law 
discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive of the rule of 
law”.187 
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Indeed, it would seem that this concern led the court to conclude that the 
enforceability level of the public policy scale, as set out in Barkhuizen, did not 
apply in relation to the parties before it.188  Here, the court iterated the fact that 
no substantive right had been implicated in casu, and further, that there was no 
overarching requirement of fairness in contract law.189 
Yet, as outlined earlier, the constitutionalisation of our common law of 
contract is grounded now, in the foundational constitutional triage.  Accordingly, 
our common law doctrine of legality is grounded equally in the triage.  This 
point of departure has two important consequences:  First, our courts need to 
adopt a more ‘policy oriented and consequentialist’ approach, which will 
ensure, that not only the tendency of the contract/clause is (constitutionally) 
reasonable and therefore, in line with public policy, but also, that the outcome in 
every contract law case is constitutionally just or reasonable.190  Second, the 
concept of reasonableness is not free floating, but necessarily grounded in the 
foundational constitutional triage (both at the tendency, and enforceability, 
levels of the public policy scale) which, in terms of s 39(2), must find application 
in every contract law case.  In other words, in every case, both the tendency of 
a contract/clause, as well as its enforcement, in the particular circumstances of 
the parties, ought to be (constitutionally) reasonable.  Importantly, the 
application of reasonableness per se does not depend on whether a 
substantive right is implicated or not.  Rather, where s 34 or any other 
enumerated constitutional right is applicable, such right(s) would serve to 
inform the triage’s conception of reasonableness, in relation to the doctrine of 
legality. 
In the end therefore, the SCA appears to be immersed still, in the 
conservative legal culture, as steeped in liberal legalism.  As a result, the SCA 
purports to revert largely, to the pre-Barkhuizen public policy scale and 
moreover, does not address any of the concerns, as outlined here, in relation to 
Barkhuizen itself. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have shown how the legal method, as employed in our 
common law of contract, is informed by pre-constitutional legal culture and 
classical liberal ideology.  Accordingly, just as the legal culture and underlying 
ideology must be constitutionalised, so too, must the legal method finding 
application be re-aligned with the substantively progressive and transformative 
goals of the Constitution.  At the very least, legal method, operating in the 
constitutional context, must reflect the weight that ought to be attached to the 
foundational constitutional triage, as well as constitutional right(s) that may be 
applicable. 
In carrying out their adjudicative function therefore, judges must be fully 
conscious of this task.  Nevertheless, whereas the judiciary accepts that the 
common law of contract is subject now to the Constitution, its constitutional 
interrogation, to date, has been fairly limited.  Thus far, the courts have only 
invoked contract law’s public policy scale, as situated within the doctrine of 
legality.  At the same time, the courts have failed to appreciate, that the legality 
doctrine houses only the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy.  
On the contrary, the courts appear to envisage, that the normative 
considerations pertaining to the internal content dimension of autonomy will 
likewise be placed on legality’s public policy scale.  As a result, the operation of 
the public policy scale, even in terms of the erstwhile classical liberal ideology, 
seems to be confused, so that, the outcomes yielded by contract cases in the 
constitutional era, even those that implicate substantive constitutional rights, 
have been less than satisfactory. 
What the courts need to do, firstly, is to appreciate the distinction 
between the internal content and external reach dimensions of contractual 
autonomy.  Second, they must be clear as to the legal function of each 
dimension, and how the methodologies pertaining to each, influence the legal 
outcomes of cases.  Third, they need to adjust the relevant methodologies, as 
required by the foundational triage and any substantive right(s) that may be 
implicated.  Finally, the courts need to ensure that the specific considerations 
pertaining to each case, are situated correctly within the correct (internal 
autonomy) framework, and/or the right level of the (external autonomy) public 
policy scale. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONALISED APPROACH TO 
CONTRACTUAL AUTONOMY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having laid down the theoretical foundations of my broader research question, I 
propose, in this chapter, to set out a ‘basic constitutionalised approach’ to 
contractual autonomy and the attending common law methodology, firstly, in 
terms of the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality 
and secondly, in terms of the substantive constitutional rights that may be 
implicated. 
In doing so, I begin by highlighting briefly the main points of each of the 
previous chapters and teasing out the pertinent connections between them.  
Indeed, in the first chapter, I argued for a particular kind of constitutionalisation 
of contract law, predominantly through the common law portal, but which has 
both a general and a case-specific dimension.  Notably, the general and case-
specific dimensions of the constitutionalisation process are mandated by ss 
39(2) and 8(3) of the Constitution respectively.  These sections highlight the 
need simultaneously to constitutionalise the entire body of contract law 
incrementally, and gradually, over time, (essentially within the common law 
tradition), and moreover, to ensure that justice is done in every individual 
contract law case, in a way that is consistent with and promotes the general 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights (including its foundational values), 
as well as those substantive right(s), (if any), implicated by a particular case. 
In Chapter Two then, I interrogated the concept of contractual autonomy 
(both actual and apparent), and argued that in post-apartheid South Africa, 
autonomy comprises two essential components viz. an internal content 
component and an external reach component.  In this respect, I explained that 
the substance of both of these components and therefore, the substance of 
contract law needs to transcend its classical liberal underpinnings and be re-
legitimated within the foundational constitutional triage’s more fluid conception 
of autonomy, as embodied by the constitutional self.  Notably, where an 
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enumerated constitutional right(s) is also implicated in a particular case, the 
specific operation of the triage has to be further informed by this fact. 
Finally, in Chapter Three, I looked at the role of the extant common law 
methodology in entrenching the classical liberal ideology and ensuing legalist 
judicial culture.  I emphasised the need to adjust the contract law machine 
itself, in a manner that would better suit a constitutional determination of both 
the internal and external dimensions of contractual autonomy.  To this end, I 
further stressed the importance of looking for guidance in the methodology 
engaged, most especially by ss 8, 36 and 39(2) of the Constitution. 
So, in this chapter, I draw from the arguments advanced and 
conclusions reached in Chapters One, Two and Three, in order to construct an 
approach to the general constitutionalisation of contract law, in terms of the 
foundational constitutional triage of freedom, dignity and equality.  I then 
consider the application of this approach in relation to the more specific 
situation, where one or more distinct substantive rights also find application in a 
particular case.  For one thing, it must be appreciated that substantive rights 
are more concrete, (at least, in their impact), than the values which underpin 
them.  More importantly, the purposes served by the rights themselves may be 
different - they may, for instance, be civil, social and/or economic.1  For this 
reason, it is to be expected that these differences will influence the legal 
outcome of a case - they may implicate different dimensions of autonomy 
which, in turn, may require different ‘degrees’ of constitutionalisation and 
different methodological adjustments. 
The pertinent question to be addressed in relation to substantive rights 
therefore, is where and how, these differences can, and will, make a difference, 
both generally, as well as in the context of a particular case, to legal outcomes 
produced by a constitutionalised law of contract. 
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It is with this question in mind, that I consider finally, the application of 
three distinct rights in this chapter; one that in a contractual setting may loosely 
be classified as economic (i.e. the freedom of trade, occupation and profession 
(s 22)), one that may loosely be classified as civil (i.e. the freedom of religion, 
belief and opinion (s 15(1))) and one that may loosely be classified as socio-
economic (i.e. the right to have access to health care services (s 27(1)(a))).  In 
all three instances, I show that constitutional infusion of the relevant substance, 
form and attending mechanics of operation of our contract law is possible, 
without sacrificing the law’s doctrinal coherence or certainty and in the end 
therefore, without sacrificing the integrity of the common law of contract. 
 
4.2 A JUDGE’S MANUAL FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 
OF CONTRACT 
 
4.2.1 Horizontal application of the Bill of Rights and the public-private 
divide 
As explained in Chapter One, the point of departure is that the common law of 
contract, like all other branches of South African law, is subject to the Bill of 
Rights.  In other words, judges must appreciate that the pre-constitutional 
(classical liberal) delineation of public (constitutional) law, versus private 
(contract) law, can no longer hold true.  But that is not to say, that there no 
longer is any value in the distinction between the public and the private.  
Rather, what judges must understand is that the Bill of Rights has replaced the 
impenetrable brick wall between the public and the private, with a more 
permeable wire-mesh fence. 
So, on the one hand, the removal of the brick wall enables judges to 
begin the constitutionalisation process of our private law of contract firstly, (and 
more generally), in terms of the Bill of Rights’ overarching ‘spirit, purport and 
objects’ and attending foundational values in all contract cases, and secondly, 
(and more specifically), in terms of any substantive constitutional rights (and/or 
duties) that may find application in the context of a particular contract case.  On 
the other hand, the wall’s replacement with a public-private wire-mesh fence 
recognises the need for judges, simultaneously to ‘translate’ the application of 
relevant constitutional concepts, in a manner, that befits the broader private 
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context, as well as the more particular context that the contracting parties find 
themselves in.2  At a minimum, the nature, extent and manner of application of 
both the broader constitutional values in every contract law matter, as well as 
the specific rights (and/or duties) pertinent to the particular contract case before 
the court, are linked inextricably to whether a judge is dealing with a public or 
private entity.  If a private entity, their basic nature also becomes relevant.  For 
instance, is the private entity a natural or a juristic person?  How vulnerable or 
powerful is the person? etc. 
In ‘horizontal application’ speak, this constitutionally altered public-
private divide means that judges basically need to conduct two distinct, (albeit 
related) enquiries, in order to constitutionalise our common law of contract.  To 
begin with, judges must consider the scope (content) of horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights to contract law.  Thereafter, judges must determine the form 
(method) of such application.3 
Beginning with the scope enquiry, a judge would be concerned with 
whether, and if so, the extent to which, the Bill of Rights ought to apply to the 
private common law of contract, both generally, to all contract law cases, as 
well as more specifically, in the context of a particular contract, where the legal 
outcome of the case now, must also be constitutionally sound/just. 
An essential premise here is that the law, as opposed to conduct per se, 
must pass constitutional muster.4  Articulated further, the question of the actual 
content of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights relates, at least, to the 
broader application of the foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality 
to contract law.5  In terms of s 8(1), read with ss 39(1) and 39(2), the Bill of 
Rights is applicable to the whole of the common law of contract, in the sense 
that all of its rules, standards, doctrines, principles and policies must 
reverberate with, and give effect to, (or at least, not be inconsistent with), the 
                                                 
2
 Hugh Collins ‘Utility and rights in common law reasoning: Rebalancing private law through 
constitutionalization’ (2007) 30 The Dalhousie Law Journal 1 at 23. 
3
 See discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2.  See also Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and 
Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at paras 39-40.  
As a final point, take note that the respective headings of ss 8 and 39 are misleading, as 
elements of application and interpretation are found in both provisions. 
4
 On the law versus conduct distinction, see the discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2.1(a). 
5
 Section 8(1) read with s 39(2) of the Constitution.  Where I use the term content in the context 
of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, I mean the particular substance of the rights and 
values of the Bill of Rights, which judges must delineate. 
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broader ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights, together with its 
foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality.  Importantly, this 
comprises the ‘objective normative value system’ that is the bedrock of the Bill 
of Rights and accordingly, the broader constitutionalisation process of the 
common law of contract.6 
At the same time, there is also the narrower context of a particular 
matter, where a substantive constitutional right(s) (and corresponding duties), 
may or may not be implicated.  In terms of s 8(2) of the Constitution, a judge 
must focus on the (potential) scope of application of substantive constitutional 
rights (and corresponding duties), to the contracts of private persons, that are 
the subject of individual instances of litigation and by logical extension, to 
contract law itself.  In other words, the focus of the judge here, must be on the 
extent of application of the Bill of Rights to a particular matter and the contract 
law, that ought to govern it in the specific context.  The judge must decide how 
much, or to what extent, it is necessary for contract law to be constitutionally 
resonant. 
So, in essence, s 8(2) is a crucial precursor, to the development that a 
judge may deem necessary, in terms of s 8(3) of the Constitution.  Accordingly, 
factors that impact on the ‘how much of contract law to change’ question, are 
relevant here i.e. the question relating to the current state of the relevant part of 
contract law and the extent to which it already reflects the applicable 
constitutional right(s) (and corresponding duties), and its underlying values, in 
the context of the particular contract matter before the court.  Significantly, s 
39(1) requires that this narrower enquiry always be conducted against the 
backdrop of the broader constitutional project, with its underlying ‘objective 
normative value system’.7 
In the final event therefore, the scope enquiry contemplates a direct 
constitutional assessment of the extant body of contract law, both generally and 
more specifically, against the ‘objective normative value system’, as well as the 
(potentially) applicable substantive constitutional rights (and corresponding 
duties).  Additionally, where the common law of contract appears to fall short, 
the relevant contract or contractual clause must be assessed in the same way, 
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 See discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2 especially 1.2.2(a)(i). 
7
 See discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2 especially 1.2.2(a)(ii). 
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in terms of s 39(2) and/or s 8(2) of the Constitution, all the while, with a view to 
developing an appropriately constitutionalised body of contract law.8 
Moving on to ss 39(2) and 8(3), these sections take up the form of 
horizontal application enquiry.  Notably, both sections take as their respective 
points of departure, the comparative identification and assessment of the 
relevant contract law rule(s), (or lack of rules as the case may be), with s 39(2), 
focusing on the ‘objective normative value system’ as the benchmark, and s 
8(3), on those substantive rights (and corresponding duties) that may be 
implicated.  So, whereas s 39(2) requires judges to consider how the common 
law ought to be developed generally, in all contract cases, so that, contract law 
accords with and gives effect to the ‘objective normative value system’, s 8(3) 
requires judges to determine how the common law ought to be developed, in 
order to give effect to applicable right(s) (and duties), in the narrower context of 
a particular contract case, as identified and assessed in terms of s 8(2).9 
In terms of s 39(2), judges must now infuse the ‘objective normative 
value system’ into the common law of contract.  They must do so organically, in 
the traditional common law fashion, incrementally, over time, as and when 
contract law issues present themselves before the courts.  In other words, 
judges must work the ‘objective normative value system’ naturally and gradually 
into the common law framework (with its legal concepts and methodology),10 
and in this manner, inform the interpretation, application and overall 
constitutional development of our common law of contract and contractual 
autonomy.  In similar vein, the common law framework itself will start to look 
different, over time, as it is constitutionalised concurrently, on a case by case 
basis.11 
Section 8(3) then, shifts the attention of judges to the manner in which to 
give effect to applicable substantive rights, in the context of particular contract 
cases, as identified and assessed within the s 8(2) scope of horizontal 
application enquiry.  Notably, s 8(3) likewise contemplates that judges will 
constitutionally develop the common law of contract, within the common law 
                                                 
8
 See discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2.2(a)(iii). 
9
 See discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2 especially 1.2.2(a)(iv); 1.2.2(a)(v); 1.2.2(b).  See also the 
discussion in chapter 3 at 3.4. 
10
 i.e. by using the contract law machine, as outlined in chapter 3 especially at 3.3. 
11
 See discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2 especially 1.2.2(b); 1.2.3. 
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framework, so that, a single integrated system of constitutionalised contract law 
will emerge over time.12  Once again, it must be noted that the common law 
framework itself likewise may require concurrent constitutional adjustment and 
to this end, ss 8, 36 and 39(2) of the Constitution will serve as a useful guide.13 
To sum up, the direct-indirect horizontality debate is largely transcended 
in the final Constitution.  The emphasis rather, is on the scope and form of 
horizontal application where the relevant sub-sections of s 39 and s 8, have 
distinct roles to play in the process of constitutionalising our common law of 
contract.  Whilst each section has links with both direct and indirect 
horizontality, the final Constitution clearly dictates that the constitutional 
development of the common law of contract, ultimately must take place within 
the common law framework, as constitutionally adjusted. 
 
4.2.2 The constitutionalisation of the substance of contractual autonomy 
In Chapter Two, I identified contractual autonomy as the central axis of South 
African contract law and so, proceeded from the premise that a 
constitutionalisation of the substance of contractual autonomy would, in 
essence, constitutionalise the substance of our common law of contract. 
Here, it is crucial for judges to appreciate that contractual autonomy 
comprises two essential components, viz. the internal content component and 
the external reach component.  Briefly stated, the internal component 
delineates what actually constitutes an exercise of autonomy by the contracting 
self, whilst the external component sets the legal limits of such (internal) 
exercise of autonomy.  So, whereas the internal dimension of contractual 
autonomy comprises the legal requirements of contractual capacity, offer and 
acceptance, the doctrine of mistake and the established categories of 
improperly obtained consensus, the external dimension essentially constitutes 
the doctrine of legality.  Accordingly, what judges adjudicating in the 
constitutional era must appreciate is that, at least the substance of all of the 
rules, standards, doctrines and principles that make up the internal and external 
components of contractual autonomy respectively, need to transcend contract 
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 See discussion in chapter 1 at 1.2 especially 1.2.2(a)(iv); 1.2.2(a)(v); 1.2.3. 
13
 See discussion in chapter 3 at 3.4. 
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law’s classical liberal underpinnings and be re-legitimated, in terms of the Bill of 
Rights. 
Even so, it seems that judges in the constitutional era still foster the pre-
constitutional (neo-) classical liberal philosophy, with the result that their 
conception of the ‘common law contracting self’ is likely to fall short of the 
constitutional ideal of the contracting self, operating in a substantively 
progressive and transformative South African society, grounded in the 
foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality.14 
Indeed, judges have not really interrogated the continued operation of 
the fixed and essentially negative (laissez faire), thin internal conception of 
contractual autonomy, in the post-apartheid era.  The elements of contractual 
capacity and offer and acceptance, as well as the doctrine of mistake and the 
established categories of improperly obtained consensus, have continued to 
operate as is, undisturbed by the Bill of Rights.15 
Instead, for purposes of constitutionalising the common law of contract, 
the courts have focused, somewhat exclusively, on the external reach 
dimension of contractual autonomy.  In particular, the doctrine of legality is 
recognised now, as the appropriate portal for constitutional considerations to 
enter the domain of contract law.  Nevertheless, in the conducting of legality’s 
public policy balancing exercise, between competing individualist and 
collectivist ideologies, judges still presume an exercise of autonomy as per the 
(neo-) classical liberal, thin internal conception of autonomy.16  Not even the 
distinction between actual and apparent autonomy, in terms of contract law’s 
(secondary) roots in distributive justice, is acknowledged in this enquiry.17  As a 
result, the strongly individualist values of self-interest, self-reliance and self-
determination still tend mostly to outweigh the more modern collectivist-type 
(read constitutional) concerns, such as, substantive fairness and 
reasonableness, in particular contracts, as well as in contract law generally.  To 
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 See in particular, the judgment of Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 
paras 88-95, where the classical liberal conception of contractual autonomy appears to have 
been constitutionalised.  See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) at 
paras 22-24; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at paras 12-16.  See further Barkhuizen 
v Napier 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) at paras 15; 30; 57, where the CC confirmed this approach. 
15
 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.2.1; 2.3.3. 
16
 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.3.2. 
17
 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.2.3(b); 2.2.3(c). 
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be sure, the courts thus far, have yielded largely unsatisfactory results, in 
relation to the transformation of contract law.18 
In order effectively to constitutionalise our contract law, what judges 
need to do rather, is to situate and construct a constitutionalised conception of 
contractual autonomy within the Bill of Rights’ ‘objective normative value 
system’, and to relate this conception, to any substantive rights that may be 
implicated in a particular matter.  Significantly, this entails a fundamental shift 
from the classical liberal, negative, atomistic conception of contractual 
autonomy, to a more positive, interdependent (collectivist), substantive 
conception, that is grounded principally in the foundational constitutional 
triage.19 
Articulated further, judges must recognise the foundational values of 
freedom, dignity and equality as intrinsically fluid and multi-faceted, where, 
unlike the classical liberal conception of autonomy, no particular facet of any of 
these values necessarily occupies primacy of place.  Moreover, judges must 
understand that the interplay between the values is also fluid, so that, once 
again, no single value is naturally or definitively hegemonic, in a particular case.  
Rather, in determining both the intra-action within each value itself, as well as 
the inter-action between the values, for the purposes of the case before the 
court, much is dependent on three factors:  One, the social and economic 
contracting context of contracts, more generally, as well as that of the particular 
contracting parties before the court; Two, the nature and scope of potentially 
applicable substantive rights (and corresponding duties), in relation to certain 
types of contracts (more generally), and moreover, in relation to the particular 
contracting parties in the case before the court (more specifically), and; Three, 
the broader constitutional project of a substantively progressive and 
transformative post-apartheid South Africa.20 
The result will be a more fluid, (as opposed to a fixed), concept of 
contractual autonomy, that is meant at a minimum, to be consistent with, but 
more importantly, to resonate with, and give effect to, the broader constitutional 
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 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.2.3(c); 2.3.2.  See in particular, the judgment of Cameron JA 
in Brisley supra note 14 at paras 88-95, where the classical liberal conception of contractual 
autonomy appears to have been constitutionalised. 
19
 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.4. 
20
 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.4.1. 
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vision of a substantively equal, free and dignified South Africa, in which the 
constitutional self is able in substance to realise his or her vision of the good 
life.  Notably, with this more fluid concept of autonomy, judges will be able to 
develop a constitutionalised contract law that can accommodate the more full-
bodied, multi-faceted internal conception of contractual autonomy.  Indeed, it 
will enable judges to pay greater attention to the crucial, modern contextual 
realities of solidarity, interdependence and the material conditions necessary 
for the exercise of choice by the constitutionalised contracting self, in 
substance, as opposed to mere form. 
In practical terms, this means that judges will constitutionally assess21 
and where necessary develop,22 gradually, on a case-by-case basis, the 
substance of the contract law machine’s general rules (and standards) 
articulating contractual capacity, offer and acceptance and the doctrines of 
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and bribery.  At the same 
time, greater cognisance must be taken of the particular context of the 
contracting parties, with a view to ensuring that their respective exercises of 
contractual autonomy are constitutionally sound.  Also, where a substantive 
constitutional right(s) tempers the internal exercise of contractual autonomy, 
judges must likewise ensure that the exercise of contractual autonomy is 
constitutionally sound (i.e. both in the broader context of contracts in which the 
relevant right is usually implicated, as well as in the more specific context of the 
particular contractant before the court). 
Similarly, in relation to the external reach dimension of contractual 
autonomy, which is also a function of the foundational constitutional triage, 
judges ought generally, to move further along the individualism-collectivism 
continuum, with a view to facilitating greater substantive contractual justice for 
the constitutional self.23  In other words, in conducting the public policy 
balancing exercise, as articulated by the contract law machine’s doctrine of 
legality, judges must take cognisance, both generally for all contract law cases 
and specifically in the context of the particular case before the court, of those 
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 As per s 8(1) read with ss 39(1) and (2), and s 8(2) read with s 39(1) of the Constitution. 
22
 As per ss 39(2) and 8(3) of the Constitution. 
23
 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.4. 
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collectivist-type considerations based on the fuller internal conception of 
autonomy and mandated by the Bill of Rights. 
 
4.2.3 The constitutionalisation of the legal methodology of contract law 
Having thus canvassed the substance of constitutionalising contractual 
autonomy, Chapter Three considered the implications of traditional legal 
methodology, as employed by judges, to give effect to the legal concepts of 
contract law, operating within the common law framework (i.e. using the 
contract law machine). 
The essential point here is that judges have to be alert to the influence of 
the established common law methodology itself, on the substance of our 
common law of contract.  Briefly stated, contract law’s methodology is 
grounded firmly in liberal legalism.  In turn, liberal legalism has facilitated our 
law’s entrenchment of the substance of contractual autonomy in classical liberal 
ideology and the attending individualist policy considerations, so much so, that 
these underpinnings have come to be naturalised within our extant common 
law of contract.24 
Nevertheless, when judges of the constitutional era assess the 
substance of the rules and standards of our contract law, as these currently 
operate within the contract law machine, they continue, for the most part, to 
employ the liberal legalist style of adjudication, without questioning its 
(potentially detrimental) influence on legal results, as measured in terms of the 
Bill of Rights. 
On the contrary, judges seem to accept that the rules of our common law 
of contract themselves are value-neutral and as such, are constitutionally 
legitimate.  In light of rules’ affinity for formalist deductive legal reasoning and 
legal certainty, judges mostly continue, somewhat mechanically, to apply the 
long-established ‘hard and fast’ common law rules of contract, without question 
- they simply feed the ‘hard facts’ of problems into the ‘common law of contract 
machine’ and the machine in turn, spits out the ‘logically correct’ (and therefore 
formally just) legal solutions.  This approach to the established rules of our 
contract law goes some way to explaining the general failure of judges, 
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 See discussion in chapter 3 at 3.2. 
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constitutionally to interrogate the relevant rules and doctrines articulating the 
internal content dimension of contractual autonomy.25 
In a similar vein, the standards featuring in our contract law machine, 
although more open-ended and therefore, more receptive to competing 
collectivist-type normative considerations, that ought to find application in a 
constitutionalised contract law, have been rather limited in effecting substantive 
contractual justice in post-apartheid contract cases.  For one thing, judges of 
the constitutional era have confined their constitutionalisation of normative 
standards, somewhat exclusively, to the doctrine of legality and therefore, to 
the external (reach) dimension of contractual autonomy alone.26  More 
significantly, judges have continued largely, to employ the fairly conservative 
liberal legalist approach to the doctrine of legality. 
In most instances, judges invoke the pre-constitutional era, public policy 
scale.  But this scale, in its liberal legalist conception, focuses firstly, on the 
general tendency of a contract/contractual clause in the abstract, as opposed to 
its actual proved result in the particular circumstances of a case.27  Secondly, it 
takes as its point of departure, the pre-constitutional (thin) internal conception 
of contractual autonomy and accordingly, is tipped at the outset, strongly 
towards the classical liberal, individualist side of pacta sunt servanda.  That the 
public policy scale of the classical liberal era is thus likely to facilitate a legal 
outcome that is classical liberal in nature, (rather than, constitutionally 
resonant), should be evident. 
So, on the one hand, by uncritically applying the seemingly value neutral 
rules (and largely sub-ordinate standards) comprising our common law of 
contract, judges adjudicating in the constitutional era effectively have masked 
the normative facet of the internal content dimension of contractual autonomy.  
On the other hand, by principally confining the (constitutional) normative 
function of contract law standards to the doctrine of legality, with its traditional 
public policy scale, judges purporting to constitutionalise our contract law can 
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 See discussion in chapter 3 at 3.3.2; 3.5.1(b). 
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 See discussion in chapter 3 at 3.2.3; 3.3.3; 3.5.1(a).  Note further, the limited operation of 
normative standards within the doctrines of mistake and improperly obtained consensus. 
27
 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) at 7I-9G. 
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effect mostly minor, constitutionally prompted adjustments on the fringes of 
contractual autonomy’s external reach dimension.28 
That said, in Barkhuizen,29 the CC does appear to have been aware of 
the influence of established common law methodology, insofar as it introduced 
a new level to the public policy scale.  According to the CC, the public policy 
scale, operating within the constitutional context, must still comprise the original 
tendency level of the scale, on which the more general (objective ‘soft fact’) 
contextual considerations, that will apply broadly in all cases, must be placed.  
In addition, the scale now has a new secondary enforceability level, on which, 
the more case-specific (subjective ‘hard fact’) considerations that will apply in 
the context of the particular case before the court, should be placed.  Still, the 
court was not systematic, in its application of the constitutionally adjusted public 
policy scale, in relation to the case before it.30 
In essence, what judges of the constitutional era need to do, is ensure 
that the legal methodology of contract law likewise reflects the fundamental 
shift from the pre-constitutional, classical liberal conception of contractual 
autonomy, to the foundational constitutional triage’s more fluid conception of 
legal autonomy, as exercised, by the constitutional self.  In other words, judges 
must ensure that the legal process, in terms of which our common law of 
contract is constitutionalised, facilitates more than minor adjustments on the 
fringes of contractual autonomy’s external reach dimension. 
To begin with, the legal method employed must facilitate the necessary 
normative interrogation of the internal content dimension of contractual 
autonomy, which moreover, has to precede a testing of the external reach 
dimension.  Importantly, the manner in which judges ought to conduct such 
constitutional assessment and development of the contract law machine must, 
in all contract cases, articulate with what is envisaged by s 8(1), read with ss 
39(1) and 39(2) of the Constitution.  Further, where a substantive right(s) is 
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 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.4.2.  It must be noted that judges have, on occasion, 
indicated somewhat curiously, that if necessary, the doctrine of legality’s public policy scale 
would house those (constitutional) normative considerations pertaining to the internal content 
component of contractual autonomy, too.  Nevertheless, such (internal autonomy) 
considerations would be fundamentally inconsistent with those (external autonomy) 
considerations that are normally placed on the public policy scale.  See discussion in chapter 3 
at 3.3.4. 
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 Barkhuizen supra note 14 at paras 56-58. 
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 See discussion in chapter 3 at 3.3.5; 3.5.2. 
  182 
implicated in a particular case, the approach of the judge must also articulate 
with what is contemplated by s 8(2), read with s 8(3). 
Presumably, this would entail judges assessing the way in which, the 
established hard and fast rules, presently give effect to the internal component 
of contractual autonomy, against the more fluid, foundational constitutional 
triage’s conception thereof.  Insofar as the established rules fall short, judges 
ought to focus on developing, not only their substance, but also their form and 
attending method of application appropriately. 
Most significant in terms of methodology, is that formalist, deductive 
legal reasoning attendant on rules, will need to yield to a hybrid-type of legal 
reasoning, where the very configuration of rules and standards needs to be 
adjusted, so as to accommodate a more contextual, fluid conception of 
contractual autonomy.  This is not to say, that the internal content dimension of 
contractual autonomy collapses simply, into a policy enquiry.  Rather, the 
constitutional concept of contractual autonomy must always be justifiable, both 
in terms of legal principle and policy; the balance between legal certainty and a 
normatively revised internal conception of contractual autonomy for the 
constitutional self, being crucial.31 
What this means, is that contractual legal principles themselves must go 
through a transitional process of re-alignment, as per the foundational 
constitutional triage and the potentially applicable substantive rights (and 
duties); the triage replacing the classical liberal foundations of contract law.  In 
other words, the legal principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt 
servanda, as well as the ensuing rules and standards of contract law (and the 
configuration thereof), must now resonate principally with the triage’s 
conception of contractual autonomy.  In the long run, such re-alignment will 
facilitate legal certainty.  Additionally, any residual policy concerns, that may be 
pertinent to the case at hand, must be taken into account, in order to ensure an 
appropriately delineated internal (content) dimension of contractual autonomy. 
So, in practical terms, what judges must do, is constitutionally assess 
and where necessary, develop gradually, on a case-by-case basis, the form 
(i.e. as a rule, a standard or a hybrid combination), and configuration (i.e. as 
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 Collins op cit note 2 at 11-14. 
  183 
predominantly rules-based or standards-based), in which the contract law 
machine broadly casts contractual capacity, offer and acceptance, and the 
doctrines of mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or bribery.  At 
the same time, judges must similarly assess constitutionally and, where 
necessary, develop incrementally, the attending methodology, as currently 
employed by the contract law machine.  Additionally, judges must develop a 
more context-sensitive methodology that will take better account of the 
particular context in which the parties before the court contracted and thereby, 
ensure that their respective exercises of contractual autonomy are 
constitutionally sound. 
Importantly, such methodology must also accommodate the possibility of 
a substantive constitutional right(s) (and/or duties), tempering the internal 
exercise of contractual autonomy by a particular contractant.  The basic idea 
here, is to ensure that the exercise of contractual autonomy remains 
constitutionally sound (i.e. both in the broader context of contracts in which the 
relevant right is usually implicated, as well as in the more specific context of the 
particular contractant before the court). 
In the final event, if our law of contract effectively articulates the 
constitutionalised internal (content) dimension of contractual autonomy, 
freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda will take on a different role, in 
terms of the external (reach) dimension of contractual autonomy.  For one 
thing, the fact that the public policy scale is tipped at the outset, towards pacta 
sunt servanda, (the onus being on the party who wants to escape the contract 
to show that it is against public policy), will no longer import the strongly 
individualist bias of the classical liberal framework.  On the contrary, the 
succeeding public policy scale will no longer have to contend with any 
deficiency in the internal (content) dimension of contractual autonomy.32  
Rather, judges can focus exclusively, on what ought to be a two-level public 
policy scale and what comprises the relevant external reach dimension-
considerations, that should be placed respectively on the primary tendency 
level of the scale (and so, apply generally in all contract law cases) and the 
                                                 
32
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secondary enforceability level of the scale33 (and so, upon proof, apply 
specifically in the context of a particular case). 
 
4.3 THE APPLICATION OF A SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
Thus far, I have focused mainly on the constitutionalisation of contractual 
autonomy, in terms of the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity 
and equality.  However, it is necessary also to consider in more detail, the 
situation where one or more of the substantive constitutional rights find 
application. 
To begin with, it must be appreciated that the enumerated rights are 
different from the values which underpin them.  Whereas values are more fluid 
and therefore more adaptable and/or accommodating of differing contexts, 
rights are more concrete in nature, having functions that are considerably more 
specific, than their foundational value counterparts.34  So, where a right(s) finds 
application, it is necessary for the triage, both to be informed by, and 
responsive to, such right(s). 
Additionally, it must be remembered that the enumerated rights 
themselves may be different, inter alia, in terms of their purpose, reach, 
formulation, the kinds of interests they serve and/or the kind of obligations that 
they may impose.  At this juncture, it must be acknowledged that contemporary 
human rights literature resists the notion of ‘categories’ of rights and, more 
especially, a rigid distinction between so-called civil-political rights and socio-
economic rights.35  I do not purport to engage here with this debate, save to say 
that I employ the so-called ‘categories’ of ‘economic, civil-political and socio-
economic rights’ very loosely, and only to the extent that I look at three 
particular rights, that serve different purposes, in relation to the constitutional 
self.  At best, the three rights that I look at, each represent a grouping of rights 
that serve a similar purpose and just so happen to dovetail with the traditional 
notion of ‘generations’ or ‘categories’ of rights. 
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In relation to contract law therefore, each right interacts with different 
dimensions of the constitutionalised contracting self and accordingly, with 
different dimensions of freedom, dignity and equality.  In particular, each right, 
after establishing its horizontal applicability, will serve primarily to implicate 
differing dimensions of each value of the foundational triage, as it operates 
along the atomistic-substantive and individualist-collectivist continuums of 
contractual autonomy.  This is further influenced by the relevant right’s interplay 
with pertinent policy concerns such as, ‘social utility versus economic cost’, 
together with the omnipresent constitutional end goal of a substantively 
progressive, post-apartheid South Africa. 
Upon examination of each group of right in the abstract, it appears that 
the loosely termed ‘civil-political’ constitutional rights are most closely aligned 
with the atomistic, individualistic conception of autonomy which, in our law of 
contract translates into classical liberal speak.  Our civil-political rights include 
such freedoms as ‘freedom and security of the person’, freedom from ‘slavery’, 
‘freedom of religion, belief and opinion’ and ‘freedom of expression’.36  These 
seem to foster an essentially negative conception of individual freedom, 
basically requiring freedom from interference by the State and/or other 
individuals.  This would then be complemented by comparable negative 
conceptions of dignity (as empowerment), and formal equality (on the basis of 
non-discrimination).37  In relation to our extant contract law therefore, the 
implication of these loosely grouped rights will be minimal, for so long as there 
is non-interference.  But where parties purport contractually to interfere with 
such a right, the internal dimension of contractual autonomy must still facilitate 
a free and fair exercise of choice (even if only minimally),38 in relation to the 
relevant right, whilst the external dimension ought to focus on the bearing of 
such freedom, against freedom of contract, in the two-tiered public policy 
(legality) exercise. 
Moving to what may loosely be called the socio-economic class of 
constitutional rights, it appears that these rights are most closely aligned with 
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 Sections 12; 13; 15; 16 of the Constitution respectively. 
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 See discussion of equality and dignity in chapter 2 at 2.4.3; 2.4.4. 
38
 This must be determined in light of the minimal pre-conditions that are necessary for the 
exercise of the relevant right.  In turn, such pre-conditions depend on the nature of the 
particular civil-political right in question. 
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the substantive, collectivist conception of autonomy which, to date, has been 
largely foreign to our common law of contract.  Our socio-economic rights 
include such rights as ‘the right to have access to “adequate housing”, “health 
care services”, “sufficient food and water” and “a basic education”’.39  Whilst all 
of the corresponding, full-blown positive duties attached to these rights, are not 
likely to fall on private individuals, these rights do, at the very least, appear to 
foster a more holistic conception of the constitutional self, where certain basic 
pre-conditions are recognised as crucial to the exercise of autonomy in 
substance, as opposed to mere form.  This would then be complemented by 
comparable positive and more collectivist conceptions of dignity (as constraint), 
and substantive equality.40  In relation to our contract law therefore, this loose 
class of right is crucial to the internal dimension of contractual autonomy.  
Socio-economic rights ought to inform the basic content threshold for an 
exercise of a choice in substance.  Moreover, where a particular socio-
economic right is implicated, such right should play a more elevated, if not 
primary, role in determining the (internal) content of contractual autonomy.  In 
relation then, to the external dimension of contractual autonomy, where a socio-
economic right is implicated, the enquiry should focus especially, on the 
collectivist implications for dignity and substantive equality. 
Dealing finally, with the loosely classed economic rights, these rights 
seem to fall between the above outlined, civil-political and socio-economic 
classes of right.  Indeed, whereas so-called economic rights such as, the 
‘freedom of trade, occupation and profession’ and the right to ‘property’41 
traditionally entail non-interference by the State and/or other individuals, they 
also presuppose a measure of substantive economic freedom, as an integral 
component of individual identity.42  In other words, an individual must, as a pre-
condition, at least be able economically to realise his or her economic rights (if 
not, all of his or her fundamental rights).43  However, in the face of 
                                                 
39
 Sections 26; 27; 29 of the Constitution respectively. 
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 See discussion of equality and dignity in chapter 2 at 2.4.3; 2.4.4. 
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 Sections 22; 25 of the Constitution respectively. 
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 Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 484-489. 
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 In the context of contract law, there is an intrinsic link also between economic power and an 
individual’s ability to realise his or her civil-political and socio-economic rights.  In other words, 
the concern regarding economic ability/freedom will permeate all fundamental rights.  The result 
is that doctrines developed to address concerns of economic freedom are likely to find 
application also when other fundamental rights are implicated. 
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concentrations of private power still largely along apartheid policy lines, such 
ability is especially stunted.44  As a result, economic constitutional rights would 
be rendered meaningless for a majority of South Africans, unless they are 
grounded in a more positive conception of autonomy.  In relation to our contract 
law, therefore, the implication of this loose class of right is that the internal 
dimension of autonomy must foster a fuller, substantive concept of contractual 
autonomy that facilitates true economic freedom.  Most notably, this is likely to 
translate into the development of a more concrete, South African doctrine of 
economic duress and/or doctrine of abuse of unequal bargaining power, the 
content of which, will be informed by the nature of the particular right implicated 
in the relevant contracting context.45  Once this is in place, freedom of contract 
would become more even-handed and, as a result, the external dimension of 
contractual autonomy can continue to invoke the two-tiered public policy scale, 
to determine the appropriate reach of freedom of contract, against competing 
economic freedoms and pertinent collectivist, (socio-economic / welfarist) goals 
of post-apartheid South Africa. 
Having thus outlined, my ‘basic constitutionalised approach’ to contract 
law and further, how I foresee these three groups of rights46 generally affecting 
our common law of contract, I will now apply my ‘model’ to three different 
substantive constitutional rights viz. the economic freedom of trade, occupation 
and profession (s22), the civil-political freedom of religion, belief and opinion 
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 Dennis Davis ‘Freedom of trade, occupation and profession’ in Stuart Woolman, Michael 
Bishop; Jason Brickhill; et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2008 Revision 
Service 4 2012) chapter 54 at 54-2 to 54-3, explains that s 22 “must be read as a corrective to 
historical employment inequities created by Apartheid. In JR 1013 Investments CC and Others 
v Minister of Safety and Security and Others, Jones J noted[,] 
“We have a history of repression in the choice of a trade, occupation or profession that (sic) 
resulted in disadvantage to a large number of South Africans in earning their daily bread. In the 
pre-Constitution era implementation of the policies of apartheid directly and indirectly impacted 
upon the free choice of a trade, occupation or profession: unequal education, the prevention of free 
movement of people throughout the country, restrictions on where and how long they could reside 
in particular areas, and the practice of making available structures to develop skills and training in 
the employment sphere to selected sections of the population only, and the statutory reservation of 
jobs for members of particular races. The result was that all citizens in the country did not have a 
free choice of trade, occupation or profession. Section 22 is designed to prevent a perpetuation of 
this state of affairs.” [1997 (7) BCLR 950 (E) at 980B-E].” 
45
 Such doctrines must be rooted in both autonomy and wrongfulness.  Further, the right 
implicated need not be economic, but could well be civil-political or socio-economic – op cit 
note 43. 
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 The three groups of rights that I have discussed here, are those that are most often 
implicated in contract law cases.  Additionally, there are other possible groups of rights that 
serve different purposes, the most obvious ones being, developmental and environmental 
rights or ‘solidarity rights’ like self-determination rights.  These other groups of rights fall beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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(s15(1)) and finally, the socio-economic right to have access to health care 
services (s27(1)(a)).47  In particular, I will show how each of these rights 
highlight distinct dimensions of the constitutional self and therefore, contractual 
autonomy (as contemplated by the foundational constitutional triage) and 
furthermore, how they may also require constitutional adjustments to pertinent 
common law methodologies. 
As a final point, it is important to remember always that whilst, in the 
abstract, each group of right may have a natural affinity with a particular 
dimension of the constitutional self, the specific context of operation of the right 
ultimately is decisive.  So for instance, the concerns associated with the 
economic freedom of contracting parties may well transcend the economic 
group of rights and, depending on the context, apply likewise where a so-called 
civil-political or socio-economic right is implicated. 
Going forward then, my approach to each right will begin with a brief 
survey of the right’s content, specifically as they each pertain to the notion of 
constitutional autonomy.  I will do this as part of the scope enquiry into the 
respective rights’ horizontal application.  Thereafter, I will identify and assess 
the relevant types of contracts/contract clauses and attending contract law(s), 
implicated by the particular right and will determine whether the law is in need 
of constitutional development.  If in need of development, I will propose a way 
forward as per the ensuing form of horizontal application enquiry. 
 
4.3.1 Freedom of trade, occupation and profession (s 22) 
 
(a) The content of s 22 of the Constitution 
In terms of s 22 of the Constitution, 
 “Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession 
freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by 
law.” 
                                                 
47
 I have chosen these three rights on the basis of the available literature and case law that 
deal with these rights, as well as their special connections to the concept of autonomy. 
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In relation to the concept of the constitutional self, this section is integral both in 
a ‘material’ and an ‘idealistic’ sense.48  The German Constitutional Court 
expressed this best: 
“…[T]he basic right aims at the protection of economically meaningful work, but 
it views work as a ‘vocation’.  Work in this sense is seen in terms of its 
relationship to the human personality as a whole.  It is a relationship that 
shapes and completes the individual over a lifetime of devoted activity; it is the 
foundation of a person’s existence through which that person simultaneously 
contributes to the total social product.”49 
In an idealistic sense therefore, s 22 articulates the more abstract notion 
of a career or a calling that is tied to the individualist idea of personal fulfillment 
and development, and the shaping of one’s identity.50  Accordingly, the 
emphasis is on autonomy - the individual’s right to self-determination in 
pursuance of a livelihood - where government regulation would be limited 
strictly to the maintenance of qualitative standards of control in the public 
interest.51  So, in an idealistic sense, s 22, operating in a free-market economy, 
promotes the negative conception of individual liberty where the right to 
freedom of trade, occupation and profession relates simply to the opportunity to 
exercise (or not to exercise, as the case may be) such right.52 
In the material sense however, s 22 “intrinsically relates to the ability to 
implement one’s choice [my emphasis]”.53  In other words, the right to freedom 
of trade, occupation and profession, exemplifies ‘work’ as the fundamental 
vehicle, through which an individual is enabled to strive toward and realise his 
or her vision of the good life.  Government regulation of this right therefore, 
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 Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 491.  See also Affordable Medicines Trust v The Minister 
of Health of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) at para 30, where 
Ngcobo J submitted: 
“What is at stake is more than one’s right to earn a living, important though that is.  Freedom to 
choose a vocation is intrinsic to the nature of a society based on human dignity as contemplated 
by the Constitution.  One’s work is part of one’s identity and constitutive of one’s dignity.  Every 
individual has the right to take up any activity which he or she believes himself or herself 
prepared to undertake as a profession and to make that activity the very basis of his or her life.  
And there is a relationship between work and the human personality as a whole.  “It is a 
relationship that shapes and completes the individual over a lifetime of devoted activity; it the 
foundation of a person’s existence.” 
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 The Pharmacy decision, as quoted in Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 491 footnotes 39; 
22; 23. 
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 i.e. what would be termed a ‘vocation’.  Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 491; Robert 
LaGrange ‘Economic activity rights’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL Haysom South African 
Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights 2ed (2005 Issue 13 September 2012) chapter 17 at 17-2. 
51
 Davis op cit note 44 at 54-3 to 54-7; LaGrange op cit note 50 at 17-5. 
52
 Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 493. 
53
 LaGrange op cit note 50 at 17-2. 
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would be geared to socio-economic (welfarist-type) development, with a view 
ultimately to the positive improvement of the quality of life of all of its citizens.54 
So, in a country where citizens enjoy a substantially free, dignified and 
equal standard of living, it stands to reason that the former interpretation of s 22 
would be emphasised; the material conditions necessary for an exercise of a 
choice, in substance, being present.  In contrast, South Africa has one of the 
highest Gini-coefficients in the world (reflecting a highly unequal distribution of 
national income),55 with the gap between the rich and the poor widening.  
Without a doubt, this is the legacy of apartheid’s education, work (versus 
residence) location and job reservation policies.56 
In post-apartheid South Africa therefore, the latter ‘material’ 
interpretation of s 22 must take precedence.  Indeed, in Affordable Medicines 
Trust and Others v The Minister of Health of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another the CC submitted: 
“In broad terms this section has to be understood as both repudiating past 
exclusionary practices and affirming the entitlements appropriate for our new 
open and democratic society.  Thus in the light of our history of job reservation, 
restrictions on employment imposed by the pass laws and the exclusion of 
women from many occupations, to mention just a few of the arbitrary laws and 
practices used to maintain privilege, it is understandable why this aspect of 
economic activity was singled out for constitutional protection.”57 
Although the government has begun to redress the systemic inequities in 
economic opportunities,58 it still has a long way to go.  This is especially so 
within the private sphere, where the aftermath of apartheid is superior access to 
economic resources by relatively few, (mostly previously-advantaged) South 
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 On the implications of s22’s reference only to citizens, see Davis op cit note 44 at 54-2; 
Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 489-490. 
55
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient (accessed 12/07/2012). 
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 Davis op cit note 44 at 54-1 to 54-3. 
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 Affordable Medicines Trust supra note 48, as per Ngcobo J at para 58.  See also s 26(2) of 
the interim Constitution, which was especially alert to these concerns.  In terms of s 26 of the 
interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993,  
“(1) Every person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a 
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(2) Subsection (1) shall not preclude measures designed to promote the protection or the 
improvement of the quality of life, economic growth, human development, social justice, basic 
conditions of employment, fair labour practices or equal opportunity for all, provided such 
measures are justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.” 
That s 26(2) was not re-enacted in s 22 of the final Constitution, should not be taken to mean 
that these considerations are no longer relevant.  On the contrary, they must be recognised as 
intrinsic to several of the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights. 
58
 In particular, the legislature has tightened labour law protections for employees and 
introduced black economic empowerment and affirmative action legislation.  Government, in 
turn, has sought to implement these laws. 
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Africans.  This in turn, translates into restricted and privileged access to better 
quality (private) basic education,59 and following there-from, improved access 
to higher education and employment opportunities.  The right to freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession therefore, is as much an issue of private 
market power wielded by private individuals, as it is an issue of government 
regulation and/or intervention.60  As such, s 22 must apply horizontally to 
private individuals and the private common law, including the common law of 
contract. 
This brings me to the final point on the content of the s 22 right.  Section 
22 has an express internal qualifier, which permits the law to regulate the 
‘practice’ of a trade, occupation or profession.  So, whereas a person should be 
enabled to choose his or her vocation, the “modern and industrial world of 
human interdependence and mutual responsibility” means that the law may 
also need to protect those persons involved in, and/or affected by, the practice 
of a particular trade, occupation or profession, especially where the trade, 
profession or occupation in question, implicates the broader public interest.61  
So, for instance, it would be in the public interest for the law to stipulate certain 
basic safety conditions that must be satisfied, in order for a qualified pharmacist 
to compound and dispense medicines, to his or her customers.  Along similar 
lines, the private law of contract may set specific parameters for contracts that 
affect a contracting party’s right to practice his or her trade, occupation or 
profession.  For instance, our law of contract may consider a contract, which 
purports to prevent a doctor from practising in a region that has a critical 
shortage of healthcare providers, to be against the public interest and therefore, 
illegal. 
In Affordable Medicines Trust, the CC unpacked the distinction between 
the right to choose a trade, occupation or profession and the right to practice it.  
Relying on German Law, the court accepted that the distinction was one of 
degree, where the “choice and practise of a profession constituted the poles of 
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 This is accentuated by government failings in basic education.  See for instance, the general 
failure of the Outcomes-Based Education model and the 2012 debacle relating to the non-
delivery of textbooks.  See Section 27 v Minister of Education Case No. 24565/2012, North 
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 Davis op cit note 44 at 54-5; 54-9 to 54-11; Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 483-487; 
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a continuum.”62  In the end therefore, the CC held that if, in objective terms, a 
governmental regulation of the practice of a profession impacts negatively on 
the individual’s very choice of profession, a court must determine if the 
regulation is reasonable and justifiable, as per s 36(1) of the Constitution.  
Conversely, if the regulation does not impact negatively on the individual’s 
choice, s 22 requires the regulation, only to be rationally connected to a 
legitimate government purpose. 
Admittedly, this case dealt with the regulation by the State of the right to 
practice a profession.  Nevertheless, the ‘choice–practice’ continuum may be 
useful also in the private realm of contracts.  As outlined above, private market 
power, wielded by private individuals, is just as crucial an issue, in post-
apartheid South Africa.  Accordingly, where a contract implicates the choice 
and/or practice of a trade, profession or occupation, in the manner envisaged 
by the CC in Affordable Medicines Trust, our common law of contract should, at 
least, be informed by the CC’s approach. 
 
(b) The identification, assessment and (potential) development of the law 
governing contracts in restraint of trade as against s 22 of the 
Constitution 
Within the sphere of our common law of contract, the s 22 right to freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession appears to be most relevant to covenants in 
restraint of trade.  Briefly stated, a covenant in restraint of trade is a contract, in 
terms of which, the covenantor (i.e. the party subject to the restraint), 
undertakes in favour of the covenantee (i.e. the party holding the right of 
restraint), not to carry on a particular trade, occupation or profession, usually 
within a particular area and for a stipulated period of time. 
Restraint of trade contracts feature in two contexts especially.  First, is 
the context of an employment contract, where the employer (covenantee) 
purports to protect its trade secrets, client base and other confidential 
information that an employee (covenantor) may be privy to.63  Second, is the 
context of a sale of a business, where the buyer (covenantee) intends mainly to 
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 Affordable Medicines Trust supra note 48 at paras 65; 87-93. 
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 See for instance, Canon KwaZulu-Natal (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Office Automation v Booth 2005 
(3) SA 205 (N). 
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protect the goodwill and confidential information of the business, against 
exploitation by the seller (covenantor).  What emerges therefore, is that 
restraints of trade are not (and indeed, should not be) used simply to prevent 
competition; the covenantee usually has what is termed a ‘legitimate interest’ 
such as trade secrets, customer connections or goodwill, which the law of 
contract deems worthy of protection.64 
Significantly, the restraint of trade contract implicates two basic 
considerations, freedom of contract and freedom of trade (occupation and 
profession).  Furthermore, our common law of contract articulates both of these 
considerations in classical liberal terms.  The contracting self is still the 
classical contracting self, as entrenched in the atomistic ‘free will’, laissez faire 
ideology of the classical liberal era, with its attending concept of pacta sunt 
servanda.  Likewise, the economic trading/professional self is embedded in 
classical liberalism, as exemplified by the industrial revolution’s rejection of 
social hierarchies and status relationships, and concomitant emphasis on the 
inherently enterprising spirit of individuals.65 
For the most part therefore, the considerations of freedom of contract 
and freedom of trade, in their classical liberal sense, complement each other in 
their respective functions in the free-market economy.  However, in the context 
of a restraint of trade contract, these two considerations become diametrically 
opposed:  whereas freedom of contract would demand that the contract be 
upheld and enforced (pacta sunt servanda), even if this should cause ‘un-
productivity’, freedom of trade would insist on productivity (as based on free 
and fair competition), rather than un-productivity, even if this should lead to the 
invalidity or non-enforcement of a contract.66  Moreover, classical liberalism per 
se cannot resolve this tension.  Our law of contract therefore, as steeped in 
classical liberalism, had to make a policy choice as to the consideration it 
prefers. 
Initially, following English law’s policy, that freedom of trade is more 
important than freedom of contract, our common law of contract treated 
contracts in restraint of trade as invalid, unless the covenantee could show that 
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 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
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 See discussion of the classical model of contract law in chapter 2 at 2.2.1. 
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 Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) at 767C-F. 
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the contract was reasonable (inter partes) and not against public policy.67  
Subsequently however, the AD (as it then was) reversed this position on the 
basis that, the importation of this aspect of English law, undermined the 
integrity of the Roman Dutch law foundations of our contract law; the Roman 
Dutch law did not, in principle, prohibit restraint of trade agreements.68 
The upshot is that, in terms of the law as it currently stands, a contract in 
restraint of trade is valid and enforceable, unless the covenantor can show that 
in the circumstances, the covenantee’s freedom of contract unreasonably limits 
the covenantor’s freedom of trade and/or it would otherwise be against public 
policy to enforce the restraint.69  The point of departure in terms of our common 
law of contract therefore, is that the (primary) consideration of freedom of 
contract trumps the (competing) interest of freedom of trade.  Further, the 
courts appear to treat the legal issue regarding contracts in restraint of trade, as 
one that relates principally to the external reach dimension of contractual 
autonomy and in particular, to the enforceability (as opposed to the tendency) 
of the restraint, as per the doctrine of legality, with its public policy scale.  In 
other words, the particular context of the specific covenantor and covenantee 
before the court, at the time of enforcement of the contract, occupies centre 
stage.  In contrast, the courts pay little attention to the internal content 
dimension of contractual autonomy, either generally, or specifically, in relation 
to the particular parties in a case before it.  The classical liberal conception of 
autonomy continues to prevail, with concerns pertaining to unequal bargaining 
power apparently situated on the enforceability level of the scale, within the 
doctrine of legality.70 
The implication then, of s 22 as an economic right, operating in post-
apartheid South Africa, would be that the rules (and standards) articulating the 
internal content dimension of contractual autonomy must accommodate the 
economic ability of the covenantor, as a more contextual, constitutionalised 
contracting self (rather than the atomistic, classical contracting self), to exercise 
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a choice, in substance.  This means that, in relation to the foundational triage, s 
22 would elevate a more positive conception of freedom, complemented by 
corresponding substantive conceptions of equality and dignity, both generally in 
cases dealing with restraints of trade and more specifically, in the context of the 
particular restraint before the court. 
So, for instance, this may require the recognition of a threshold 
education and work/business experience level, as a material (equality) pre-
condition for the exercise of such contractual choice in all cases.  This could be 
housed more concretely, by the development of a constitutionalised contractual 
doctrine of abuse of unequal bargaining power.  Such a doctrine would need to 
ensure, or at least facilitate, a more substantive exercise of choice by 
covenantors generally.  For instance, this could be effected by articulating the 
threshold requirements of autonomy, as generally applicable rules.  At the 
same time, such a doctrine would need also to do this more specifically, in the 
particular case before the court, in light of the particular power dynamic 
between the covenantor and the covenantee in question.  For instance, this 
could require the stronger party to show that his or her exploitation of 
bargaining power, in the course of negotiations, was reasonable, where the 
standard of reasonableness must be set by the triage and s 22. 
Moving on to the external reach dimension, it is important to note that 
this has been the arena of constitutional interrogation of restraints of trade.  
More specifically, the main argument has been that the placing of the onus on 
the person who wishes to escape the restraint (i.e. the covenantor), to show 
that the restraint is unreasonable and/or against public policy, is 
unconstitutional because the covenantor is usually in a weaker bargaining 
position than the covenantee.71  As matters stand, the SCA has left open the 
question of the constitutionality of the onus regarding restraints of trade.72  
Nevertheless, if our law of contract were to first address the internal content 
dimension of autonomy, as outlined above, any inequality in bargaining power 
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will be dealt with appropriately.73  Accordingly, the covenantor would, in relation 
to the covenantee, be better placed than his classical liberal counterpart, by 
reason of his or her more substantive (as opposed to formal) exercise of 
choice.  That is to say, that the value freedom of contract would become more 
even-handed in its operation and effect.  As a result, the question of which 
party should bear the onus in relation to the external dimension of contractual 
autonomy would become a non-issue.74 
In terms of the substance of the external reach dimension (legality) 
enquiry, the common law’s emphasis, as outlined above, is on the 
enforceability of the restraint.  The focus therefore, is primarily on the particular 
restraint contract before the court and the (potential) impact of its enforcement 
on the contracting parties before the court.  Even so, the law governing 
contracts in restraint of trade has not been rendered unacceptably uncertain or 
unworkable. 
Over time, the courts have developed guidelines, as to when a contract 
in restraint of trade would unreasonably limit the covenantor’s freedom of trade 
and/or otherwise be against public policy.  Most important, is whether the 
covenantee has a legitimate interest that is qualitatively and quantitatively 
proportionate to the covenantor’s competing interest, in being free to carry on 
his or her trade, occupation or profession.  In this respect, courts take 
cognisance of relevant factors, including the nature of the economic activity 
covered by the restraint, its duration and the area that it spans.  At the same 
time, the courts are alert also, (albeit less so), to any broader public interest 
that is (potentially) impeded by restraint contracts generally, and/or by the 
particular restraint before a court.75 
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  197 
Significantly, this approach of our courts is resonant with the 
reasonableness (proportionality) exercise fostered in s 36(1) of the 
Constitution.76  At least to this extent therefore, the common law’s approach to 
contracts in restraint of trade is likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
As a precursory step in this legality exercise however, it may be 
constructive for a court to assess and situate the restraint along the ‘choice-
practice’ continuum, as delineated by the CC in Affordable Medicines Trust.77  
Indeed, this could assist a court in its development of a constitutional standard 
that the contract in restraint of trade must measure up to.  The more the 
restraint contract and/or its operation impacts the covenantor’s future choice78 
of trade, occupation or profession, the higher the standard of reasonableness 
(presumably a s 36(1)-type standard), to which the terms of the restraint 
contract (as per the tendency level of the public policy scale), and its 
enforcement (as per the enforceability level of the public policy scale), must be 
held.  Conversely, the more the restraint contract and/or its operation impact 
merely upon the covenantor’s future practise of a trade, occupation or 
profession (rather than the very choice thereof), the lower the standard of 
reasonableness (presumably a standard analogous to that of the ‘rational-
connection’ test), to which the tendency of the restraint contract and its 
enforcement must be held. 
On a final note, whilst the jurisprudence on contracts in restraint of trade 
is informative, for the development of context-sensitive guidelines for the 
application of the secondary enforceability level of the constitutionalised public 
                                                                                                                                              
after termination of the agreement?  (b) If so, is that interest threatened by the other party?  (c) In 
that case, does such interest weigh qualitatively and quantitatively against the interest of the other 
party not to be economically inactive and unproductive?  (d) Is there an aspect of public policy 
having nothing to do with the relationship between the parties that requires that the restraint be 
maintained or rejected?  Where the interest of the party sought to be restrained weighs more than 
the interest to be protected, the restraint is unreasonable and consequently unenforceable.  The 
enquiry which is undertaken at the time of enforcement covers a wide field and includes the nature, 
extent and duration of the restraint and factors peculiar to the parties and their respective bargaining 
powers and interests.” 
76
 Reddy supra note 71 at para 17. 
77
 Affordable Medicines Trust supra note 48 at paras 65; 87-93. 
78
 The covenantor’s future choice of trade, occupation or profession is a distinct, (albeit related) 
choice, from his or her original contractual choice (exercise of autonomy), of agreeing to the 
restraint of trade.  Even so, it must be noted that a restraint of trade also affects the 
autonomous (continuous) self’s future choice.  This may need to be taken into account in the 
internal content dimension of contractual autonomy.  This issue is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  See further, the discussion of waiver in 4.3.2(b)(iii). 
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policy scale,79 I submit, that the courts’ somewhat exclusive focus on the 
question of enforceability of the restraint is in need of adjustment.  In dealing 
with restraints of trade in the constitutional era, I would argue that the broader 
tendency level of the public policy enquiry ought likewise, as per the two-tiered 
Barkhuizen scale, to precede the enforceability level of the scale.  Furthermore, 
it ought equally to be informed by the foundational triage.  There appears to be 
no reason in principle, to differentiate the determination of the appropriate 
reach of freedom of contract, against what I loosely term, competing 
(constitutional) economic rights.  On the contrary, legal coherence would be 
promoted by the systematic development of, and adherence to, the Barkhuizen 
model. 
 
4.3.2 Freedom of religion, belief and opinion (s15(1)) 
 
(a) The content of s 15(1) of the Constitution 
In terms of s 15(1) of the Constitution, 
 “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion.” 
In brief, ‘religion, belief and opinion’ relates essentially to the basic belief 
system of an individual, which may or may not be articulated as an organised 
religion80 - it comprises an individual’s basic moral outlook on life, an essential 
component of the self’s identity and, as such, his or her appreciation of his or 
her self-worth and dignity.81  To explain further, the empowerment dimension of 
dignity is elevated by s 15(1), in the sense that dignity lies in the recognition of 
the individual as an autonomous moral agent, capable of self-actualisation and 
governance through the exercise of free choice regarding religion, belief and 
opinion.82 
Significantly, the material conditions necessary for the constitutional self 
having a particular belief system are minimal.  In this context, freedom is 
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 See discussion in chapter 3 at 3.3.3(b). 
80
 Debates as to the precise definition of religion are beyond the scope of this discussion.  For 
more on this issue, see Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 338.  See further, and more 
generally, Christof Heyns and Danie Brand ‘The constitutional protection of religious human 
rights in Southern Africa’ (2000) 33 CILSA 53. 
81
 MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at para 53. 
82
 See discussion of dignity in chapter 2 at 2.4.4. 
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connected largely, to the internal dialogue of the self about his or her 
understanding of the various relationships that give his or her life meaning.  
Most important, would be the relationships that he or she has with family, 
friends, the community in which he or she works and lives, as well as the 
broader South African society; all with their respective belief systems and 
practices that have varying degrees of influence and are not necessarily 
cohesive.83  Moreover, the value of equality would operate mostly negatively in 
this context, to abhor unfair discrimination on the basis of religion, conscience, 
belief or culture.84 
Even so, in South Africa, the importance of the narrower concept of 
religion85 to individual identity is somewhat paradoxical.  On the one hand, 
religion was exploited by the apartheid regime as an apparatus through which 
to promote apartheid policy.  As alluded to above, the law was infused with an 
“apartheid brand of Christianity” to the legal detriment of other religions.86  It 
stands to reason therefore, that many South Africans now view religion with 
political circumspection, and would advocate rather, for a secular State, or at 
least one, that does not discriminate unfairly against any particular religion.87  
Further, at an individual level, such persons would place emphasis on the 
freedom not to exercise any particular religion too.88 
On the other hand, the individual and systemic experience and legacy of 
unfair discrimination, prejudice and hatred under the apartheid regime, has 
served, (albeit inadvertently), to facilitate introspection and therewith, a 
deepening of individual belief systems.  In this respect, many sought, and 
                                                 
83
 Patrick Lenta ‘Muslim headscarves in the workplace and in schools’ (2007) 124 SALJ 296 at 
296; Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 339-340; Paul Farlam ‘Freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion’ in Stuart Woolman, Michael Bishop; Jason Brickhill; et al (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2ed (2008 Revision Service 4 2012) chapter 41 at 41-11 ffg. 
84
 As per s 9(3) read with s 9(4) of the Constitution. 
85
 In this discussion, I focus specifically on religion, although the same line of argument could 
apply likewise to ‘conscience, thought, belief and[/or] opinion’. 
86
 Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 337 and the authorities cited in footnote 4.  They refer to 
“the cosy relationship that existed between the apartheid regime and the three Afrikaans 
churches in South Africa…”.  See also Farlam op cit note 83 at 41-1 to 41-2. 
87
 See for instance, the secular approach of France, and the United States, as contrasted with 
the concept of reasonable accommodation, espoused by Germany.  For more on these 
concepts, see Dennis Davis ‘Religion, belief and opinion’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL 
Haysom South African Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights 2ed (2005 Issue 13 September 
2012) chapter 10 at 10-1 to 10-8. 
88
 Gerhard Van der Schyff ‘Limitation and waiver of the right to freedom of religion’ (2002) 
TSAR 376 at 379-381.  Note however, that the author refers to the freedom not to exercise a 
religious practice as waiver.  On ‘waiver’, see discussion in 4.3.2(b)(iii) below. 
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continue to seek, guidance from the religious and associated cultural belief 
systems of the communities, that they were born into and/or grew up in.  This in 
turn, has entrenched the role of religious institutions within communities where, 
notwithstanding, their erstwhile legal marginalisation, such institutions in fact 
have enabled, and continue to enable, individuals to practise their religious 
beliefs as part of a community and so, foster the collective (sense of 
‘belonging’) facets of their particular identities.89  For these South Africans 
therefore, the individual and communal dimensions of religious (and cultural) 
belief and practice are integral to daily life.  As such, they would expect their 
freedom to exercise their religions, beliefs and opinions to be respected, both 
by the State and their fellow South Africans.  Indeed, this is now recognised by 
the complementing ss 30 and 31 of the Bill of Rights, as being fundamental in 
post-apartheid South Africa.90 
Against this background, it becomes clear that s 15(1) contemplates a 
liberal constitutional self who is free to exercise, or not to exercise, (as the case 
may be), a particular belief system, basically without interference by the State.  
Being integral to the (private) self’s conception of the meaning of life, who 
necessarily lives with, and amongst, other individuals, s 15(1) must apply 
horizontally also to private persons and as a result, to the private common law 
of contract.  This is endorsed by the largely negative nature of the duty imposed 
by s 15(1), together with s 9(4) of the Constitution, which provides expressly 
that “[n]o person… [my emphasis]” may discriminate unfairly on the basis, inter 
alia, of religion, conscience, belief or culture; the constitutional end goal (and 
thus, basic contract law parameter), being the fostering of an inclusive society 
that, not only is tolerant and accommodating of different religions, beliefs and 
opinions, but also celebrates its diversity.91 
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 Section 31 of the Constitution highlights this communal dimension.  See also Currie and De 
Waal op cit note 1 at 339. 
90
 Sections 30; 31 of the Constitution recognises culture as integral to religion and/or individual 
belief systems. 
91
 Lenta op cit note 83 at 297-299.  Note that the notion of accommodating different religious 
beliefs may sometimes require positive action (so-called reasonable accommodation), even of 
private persons, such as private employers, or private schools. 
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(b) The identification, assessment and (potential) development of the law 
governing contracts that relate to a party’s exercise (or non-exercise) of 
religious freedom as against s 15(1) of the Constitution 
In relation to our common law of contract, s 15(1) will operate in two ways.  
First, s 15(1) will operate in terms of its underpinning values, which need to be 
infused generally into the boni mores element of contract law’s doctrine of 
legality.  Second, s 15(1) will operate as a substantive right implicated in 
specific cases, where parties purport to regulate, by agreement, some 
manifestation of a contractant’s beliefs, in terms of his or her “conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and[/or] opinion.”92 
Dealing with s 15(1)’s broader operation as a set of values within our 
common law of contract, ‘religion’ appears to have been relevant to contracts in 
the pre-constitutional era, insofar as the boni mores element of legality’s public 
policy enquiry, assumed an apartheid-Christianity-type of disposition.  For the 
most part, the boni mores operating within this context were not alert to 
alternate belief-systems/religions.  Rather, agreements having to do with 
religious practices, that were inconsistent with Christian values would be contra 
bonos mores and against public policy and therefore, void for illegality.93  
Moreover, there was no objection in principle, to the curtailing or restraining of 
any non-Christian religious freedoms, by way of contract. 
Clearly, this understanding of the boni mores is not acceptable within a 
constitutionalised contract law.  At the very least, the broader values of 
inclusion, tolerance and diversity, that are espoused by s 15(1), must now be 
infused into the boni mores, so that, the boni mores become more secular or 
multi-denominational, whichever is most appropriate, in terms of the 
foundational triage, as well as the particular context of the case before the 
court.  Presumably, the constitutional infusion contemplated here, would adopt 
(or at least, be informed by), a s 39(2)-type of methodology. 
Dealing next with s 15(1) as a substantive right, the pressing question 
relates to how it would apply horizontally to contracts, that relate to a party’s 
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 Note that one cannot really regulate or contract about a person’s beliefs or faith, but only the 
external manifestation thereof.  See Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 338-339; Lenta op cit 
note 83 at 297. 
93
 For instance, an agreement purporting to govern a polygamous, or even a potentially 
polygamous marriage, would not be recognised by our common law.  Another example would 
be a marriage brokerage contract. 
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exercise (or non-exercise,94 as the case may be), of religious freedom.  For this 
purpose, I propose to examine the cases of Garden Cities Incorporated 
Association Not For Gain v Northpine Islamic Society95 and MEC for Education, 
KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay.96 
In doing so however, I need at the outset, to draw attention to and 
canvass three important concepts:  First, the distinction between a direct and 
an indirect contractual restriction of freedom of religion, second, the operation 
of the freedom of religion right at a collective level and finally, the concept of 
waiver that comes up in the literature discussing the contractual restriction of 
the right to freedom of religion.97 
 
(i) Direct versus indirect contractual restriction 
Briefly stated, a contractual restriction is direct when a contract purports 
deliberately to restrict a particular facet of a party’s religious practice.  In other 
words, the party agreeing expressly to a particular restriction is likely to have 
applied his or her mind to the implications of such agreement, for his or her 
right to freedom of religion. 
An example of a direct contractual restriction is found in the case of 
Garden Cities.  In this case, the respondent Mosque had undertaken in a 
contract with the applicant, not to use sound amplification equipment, in making 
the Islamic call to prayer (‘azaan’).  Instead, the respondent had agreed, that at 
the relevant times, it would turn on a light that it would install on the top of the 
minaret.  Subsequently, the respondent argued, that this agreement infringed 
on its freedom of religion, as the call to prayer is a fundamental tenet of Islam.98 
In contrast, a contractual restriction is indirect when a contract, although 
seemingly neutral, has the (inadvertent) effect purportedly of impinging on a 
party’s right to freedom of religion.  In other words, the party agreeing to such a 
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 I use this phrase loosely because the decision not to exercise a particular religion is in fact an 
exercise of such freedom.  See further discussion in 4.3.2(b)(iii) below. 
95
 1999 (2) SA 257 (C). 
96
 Pillay supra note 81.  I have chosen these two cases because they raise important issues 
about the contract-religion interface. 
97
 See for instance, Van der Schyff op cit note 88; Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 39-43. 
98
 Garden Cities supra note 95 at 270A-270J.  This case is discussed further in 4.3.2(b)(iv) 
below. 
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restriction is not likely to have applied his or her mind to the precise implications 
of such agreement, for his or her right to freedom of religion. 
An example of such a contractual restriction is found in the case of 
Pillay.  Here a learner’s parent had signed the school’s code of conduct, in 
terms of which, she agreed that her learner daughter would adhere, inter alia, 
to the clause restricting the type of jewellery that could be worn to school.99  
This clause, although seemingly neutral in effect, was held to impinge on the 
learner’s freedom of religion and associated Hindu culture, insofar as it 
prevented her from expressing her heritage by way of wearing a gold nose-stud 
at school.100 
In summation, the courts should be mindful of this distinction, both when 
formulating the general threshold (internal) content of contractual autonomy 
that may restrict the fundamental right to freedom of religion, as well as when 
applying such threshold requirement in the context of a particular case. 
 
(ii) Operation of the right to freedom of religion at a collective level 
Thus far, my discussion of rights in relation to contract law has been at the 
individual level i.e. it contemplates a particular individual exercising his or her 
right, exclusively, for him or herself.  This would occur where, as in the case of 
Pillay, the individual agrees, by way of contract, to exercise (or not to exercise) 
his or her right to freedom of religion, in some particular way or form.101  
Importantly, the communal dimension of freedom of religion - i.e. where people 
exercise their religious freedom, through practice, in community with others - 
would feature insofar as it informs, and evidences, the actual exercise of 
autonomy by the individual.  Additionally, the communal dimension would be 
relevant to the determination of the external reach of such an exercise of 
autonomy.  This much is clear - our contract law is designed specifically to deal 
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 Pillay supra note 81 at paras 4-10.  The relevant provision stated,  
“Jewellery: Ear-rings – plain round studs/sleepers may be worn, ONE in each ear lobe at the 
same level. No other jewellery may be worn, except a wristwatch. Jewelley includes any 
adornment/bristle which may be in any body piercing. Watches must be in keeping with the 
school uniform. Medic-Alert discs may be worn.” 
100
 Pillay supra note 81 at paras 60-68.  As will be explained in 4.3.2(b)(v) below, although this 
case involved a State school, its facts, and some of the legal principles discussed by the CC, 
lend themselves to application of the s 15(1) right in the private law context, too. 
101
 Here, Ms Pillay’s parent acted on her behalf, as she was a minor child, at the time. 
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with exercises of individual autonomy, with the result that this aspect of the 
Pillay-type scenario should not pose a problem in principle. 
In contrast, where a right operates at a collective level, i.e. when a 
collective (communal (religious)) institution exercises a right for the community 
of persons that customarily identify with that particular institution, the situation is 
far from clear-cut.  In Garden Cities for instance, the Northpine Islamic Society 
had agreed, by way of a contract with Garden Cities Incorporated that the 
Mosque would not sound the call to prayer and in so doing, collectively agreed 
not to exercise this aspect of the religious practice for the Muslim community of 
District Six.102 
Yet, our common law of contract is able to accommodate the institution’s 
collective exercise of the right, only insofar as all of the affected persons agree 
individually, to the particular exercise of the freedom of religion right, by the 
religious institution.103  In reality however, the attainment of such agreement is 
improbable and impracticable, because persons’ associations with the relevant 
religious institutions are usually informal and fairly fluid.104  Indeed, in Garden 
Cities, there did not appear to be specific agreement by the individuals affected 
by the Northpine Islamic Society’s undertaking, but even so, they were in effect 
bound by it.105 
The basic shortcoming, is that our contract law presently does not have 
a collective conception of autonomy and, as a result, is unable to deal 
effectively with scenarios, where a religious institution undertakes collectively to 
exercise (or not to exercise) the right to freedom of religion, in some particular 
way or form.106 
To sum up, if contract law is to deal with rights operating at a collective 
level, our constitutionalised conception of contractual autonomy will need to be 
developed accordingly.  Presumably, this would entail a reading of s 15(1) 
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 Or at least, not to amplify the call electronically – the applicant abandoned the claim for no 
call to prayer to be made.  Garden Cities supra note 95 at 270G-H; 271B-C. 
103
 Or at the very least, for each individual to give a mandate to the Mosque, to act as his or her 
agent.  In this way, the right is still exercised at an individual level i.e. by way of an exercise of 
individual autonomy as opposed to collective autonomy. 
104
 For instance, there is no formal register of members.  Further, people may move in and out 
of the area; there may also be persons working, or visiting, in the area, who may go to the 
Mosque, etc. 
105
 Garden Cities supra note 95 at 273E-F. 
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 I do not propose here, to develop such collective conception of autonomy. I merely draw 
attention to it as something to be mindful of, and leave it for further study. 
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together with s 31, and an elevated role for collective dignity and equality 
respectively.107 
 
(iii) The concept of waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
The final preliminary observation that I wish to make, relates to the notion of 
contractual waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.  I raise it here, because 
it comes up in the cases and literature particularly in relation to the right to 
freedom of religion and other classical-type rights.108 
The notion of waiver, i.e. “an undertaking not to exercise a fundamental 
right in future”,109 is seemingly controversial.  On the one side, the argument is 
that constitutional rights can never be waived.  Rather, when dealing with 
constitutional rights, the issue is one of interpretation and/or limitation of the 
relevant right.110  The competing side of the argument is that, in principle, the 
waiver of a constitutional right is possible, depending on the nature (or purpose) 
of the particular right.  This is because waiver of the right would actually entail 
exercise of the right, as is the case with religious freedom.111  To explain 
further, in deciding, and then undertaking contractually, not to observe a 
particular religious belief or practice, the constitutional self in fact exercises his 
or her religious freedom, in very much the same vein as he or she would have 
done, if he or she had decided and agreed (whether expressly or impliedly), 
rather to observe such religious belief or practice. 
For purposes of this thesis, it is not necessary to engage with this 
debate.  As should be apparent, from the earlier-outlined methodoIogy 
proposed for the application of a substantive right in contract law, I submit that 
the right to freedom of religion must be balanced against, and reconciled with, 
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 Again, I merely draw attention to this possibility.  Note further, that if the collective 
conception of autonomy is treated as a non-contractual issue, one ought to be wary of the 
dangers associated with parallel versions of contract law.  See further, Jeremy Waldron ‘The 
dignity of groups’ in AJ Barnard-Naude, Drucilla Cornell and Francois Du Bois (eds); Jan 
Glazewski (gen ed) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order The Critical 
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 See generally, Van der Schyff op cit note 88; Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 39-43; 
Stuart Woolman ‘Category mistakes and the waiver of constitutional rights: A response to 
Deeksha Bhana on Barkhuizen’ (2008) 125 SALJ 10; Garden Cities supra note 95; Wittman v 
Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria 1998 (4) SA 423 (T); Kevin Hopkins ‘Insurance policies and the 
Bill of Rights: Rethinking the sanctity of contract paradigm’ (2002) 119 SALJ 155 especially at 
172. 
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 Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 40. 
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 Woolman op cit note 108 at 12-13, 20-23. 
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 Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 41. 
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contractual autonomy, as contemplated by the foundational constitutional 
triage.112  Articulated further, once it is accepted that the right does apply 
horizontally to the common law of contract, the pertinent question firstly, is 
whether the particular contractant validly exercised his or her individual 
contractual autonomy in relation to the relevant right and, secondly, whether the 
external reach of such exercise of autonomy is legally acceptable, in light of the 
policy considerations associated with the right. 
At all times therefore, the relevant substantive right is meant to be 
engaged with analytical rigour, rather than sacrificed.  The concept of 
contractual waiver in the sense of forfeiture of the right therefore, is 
misconceived.113  The only caveat that I would add here, is that, in cases 
dealing with such a ‘waiver-type’ exercise of a substantive right, the courts 
ought to be especially mindful of the extent to which, the relevant 
(constitutionalised) contractual undertakings affect the choice of the 
autonomous (continuous) future self, regarding the substantive right in question 
- this would be particularly pertinent in the context of long-term continuing 
contracts, or contracts subject to suspensive conditions, that may not be 
fulfilled in the immediate future.114 
To conclude, my usage of the terminology ‘freedom not to exercise’ or 
‘non-exercise’, of a right, should not be entangled with the (non-) issue of 
contractual waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. 
 
(iv) Garden Cities Incorporated Association Not For Gain v Northpine Islamic 
Society 
In terms of how s 15(1) would apply to the Garden Cities scenario, it would be 
useful first, to outline the findings of the court.  Briefly stated, the court focused 
on the electronic amplification of the call to prayer and held that this was not a 
precept of Islam, but merely a ritual that is practiced widely.115  Accordingly, it 
was open to the parties to restrict such practice by way of contract.  
Furthermore, the relevant prohibiting clause was fundamental, in the sense that 
Garden Cities Incorporated would not have entered into the contract without the 
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 See discussion in 4.2 above. 
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 Currie and De Waal op cit note 1 at 42. 
114
 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.3.3(b) especially at 34; see also 4.3.1(b) op cit note 78. 
115
 Garden Cities supra note 95 at 271B-C; 272F-H. 
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clause.  In other words, freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda supported 
the enforcement of the prohibiting clause.  In the final event, the clause was 
also held to be in the interests of the other members of the community.116 
In an obiter dictum then, the court submitted that, even if it had to deal 
with the call to prayer itself, (as opposed to its electronic amplification), and had 
accepted that it was a fundamental precept of Islam, the sanctity of contract 
should still prevail for two reasons.117  First, it would not be easy for the other 
contractant to know if the relevant right (read ‘precept of faith’)118 relinquished, 
was fundamental or not.  Second, even if a fundamental precept, this was not 
relevant, as equally integral to the right to freedom of religion, is “the right to 
discard established dogma and believe in something new or nothing at all”.119 
The prohibiting clause therefore, was upheld and Northpine Islamic 
Society was found to be in breach of contract. 
In approaching this particular case and, more specifically, in considering 
the effect of the right to freedom of religion, it is submitted, that the analysis120 
could well have benefitted from distinguishing at the outset, between the 
internal content and external reach dimensions of contractual autonomy and 
then, properly situating the relevant considerations within these two 
dimensions. 
In doing so, the court is likely to have exposed the added complication of 
Northpine Islamic Society’s purported collective exercise of the right to freedom 
of religion, for the Muslim community of District Six.121  But the collective 
conception of autonomy aside, the judgment failed even to interrogate the 
threshold (internal) content of contractual autonomy, when dealing with the 
fundamental right to freedom of religion.  Indeed, the court mentions that the 
relevant clause was fundamental to Garden Cities, but does not explore the 
reasons why the Northpine Islamic Society ostensibly had agreed to the clause, 
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 In the form peace and quiet / no nuisance.  Garden Cities supra note 95 at 271C–271I. 
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 Garden Cities supra note 95 at 272B. 
118
 Garden Cities supra note 95 at 272A – I submit that the term ‘right’ was used incorrectly 
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 Garden Cities supra note 95 at 272B. 
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Pieterse ‘Many sides to the coin: The constitutional protection of religious rights’ (2000) 38 
CILSA 300 at 312; Van der Schyff op cit note 88. 
121
 See discussion in 4.3.2(b)(ii) above. 
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when it never intended to abide by it.  This, notwithstanding, the clause having 
comprised a direct contractual restriction, that the Northpine Islamic Society 
was aware of, and in some way, must have applied its mind to. 
It appears that the court simply relied (albeit implicitly), on the 
established classical liberal conception of the atomistic, independent 
contracting self,122 in relation to the Northpine Islamic Society.  Even so, it is 
unclear whether in the context of this particular case, the court was convinced 
that there was a free and fair exercise of choice by Northpine Islamic Society, in 
its apparent “discarding of established dogma” regarding the call to prayer. 
Arguably, this is because bargaining power may have been an issue 
between the parties here, and the common law of contract, as currently 
articulated, is deficient in its accommodation of this issue.123  Indeed, if the 
court had inquired into the internal (content) dimension of autonomy, as per the 
foundational triage and s 15(1) of the Constitution, it is likely to have identified 
this deficiency, both generally, in contracts of this nature and in the context of 
the particular contract, before it.  Further, if such deficiency did, in fact, turn out 
to be in issue, the court could have then situated the necessary development of 
our contract law, within the earlier proposed, constitutionalised, contractual 
doctrine of abuse of unequal bargaining power.124  Here, the potential impact of 
unequal bargaining power on an individual’s religious identity and sense of 
community would be especially relevant. 
More significantly however, this may have been a case where the 
doctrine of mistake could have been relevant, with a view to weighing up the 
reasonable reliance by Garden Cities on the appearance of consensus, against 
the excusability of the Northpine Islamic Society’s mistaken belief, that it was 
not bound by the prohibiting clause.  Notably, the ‘otherwise excusable’ 
category of mistake would have to be informed by the foundational 
constitutional triage, working in conjunction with s 15(1) of the Constitution.  For 
instance, this category may now require, that where the right to freedom of 
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religion is implicated, the mistaken party (which would be Northpine Islamic 
Society, in casu), needs only to show that his or her mistake was unintentional, 
rather than non-negligent.125 
Moving to the external reach dimension of autonomy, if our law of 
contract was to deal holistically with the internal content dimension of 
autonomy, as outlined above, freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda 
could operate fully against the right to freedom of religion.  This means that the 
balancing exercise would not be as fraught, and apparently unsolvable, if courts 
were to approach the concept of contractual autonomy correctly.126 
Furthermore, if the Northpine Islamic Society was held bound on the 
basis of apparent consensus, (as opposed to actual consensus), the specific 
external reach dimension policy considerations appertaining to reasonable 
reliance, would also have to be brought into play.  At the tendency level of the 
public policy scale therefore, the court ought to be mindful generally, of 
reliance-based distributive justice concerns (for instance, those considerations 
that traditionally have been housed within the law of delict and have been 
subordinate to freedom of contract – in casu this may translate loosely to ‘insult’ 
(or impairment of dignity) of the broader Muslim community of South Africa).  
Looking then at the enforceability level of the public policy scale, the court 
should be alert to the circumstances in which the mistaken and non-mistaken 
parties find themselves, in the particular context of the case (for instance, the 
presence or absence of tangible harm to the mistaken and non-mistaken party 
respectively – for Garden Cities Incorporated, the harm may comprise the noise 
pollution/nuisance experienced by non-Muslim members of the community, in 
having to hear the ‘azaan’ five times a day; for Northpine Islamic Society, the 
harm may relate to the specific implications for its individual members, of 
inadequate expression of a fundamental tenet of Islam).127 
This brings me to my final point on Garden Cities.  The court’s 
engagement with the right to freedom of religion itself was not very rigorous.  At 
the tendency level of the legality enquiry, the court ought carefully to have 
evaluated the general nature of the contractual clause that was before it, and to 
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have considered its broader impact on the relationship between the 
constitutional self and the right to freedom of religion, in post-apartheid South 
African society.  In doing so, the court ought to have been more mindful also, of 
the s 15(1) right to freedom of religion’s communal dimension, as 
complemented by ss 30 and 31 of the Constitution.  Finally, it should have 
highlighted the overarching prohibition of unfair discrimination on the basis of 
religion, conscience or belief.  In this respect, it should have highlighted also, 
the potential for intersectional unfair discrimination, especially on the basis of 
race, given the strong intersection in South African society between religion, 
race and community.128 
In more concrete terms, I submit that if the court had engaged more 
rigorously with s 15(1), it is likely to have uncovered the tendency of a Garden 
Cities type of contractual clause, to reinforce apartheid’s marginalisation of 
persons (and communities) observing Islamic norms and practices.  In post-
apartheid South Africa, it is arguable that the Garden Cities type of contractual 
clause would tend to feature mostly in (previously advantaged) residential 
areas, in relation to practices of alternate (and usually, minority) religions that 
may be unfamiliar to established residents.  Furthermore, to the extent that an 
alternate religious practice may impact on the status quo dynamic of the 
general community space, the practice may be seen as an unwelcome 
intrusion, by those members of the broader community, who are not associated 
with the relevant religion.  Accordingly, the Garden Cities type of clause could 
be used potentially to regulate or even avoid completely, by way of contract, 
any unwelcome intrusion (even if reasonable), by an alternate religious 
practice.  This cannot be acceptable in the post-apartheid era, where the s 
15(1) vision of an inclusive and tolerant South African society, which celebrates 
its diversity, is crucial. 
In the final event, as concerns the enforceability of the Garden Cities 
contractual clause,129 the court ought fully to have interrogated the particular 
circumstances of the contracting parties, at the time of enforcement of the 
clause, in order to determine whether, the Northpine Islamic Society’s right to 
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freedom of religion would be unreasonably and unjustifiably infringed, if Garden 
Cities Incorporated was allowed to enforce the clause.130  Here, the court could 
have sought guidance from the restraint of trade jurisprudence, as to how it 
should conduct the ‘enforceability level’ of the public policy, balancing exercise.  
In this respect, a particularly influential factor, could be the fact that the 
Northpine Islamic Society represents the District Six Muslim community, a 
community that may have an especially oppressive, ‘forced-removals’, 
apartheid history.131 
 
(v) MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 
At the outset, it must be noted that, although this case involved a State School 
and therefore, the State, its facts (as well as some of the legal principles 
discussed by the CC) tend to lend themselves to application of the s 15(1) right 
in the private law context, too.  Accordingly, I will focus on the facts of this case 
insofar as the learner’s parent had signed the School’s code of conduct that 
contained the relevant provision and further postulate, how a court ought to 
handle the matter, if instead, the school were a private school or individual. 
As mentioned above, the Pillay scenario involved a clause that appeared 
neutral, but had the inadvertent effect of impinging on a party’s freedom of 
religion.  In other words, it is unlikely that upon agreement to the clause, the 
parties applied their minds specifically, to the implications of the clause, in 
relation to the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion.  On the contrary, 
in the context of a multi-cultural, diverse and tolerant, post-apartheid South 
Africa, it is more likely that the parties would expect the clause to operate 
rather, in a manner that would at least respect, if not positively accommodate, 
this fundamental right.132 
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In other words, when dealing with an indirect contractual restriction, the 
emphasis, in terms of the foundational constitutional triage, shifts from freedom 
to equality (coupled with dignity as constraint).  Indeed, the CC accepted as 
much, in its treatment of the Pillay case as an ‘equality case’ that had to be 
resolved by way of an application of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act.133  Admittedly, this case involved a State school 
and as such, the court did not pay much attention to the implications of the 
clause in contract law.  Nevertheless, s 9(4) of the Constitution makes clear 
that private persons are also bound by the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.134  Accordingly, the court’s emphasis 
on equality ought to apply also, when dealing with two private individuals. 
The pertinent question then, is how to translate and situate the court’s 
vertical approach, to an indirect contractual restriction, within the 
constitutionalised contract law framework.135 
First, looking at the internal content dimension of contractual autonomy, 
it is necessarily determined on conclusion of the contract.  As such, when 
agreeing to a facially neutral clause, the internal content dimension of 
contractual autonomy is unlikely to implicate the constitutional right to freedom 
of religion, belief and opinion, given that the parties did not at that point 
anticipate its application.  A thinner, more abstract concept of autonomy 
therefore, would apply generally in the Pillay-type of case.136 
At the same time, the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy 
would, at both the tendency and enforceability levels of the public policy 
enquiry, elevate the equality dimension of the foundational constitutional triage, 
especially in relation to the enforceability level of the public policy scale.  It is in 
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conducting this balancing exercise that the Constitutional Court’s approach to 
Ms Pillay’s wearing of the nose stud, as an expression of her right to freedom of 
religion and culture, can be adopted. 
Notably, the consideration of freedom of contract was not central.  
Rather, having established that the religious practice was important to Ms 
Pillay, equality occupied centre stage.  This meant that Ms Pillay could not, on 
the basis of her right to freedom of religion and culture, be unfairly 
discriminated against.  Here, the court looked at the importance of the school’s 
purpose for having the clause and whether, a granting of an exemption to Ms 
Pillay, in relation to her nose ring, would defeat that purpose.  The court held 
that it would not and accordingly, that Ms Pillay should have been exempted 
from the operation of the clause in this case.137 
So, in relation to the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy, 
the CC’s approach would translate into freedom of contract not being the 
primary consideration, at either the tendency, or the enforceability, level of the 
public policy enquiry.  Rather, when dealing with a Pillay-type of clause, the 
focus should be on (substantive) equality.  Further, at the enforceability level of 
the enquiry, most crucial would be the need to weigh up the importance of the 
particular religious practice to the affected contractant, against the importance 
of the particular purpose that is served by the relevant prohibitive clause, in the 
particular circumstances of the case.  Significantly, this approach appears to 
resonate also, with the restraint of trade jurisprudence, on the legal 
enforceability of contracts.  In conducting the enforceability enquiry therefore, 
the courts should draw from and build upon this jurisprudence too. 
In the end therefore, the upshot of the Pillay judgment is that we have 
guidance from the Constitutional Court itself, in terms of how to interpret and 
apply s 15(1), read together with s 9(4), in relation to our common law of 
contract. 
 
(vi) The concept of ‘reasonable accommodation’ and contract law 
Although the Pillay-type scenario lends itself to a forbearance remedy, of the 
relevant clause simply being unenforceable, in the circumstances of wearing 
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the nose-stud to school, s 15(1) may well require, a private individual 
(contractant) to take positive steps, to accommodate an individual (co-
contractant)’s right to exercise his or her freedom of religion, in the course of 
the conclusion and/or operation of contracts.  This is based on the concept of 
‘reasonable accommodation’, as espoused by s 15(1) of the Constitution.138 
The concept of ‘reasonable accommodation’ raises a number of broader 
substantive issues within the sphere of contract law.  Most significantly, the 
duty of a contractant, to accommodate a co-contractant’s right to exercise his or 
her freedom of religion, may impinge on the contractant’s very exercise of 
contractual autonomy.  This could be the case, for instance, where a Muslim 
learner insists on attending a particular (private) Catholic school, for some 
reason.  In such a case, could the Catholic school be compelled to admit her 
into the school and if so, to what extent would the school need to accommodate 
her religious beliefs? 
Arguably, these questions fall to be dealt with, primarily in terms of the 
internal dimension of contractual autonomy, as complemented by the 
development of an implied contractual term that would be required by a 
constitutionalised contract law. 
In relation to the internal content dimension of contractual autonomy, its 
normative facet would be especially relevant to the question of reasonable 
accommodation.  In other words, a constitutionalised normative standard of 
reasonableness is pivotal to the determination of whether, the concept of 
reasonable accommodation would require an individual to conclude a contract, 
in the particular circumstances of the case.  For purposes of my example 
therefore, the school could only be reasonably compelled to admit the Muslim 
learner.  So if the reason that the Muslim learner wants to attend the school is 
because she is adept at science, and the school has an excellent science 
programme, the school could well be compelled to admit her.  If however, there 
is a Muslim school nearby that has equally good science programme, the 
Catholic school may not have to admit her.139 
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Likewise, when it comes to the nature of the positive steps required, in 
terms of the principle of ‘reasonable accommodation’, our constitutionalised 
contact law may have to develop an implied term, to the effect that such steps 
need only be reasonable.140  In turn, what is reasonable will depend on how 
onerous (and costly) such steps would be, bearing in mind always, that the duty 
would be imposed on a private individual, as opposed to the State.  So, in 
relation to my example, upon admittance of the Muslim learner to the Catholic 
school, the school may well, in addition to granting Pillay-type exemptions to 
the learner,141 be required, for instance, to make available Muslim headscarves, 
as an added (optional) part of uniforms that learners are required to wear, in 
terms of the school’s (contractually binding) code of conduct.  In contrast, it 
may be unreasonable to expect the private school to build a special prayer 
room on its premises, so as to accommodate a particular learner (or even 
group of learners)’s freedom of religion.142 
In the end therefore, our contract law remedies relating to s 15(1) may 
need to be developed in this direction too. 
 
4.3.3 The right to have access to health care services (s 27(1)(a)) 
For purposes of the discussion below, I use the right of access to health care 
services, as an example of a socio-economic right.  Accordingly, the 
conclusions reached here, apply also to other rights such as, the right to have 
access to “adequate housing”, and “sufficient food”, where access is mostly by 
way of contract. 
 
(a) The content of s 27 of the Constitution 
In terms of s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution, 
 “Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including 
reproductive health care...” 
Further, s 27(2) provides that, 
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 “The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of [the right to have 
access to health care services].” 
Finally, s 27(3) provides that, 
 “No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.” 
At the outset, it must be noted that while we tend generally to think of 
socio-economic rights as operating predominantly against the State, there are 
clear and important private dimensions to such rights that need to be thought of 
in terms of horizontal application. 
Within the private arena, access to socio-economic rights is essentially 
relational in nature, meaning that the rights are realised through relationships 
with others.143  The logical legal paradigm of such relationships would be 
contract.  In other words, the right of access to health care in the private sphere 
is facilitated and controlled ultimately by the common law of contract.144  It 
stands to reason therefore, that the constitutional right of access to health care 
services must apply horizontally to contracts that purport, by way of an exercise 
of private power, to regulate the very object of the s 27 socio-economic right. 
The more critical question relates to the extent to which, the right of 
access to health care services, ought to apply to our common law of contract.  
To begin with, classical contract law did not have a ‘conceptual foundation’ for 
the protection of an individual’s right of access to basic socio-economic goods 
and services; the idea being, that the recognition of contractual liberty suffices 
for this purpose.145  As a result, the (potential) power146 exercised by private 
health care providers was in no way policed by our law of contact – contracts 
impacting upon an individual’s access to health care were not treated any 
differently to other contracts.  On the contrary, the thin classical liberal 
conception of autonomy, with its maxim of pacta sunt servanda, enabled health 
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care providers contractually even to exclude liabilities that would otherwise 
attach for medical malpractice or negligence.147 
With the advent of the Constitution however, the classical liberal position 
on socio-economic rights can no longer stand.  Without a doubt, the 
constitutionalised concept of contractual autonomy, as grounded in the 
foundational triage of freedom, dignity and equality, must accommodate the 
right of access to socio-economic goods.  Once again however, to what extent? 
At first glance, the horizontal application of the s 27(1) right, when read 
with s 27(2), would appear merely to be negative, in the sense that a private 
individual must not be prevented actively from seeking medical attention by 
anyone.148  Nevertheless, s 27(2) stipulates that the State must take 
reasonable measures, progressively to realise the right of access to health 
care.  Such measures must include judicial measures which, when read with ss 
8(2) and 8(3), translates into a development of the common law, including the 
common law of contract.149  At the very least therefore, the underlying public 
law values associated with the constitutional recognition of the right of access 
to health care, must filter into contract law.150  Notably, this infiltration may, in 
appropriate circumstances, translate into a more positive application of s 27(1) 
to contract law. 
In reading s 27 with s 8(2), the precise scope of horizontal application of 
the right of access to health care to our common law of contract is determined 
by the content of the right (and any corresponding duties).  Importantly, the 
content of the right of access to health care is not fixed – it is context sensitive 
and furthermore, depends on the socio-economic status of the particular 
contracting parties, as well as the influence of private power in the 
circumstances.151 
Broadly speaking however, the right of access to health care services 
would appear to be most pertinent to the development of the internal content 
threshold of a more positive concept of contractual autonomy.  Indeed, good 
health is a core requirement for the constitutional self’s basic survival and 
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ensuing ability to pursue his or her vision of the good life.152  In the words of 
Sandra Liebenberg, 
“The purpose of [socio-economic] rights is to ensure that everyone has access 
to the socio-economic goods and services referred to in the relevant provisions. 
These goods and services must be adequate in quality and quantity so as to 
facilitate the development of people to their full potential and their participation 
as [substantive] equals in all spheres of society.”153 
Articulated further, s 27(1) serves to recognise the right of access to health 
care, as one of the material requirements, necessary for the protection of an 
individual’s fundamental human rights and the effective realisation of his or her 
life aspirations.  Good health and general well-being are crucial for purposes of 
empowering an individual to live with dignity, making real choices for him or 
herself, on a substantively equal footing with all other individuals.154 
In relation to the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy then, 
an enquiry must be cognisant of health’s linkage also to collective dignity - the 
good health of every member of a community is an important function of 
collective dignity.  Indeed, the right of access to health care services recognises 
the values of human solidarity and interdependence as especially poignant in 
South Africa, where conditions of ‘poverty and material deprivation’ remain a 
‘lived reality’ for a majority of South Africans.155  In other words, health must be 
appreciated as a crucial collective cog which, at one and the same time, is a 
product of, and exacerbates, socio-economic vulnerabilities.  The HIV Aids 
pandemic epitomises this reality – whereas those that live below the poverty 
line are especially vulnerable in terms of contracting the virus, by reason, inter 
alia, of lack of access to adequate health care, (sex) education and economic 
resources, the contracting of the virus itself exacerbates conditions of 
disadvantage and poverty.  For women, this reality is often aggravated by 
gender-based relational power structures,156 which impede access to socio-
economic rights.  Most notably, sex (and the attending health issues) becomes 
a systemic weapon that is used against women, whether violently or otherwise, 
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to entrench patterns of dependency and so, undermines the intrinsic dignity and 
equality of South African society as a whole. 
Moving on to the question of how s 27(1) would apply concretely to 
contracts that implicate a party’s right of access to health care, I look at the 
case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom.157  Before doing so however, I 
consider the possibility of compelling a private health care provider to contract 
with an individual in need of health care. 
 
(b) Forced to contract? 
To begin with, s 27(3) compels health care providers, whether public or private, 
to provide emergency medical treatment.158  More significantly, if a contract is 
accepted as the appropriate legal paradigm, to regulate the relationship 
between the (private) health care provider and the patient, the implication is 
that s 27(3) forces a health care provider to contract with the patient.  To 
expound, in the case of a medical emergency (as contemplated by s 27(3)), the 
foundational constitutional triage articulates a conception of contractual 
autonomy, which prefers a more collectivist understanding of each of the values 
and moreover, elevates the values of dignity (as constraint) and (substantive) 
equality, above that of freedom.159 
Arguably, the main reason for s 27(3), at least in relation to the private 
realm, is to prevent the prevailing power dynamic, between (private) health care 
providers and (impending) patients, from frustrating the receipt of (potentially 
life-saving) emergency medical care.  The implication for contracts therefore, is 
that the substantive right not to be refused emergency medical treatment 
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comprises an example of where the Constitution has stepped in, to mitigate the 
general imbalance of bargaining power, between health care providers and 
patients, when contracting – in the context of a medical emergency, the basic 
principle, in terms of the Constitution, is that a health care provider has no say 
as to whether to contract with the particular person in need of care. 
Using this principle as the point of departure then, it becomes important 
to know what precisely constitutes “emergency medical treatment” because 
this, in turn, will determine the extent to which a (private) health care provider 
can be compelled to contract with the patient in need of such emergency 
treatment. 
Here, the discussion of emergency medical treatment in Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal160 may be helpful.  In brief, the CC defined 
emergency medical treatment as the urgent medical treatment required in those 
circumstances, where a person experiences a sudden, unexpected (physical 
and/or psychological) trauma.161 Further, the CC submitted that the extent of 
the obligations imposed by s 27(3) should be interpreted against the backdrop 
of s 27(2), so that, the resource constraints of the State are borne in mind.162  
Finally, the CC delineated the duties imposed by s 27(3) in negative terms, in 
the sense that, where emergency care is available and adequate, the health 
care provider may not turn away any person in need of such care.  Notably, the 
CC did not outline any corresponding positive obligations for the State actively 
to ensure that, emergency medical treatment is available and adequate in the 
first place.163 
The CC’s interpretation of s 27(3) in Soobramoney164 has been subject 
to criticism, largely due to its watering down of the provision’s (potentially) 
transformative role in the post-apartheid era.165  Nevertheless, the criticism 
relates mainly to the extent of the obligations imposed by s 27(3) on the State, 
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rather than private individuals.  In general terms, it may well be appropriate for 
the extent of the contractual obligations of private health care providers, to be 
delineated in terms of the narrower Soobramoney definition of emergency 
medical treatment.  The only caveat would be that the CC’s contemplated 
application of s 27(2), in relation to s 27(3), is not suited to the private law 
context, given that s 27(2) refers to the resources of the State alone.  Rather, 
resource constraints of private health care providers ought to be 
accommodated under the scope of horizontal application enquiry, as per s 8(2) 
of the Bill of Rights.  Accordingly, as with all enumerated rights, the extent of 
the duty to provide emergency medical treatment, in terms of the imposed 
contract, must depend likewise on the context in which s 27(3) finds application, 
(both generally, when dealing with emergency medical treatment contracts and 
specifically, in relation to the particular contract and parties before the court).166 
So, bringing this interpretation back to the internal content dimension of 
contractual autonomy, the values of dignity and equality, as outlined earlier, 
would dominate the triage’s delineation of health care providers’ freedom of 
contract, in relation to emergency medical treatment – whereas providers have 
no say as to whether to contract in the narrowly defined emergency context, 
they remain free to exercise their autonomy in relation to the terms upon which 
they contract.  Further, their freedom not to contract in non-emergency contexts 
remains valid.167 
Still, the terms of an emergency treatment contract may be restricted, 
insofar as they cannot lead constructively to a denial of emergency medical 
treatment by, for instance, insisting on payment upfront.  Health care providers 
can however, at least charge a reasonable price for their services. 168  In other 
words, s 27(3) requires the contents of emergency medical treatment contracts, 
also to be reasonable, both generally and in the particular circumstances of the 
case.169 
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In practical terms, this means that patients could challenge the 
reasonableness of the terms of such emergency treatment contracts.  This is 
where the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy, is most likely to 
come into play.  Here, I would submit, once again, that a s 36(1)-type standard 
of reasonableness ought to be invoked, where on the tendency level of the 
public policy scale, the broader implications for (economically) sustainable and 
quality private health care provision in South Africa, ought to be taken into 
account.170  Further, on the enforceability level of the scale, an important factor 
will be the nature of the particular health care provider before the court - for 
instance, whether it is an individual medical practitioner or a big private hospital 
- and its ability in the circumstances of the case, to have provided adequate 
emergency medical care. 
On a final note, the other constitutional provision that may force one to 
contract in this context is s 9(4).  Briefly stated, s 9(4) prevents a person from 
discriminating unfairly against another, on any of the grounds listed in s 9(3).  In 
other words, a health care provider cannot refuse to contract with a (potential) 
patient, whether in an emergency situation or not, if such refusal of access to 
health services would amount to unfair discrimination.171  Here, the foundational 
constitutional triage, read with ss 9 and 27 of the Constitution, articulates a 
conception of contractual autonomy, which elevates the values of substantive 
equality and ensuing dignity, above that of freedom.  Once again however, 
although the provider may have no say as to whether to contract, this would not 
prevent it, along the same lines as s 27(3), from at least negotiating a contract 
on reasonable terms and so, for instance, charging a reasonable price for its 
services.172 
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(c) Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 
In brief, this case dealt with a contract between Mr Strydom and a private 
hospital, run by Afrox Healthcare Bpk.  On admission to the hospital for an 
operation, Mr Strydom had signed a contract with the hospital, in terms of 
which, he agreed, inter alia, to an exclusion clause.  The exclusion clause 
excluded liability of the hospital for the negligence of its staff.  Accordingly, 
when Mr Strydom sued the hospital for damages suffered, as a result of a 
nurse’s negligent post-operative care, the hospital raised the exclusion clause 
as a defence.173 
In turn, Mr Strydom purported to invoke the doctrine of mistake.  He 
argued that he was mistaken about the existence of the exclusion clause in the 
contract, because it was an unexpected clause.  As such, he explained that 
Afrox had had a legal duty to draw his attention to the exclusion clause, before 
it could be binding on him and that Afrox had failed to comply with this legal 
duty.  (To expound, Afrox had failed to draw Mr Strydom’s attention to the 
unexpected exclusion clause and so, made a misrepresentation by omission, in 
relation to the existence of the clause.  The argument therefore, was that Afrox 
had caused Mr Strydom’s mistake, by its misrepresentation and thereby, 
rendered his mistake justus (legally excusable)).174 
Further, Mr Strydom argued that the clause was contrary to public policy 
firstly, because in concluding the contract, he was in a weaker bargaining 
position than Afrox, in relation to the exclusion clause.  Secondly, because the 
exclusion clause undermined s 39(2) of the Constitution, insofar as it 
undermined the spirit, purport and objects of the s 27(1)(a) right of access to 
health care.  Mr Strydom argued that his right of access to health care services 
required such services to be rendered in a professional (non-negligent) 
manner.  In the final event, Mr Strydom argued that even if the two preceding 
public policy arguments failed, the clause was nevertheless unenforceable on 
the basis that it was unreasonable, unfair and in conflict with the principle of 
good faith.175 
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In dealing with Mr Strydom’s first argument, the court applied the caveat 
subscriptor rule,176 and held further, that there was no legal duty to point out the 
exclusion clause, because it was not an unexpected clause.  The court 
explained that an exclusion clause is “the rule rather than the exception” in 
standard form contracts.  The doctrine of mistake therefore, was not applicable.  
In this respect, the court emphasised that the test as to whether a clause is 
unexpected did not depend on the subjective expectations of Mr Strydom, as to 
the contents of his contract with Afrox.  Rather, it was an objective test as to 
whether an exclusion clause is to be expected (generally) in such a contract.177 
In terms of whether the exclusion clause was contrary to public policy, 
the court rejected the argument that Mr Strydom was in a weaker bargaining 
position than Afrox, on the basis that there was no evidence of this (hard) 
fact.178  Further, whilst the court was willing to accept that s 27(1)(a) and the 
foundational constitutional values were applicable in the circumstances,179 it 
held ultimately that freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda prevailed, 
because there were sufficient safeguards (outside of contract law), to ensure 
professional, (non-negligent) health care.180  Finally, the court dismissed Mr 
Strydom’s good faith argument on the basis that good faith was an underlying 
value that could not override established legal rules.181 
Once again, in approaching this particular case, it is submitted that the 
court’s analysis182 could well have benefitted from distinguishing at the outset, 
between the internal content and external reach dimensions of contractual 
                                                 
176
 Briefly stated, in terms of the caveat subscriptor rule, a party is bound to a contract that he 
or she signs, whether he or she read it or not - George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 
(A). 
177
 Afrox supra note 14 at para 36. 
178
 Afrox supra note 14 at para 12. 
179
 Afrox supra note 14 at paras 17-18. 
180
 Afrox supra note 14 at paras 23-24. 
181
 Afrox supra note 14 at para 32.  For further discussion of this case, see Danie Brand 
‘Disclaimers in hospital admission contracts and constitutional health rights Afrox Healthcare v 
Strydom’ (2002) 3 ESR Review 17; Dire Tladi ‘One step forward, two steps back for 
constitutionalising the common law: Afrox Healthcare v Strydom’ (2002) 17 SA Public Law 473; 
RM Jansen and BS Smith ‘Hospital disclaimers: Afrox Healthcare v Strydom’ (2003) 28 Journal 
for Juridical Sciences 210; Tjakie Naude and Gerhard Lubbe ‘Exemption clauses – A rethink 
occasioned, Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’ (2005) 122 SALJ 441; Deeksha Bhana and 
Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and 
Afrox revisited’ (2005) 122 SALJ 865 at 875-876; 883-889.  More generally, see H Lerm 
‘Exclusionary clauses in medical contracts revisited’ 2011 (74) THRHR 47. 
182
 As well as the parties’ framing of the case. 
  225 
autonomy, and then, properly situating the relevant considerations within these 
two dimensions. 
Dealing first with the internal content dimension, socio-economic rights 
foster a more positive, capabilities-based approach to autonomy.  As discussed 
earlier, socio-economic rights ought to inform the basic content threshold, for 
an exercise of a choice, in substance.  In other words, the right of access to 
health care is likely to infiltrate the initial requirement of contractual capacity, as 
well as the doctrines articulating improperly obtained consensus and mistake. 
In terms of the element of contractual capacity, our law should now 
accommodate a contractant’s subjective feelings of vulnerability, pain and 
distress when dealing with a health issue, with a view ultimately to developing a 
fuller conception of autonomy.183  Likewise, our law should be alert to the reality 
that illness itself can impact on contractual capacity, by way of the symptoms of 
an illness that are experienced and/or the side-effects of medication taken.  
Indeed, taking account of these factors would dovetail with the subjective 
nature of the contractual capacity enquiry (and, which could have been 
investigated in Afrox had the issue been raised). 
That said, some authors have argued that the extant element of 
contractual capacity limits private access to health care services by child-
headed households, as well as the unassisted elderly and mentally ill, and for 
this reason, its requirements ought to be relaxed, when dealing with such 
vulnerable persons.184  To do so however, would be to misunderstand the 
function of contract law and contractual autonomy itself.  As outlined in Chapter 
Two, contract law’s axis of contractual autonomy is meant to attribute liability to 
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a contracting party, basically in terms of his or her actual (subjective) or 
apparent (objective) exercise of autonomy (as per the internal content 
dimension of contractual autonomy).  Importantly, the underlying premise (and 
essential pre-requisite) here, is that the contracting party does, in fact, have the 
ability to exercise such (actual or apparent) autonomy.  Hence, the foundational 
element of contractual capacity – without the requisite capacity, there simply 
cannot be a valid exercise of autonomy by an individual, for the purposes of 
contract law. 
In the end, therefore, a relaxation of the element of contractual capacity 
would refute our law’s very foundation of contractual autonomy and voluntarily 
assumed obligations.  To be sure, the legal lacuna, as identified by the relevant 
authors, resides not in contract law, but rather, in the laws of guardianship and 
curatorship respectively.  As such, the concern regarding the impaired capacity 
of the respective vulnerable groups must be addressed there.185 
Moving on to the issue of bargaining power, the earlier proposed 
doctrine of abuse of unequal bargaining power must likewise be relevant, in 
relation to contracts for the provision of health care.  Here, the general power 
dynamic between (private) health care providers and patients is dependent on 
several factors. 
To begin with, the socio-economic status of a patient is directly 
proportional to the extent of enjoyment of the right of access to health care 
services.  This is especially so, in terms of the quality of health care:  the higher 
the cost of care, the better the quality that is generally expected.  So, in relation 
to Mr Strydom, his bargaining power, in terms of the quality of care that he 
could have negotiated for, in his contract with Afrox, would depend, inter alia, 
on how much he was willing/able to pay for such care.186 
That said, a more significant factor would be the reality of certain 
standard terms that tend to be included in all health care contracts of a 
particular kind.  So, for instance, if as in Afrox, the exclusion clause is “the rule 
rather than the exception” in all (private) hospital contracts with patients, and 
furthermore, no hospital would be willing to admit a patient without such 
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exclusion clause in the contract, Mr Strydom would in effect have been forced 
to ‘agree’ to such clause; his bargaining power being nullified, in relation 
thereto.187 
Additionally, information asymmetries also contribute to unequal 
bargaining powers, in the sense that patients generally are not privy to the 
economic factors, which influence the cost of health care services.  Indeed, 
whereas the doctrine of informed consent188 goes some way to balancing out 
information asymmetries, in terms of medical treatment options, there are no 
similar duties of disclosure in terms of costs of treatment and therefore, 
normally there is minimal contractual negotiation, in relation thereto.  So, in 
relation to Mr Strydom, it would be relevant whether he was simply given the 
‘hospital bill’ as per the hospital’s imposed tariffs, (which tends to be the usual 
practice), or whether, he had negotiated the costs/tariffs upfront. 
Such diluted bargaining power is exacerbated then, by the fact that 
patients generally need the relevant medical treatment and as such, are 
necessarily vulnerable in their having to rely on, and trust, health care providers 
to provide the appropriate care.  Being in such a vulnerable position, tends to 
make patients’ wills more pliable, in the sense that they may ‘agree’ to 
whatever terms are proposed by the health care provider, with a view simply, to 
getting the required treatment.  Here, Mr Strydom’s sensitivity and appreciation 
of his need for the operation, as based on the nature of his illness and his 
relationship with his doctor, would be relevant. 
Finally, in relation to health care provision, the bargaining power enquiry 
must also accommodate relational undertones (which, although not necessarily 
pertinent to Mr Strydom per se, remain crucial for the broader progressive 
constitutionalisation of our contract law).  Not all persons have direct 
contractual access to health care providers.  Many are dependent on inter-
personal (familial) relationships, inter alia, for the funds, transport and relief 
from child-care responsibility, necessary to gain the relevant access to health 
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care.  Such relational dependence is compounded by the deteriorating state of 
public health facilities.189 
Even so, the delineation of health care services as public or private has 
no relevance in the mind of the average individual.  For the average individual, 
health care provision is associated with communal values of care-giving and 
benevolence.  Accordingly, patients (and their next of kin) trust health care 
providers implicitly, to act in their best (health-care) interests, as part of a 
relational collectivist-type duty, which transcends the public-private divide and 
so, shifts emphasis away from the fact that the health care provider in question, 
happens to be a private entity.  In relation to Mr Strydom, such trust appears to 
have translated into an expectation that he would not be treated negligently by 
hospital staff. 
The upshot is that the issue of unequal bargaining power is far more 
complex than suggested by the court in Afrox and it is unfortunate, that the 
court did not take advantage of the opportunity to unpack this issue, in greater 
detail.  At the very least, it could have provided guidance, as to the type of 
evidence and/or factors that may show the existence of unequal bargaining 
power, in future cases. 
The final component of the internal content dimension, that ought to 
have been assessed in Afrox, is the relationship between unequal bargaining 
power, the caveat subscriptor rule and the doctrine of mistake. 
In essence, the caveat subscriptor rule binds a party to a contract, upon 
signature, whether he or she has read the contract or not.190  The basic 
rationale for this rule is that signature denotes agreement – it presumes that a 
party would read the proposed contract and only upon satisfaction with all of its 
proposed terms, would he or she sign it.  Generally speaking therefore, the rule 
considers it unreasonable for a signatory not to read his or her contract, before 
signing it. 
In the modern context however, standard form contracts have become 
proliferate and parties increasingly do not read their contracts.  Accordingly, the 
rationale for the caveat subscriptor rule has been adjusted - whereas the 
original rationale still applies when contracts are in fact read, insofar as parties 
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do not read their contracts, the rule assumes further, that upon signature, such 
parties are willing to assume the risk of being bound to contractual terms that 
they have not read/are not aware of.191  Contracting parties therefore, are still 
said to be bound upon the basis of actual subjective consensus. 
But our courts have gone further than this.  In practical terms, the 
application of the caveat subscriptor rule has proved quite harsh, particularly in 
relation to exclusion clauses that feature in standard form contracts (as in the 
case of Afrox).  So, in an effort to mitigate the (potentially) harsh effect of the 
caveat subscriptor rule, the courts have developed the doctrine of mistake, to 
enable (mistaken) parties to escape any unexpected clauses that appear in 
signed, unread contracts.192  The argument is that the mistaken party was 
unaware and/or unwilling to assume the risk of being bound to unexpected 
clauses and so, should be allowed to escape the application of such clauses.193 
Nevertheless, a clause can only be unexpected if a signatory does not 
read his or her contract and, in terms of the caveat subscriptor rule, it is 
unreasonable for a signatory not to read his or her contracts.  So, in allowing a 
party to escape a so-called ‘unexpected’ clause, the premise of the caveat 
subscriptor rule is subverted to such an extent, that it appears now, to be 
reasonable not to read one’s contracts.194  Indeed, our law creates an 
interesting anomaly: the party who does not bother to read his or her contract, 
may avoid the (potentially) harsh effect of the caveat subscriptor rule, by way of 
the doctrine of mistake, whilst the more conscientious party who does read his 
or her contract, may not. 
The essential problem here, is that the courts have failed to appreciate 
that the potentially harsh operation of the caveat subscriptor rule, is not so 
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much an issue of mistake (due to not reading one’s contracts), as it is an issue 
of the prevailing unequal bargaining power in standard form contracts.  
Arguably, the main reason for the increasing trend of parties not to read their 
contracts is that, even if a party were to read his or her contract and thereby, be 
alerted to (potentially) harsh clauses, he or she generally has no real power to 
negotiate for something else.  The party either agrees to the presented contract 
as it is or does not contract at all.195 
Therefore, in a constitutional context, which recognises the potential for 
abuses of unequal bargaining power and so, purports to develop our contract 
law accordingly, the courts have an opportunity to resolve the anomaly created 
by the notion of unexpected clauses.  So, in relation to Mr Strydom, the court 
could have linked the issue of unequal bargaining power, if proved, also to the 
operation of the caveat subscriptor rule.196 
Dealing finally, with the external reach dimension of autonomy, if our law 
of contract was to articulate the internal content dimension of autonomy, as 
outlined above, a fuller, more positive concept freedom of contract and pacta 
sunt servanda could operate, against the right of access to health care 
services.197  Indeed, upon closer examination of the internal content dimension 
of contractual autonomy, the court in Afrox, would probably have uncovered the 
deficiency of the classical liberal conception of contractual autonomy in relation 
to the right of access to health care and so, would not have elevated the 
ensuing hegemonic understanding of freedom of contract to being a 
constitutional right itself.198  In turn, this process would have led to a more 
rigorous engagement, by the court, with the s 27(1) right of access to health 
care services. 
In terms of the first tier of the public policy scale, the court ought to have 
assessed the tendency of the exclusion clause that was before it, and more 
especially, ought to have considered its broader implications for the relationship 
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between the constitutional self and the socio-economic right of access to health 
care services, in post-apartheid South Africa.  In this respect, the communal 
dimensions of dignity and substantive equality, as well as the potential 
undermining of the doctrine of informed consent, would be most pertinent. 
In more concrete terms, I submit that if the court had engaged more 
rigorously with s 27(1), it would have exposed the potential for the Afrox-type of 
exclusion clause to undermine the important, constitutional goal of access to 
adequate health care, by all South Africans, particularly in light of the general 
failings of public health facilities.  At the very least, the collectivist values of 
solidarity and interdependence, operating in post-apartheid South Africa, are 
likely to require that the standard of health care observed, must be reasonable 
(or non-negligent).  Indeed, to hold otherwise would simply elevate contract law 
over the law of delict in the context of exclusion clauses, and perhaps, even in 
relation to the doctrine of informed consent.  That said, the commercial viability 
of the private health care industry, in light of medical negligence liability, would 
also need to be borne in mind. 
Yet, the notion of individuals contractually assuming the risk of a 
negligent, or even a grossly negligent, standard of care (as hinted at in Afrox), 
cannot be tolerated in the face of s 27(1), which envisages healthy, capable 
and fulfilled members of communities, across South Africa.  Even so, the 
assumption of risk by patients, may translate to a lower economic cost (and 
arguably greater access to health care), for them.  Nevertheless, the attending 
broader risk of a generally unhealthy and un-well society may be too high, 
unless of course, there are adequate alternate safeguards (such as, 
professional disciplinary bodies), that are effective in addressing such danger. 
So, in the end, the decision to uphold or void the Afrox-type of exclusion 
clause must be the product, of a careful balancing of all considerations 
pertaining to its potential impact, on the right of access to health care services. 
In the final event, as concerns the enforceability of the exclusion clause 
in Afrox, the court once again, ought to have interrogated the particular 
circumstances of the contracting parties, at the time of enforcement, drawing 
from the restraint of trade jurisprudence, as required.  Here, influential factors 
would include the nature, size and viability of Afrox, as a private health care 
provider and a commercial enterprise.  Further, in relation to Mr Strydom, his 
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bad faith argument would be relevant here.  In particular, Mr Strydom would 
need to convince the court, that enforcement of the exclusion clause in the 
circumstances, would be in bad faith and therefore, subjectively 
unreasonable.199  In this respect, evidence of an inequality of bargaining power 
on conclusion of the contract, may also attest to the unreasonableness of 
enforcement of the clause, in the particular circumstances of the case. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I surmised the main points of each of the previous chapters and 
teased out the pertinent connections between them.  In so doing, I put together 
a manual for the basic constitutionalising of the substance, form and attending 
mechanics of operation of our common law of contract and, in particular, of 
contractual autonomy, in terms of the foundational constitutional triage of 
freedom, dignity and equality.  In this respect, I highlighted also the general and 
case-specific dimensions of the constitutionalisation process that are mandated 
by ss 39(2) and 8(3) of the Bill of Rights respectively. 
Thereafter, I shifted focus to the situation where a specific substantive 
constitutional right finds application, and considered the implications thereof.  
First, I looked at the three broad groupings of enumerated constitutional rights 
that are most often implicated in contract law cases viz. economic, civil-political 
and socio-economic rights. 
Next, I considered the application of the guidelines for the 
constitutionalisation of our law of contract that I had just set out, to three 
different substantive constitutional rights; the right to freedom of trade, 
occupation and profession (s 22), the right to freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion (s 15(1)) and the right to have access to health care services (s 
27(1)(a)).  Notably, I chose these three specific rights, because they are 
broadly representative of three groups of rights, which are each situated 
differently in relation to contractual autonomy.  Furthermore, they each have a 
special connection to the concept of autonomy.  My arguments in respect each 
right therefore, would find broader application, at least, within the sphere of 
contract law. 
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Dealing then with each right in turn, I have shown how, on the basis of 
their respective natures, they implicate distinct dimensions of the constitutional 
self and therefore contractual autonomy and attending methodologies. 
In particular, I have shown how a proper invocation of the distinction 
between the internal and external dimensions of autonomy, and the correct 
situating of (especially constitutional) considerations in relation thereto, would 
resolve much of the judiciary’s current adjudicatory problems pertaining to the 
constitutionalisation of our common law of contract.  At present, the courts are 
overworking the external reach dimension of contractual autonomy, whilst its 
internal counterpart continues largely to assume its pre-constitutional classical 
liberal conception.  This, I argue, effectively frustrates efforts to constitutionalise 
our contract law and cannot continue. 
So, using the three rights, I have shown how courts can, and indeed 
must, over time, facilitate fairly radical change to the current conception of 
contractual autonomy (both externally and internally), through fairly small and 
mostly uncontroversial developments, that will ensure a proper application of 
the Constitution to contract law.  I have shown further, that all of this is possible 
without sacrificing certainty or doctrinal coherence within our contract law.  On 
the contrary, the systematic approach which I have advocated for here, can 
resolve certain inconsistencies within our law.  Significantly, in the course of 
doing so, I have critiqued the manner in which pertinent cases have been 
decided, by the post-apartheid judiciary. 
In the end, I have provided a blueprint for future similar litigation which, 
although still grounded essentially in the established common-law 
methodology, introduces a greater measure of flexible, purposive adjudication. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The distribution of private power in contemporary South African society remains 
a function both of apartheid policy and private law.  So, whereas apartheid has 
been abolished, the judiciary’s maintenance of the classical liberal 
underpinnings of private law, serves essentially to entrench the status quo 
(unequal) private power dynamics, distribution of wealth and attending patterns 
of poverty and disadvantage of the apartheid regime.  In the words of Sandra 
Liebenberg: 
“A presumption in favour of liberty rests on a seductive myth that the existing 
status quo is the result of a natural state of affairs which cannot be attributed to 
communal responsibility.  It obscures the extent to which historical decisions, 
the design of political, economic and social institutions and the ‘unarticulated 
normative baseline’ of private law rules [including contract law rules] create and 
perpetuate classes of marginalised and subordinated groups…In the end, it is 
the power of the law which enforces prohibitions on accessing certain services 
and institutions if one does not have the income to pay for them.  The 
restrictions may be justifiable.  However this is precisely the point.  [U]nder (sic) 
a constitutional dispensation which is committed to transforming unjust social 
[and economic] relations all legal rules [including contract law rules] are subject 
to scrutiny and justification in terms of the normative rights and values of the 
Constitution.”1 
As a result, the constitutionalisation of our private law and, in particular, our 
common law of contract, continues to be a critical issue for the dismantling of 
such systemic (private) inequities and for the concomitant realisation of the 
substantively progressive aims of the Constitution.2  In terms of the 
foundational values of freedom, dignity and equality, every person should, at 
least, be enabled effectively, to unlock their potential for themselves and so, to 
realise their particular visions of the good life.3 
                                                 
1
 Sandra Liebenberg ‘Grootboom and the seduction of the negative/positive duties dichotomy’ 
(2011) 26 SA Public Law 37 at 47.  See also Lucy Williams ‘The legal construction of poverty: 
Gender, “work” and the “social contract”’ (2011) 22 Stell LR 463 at 468-470 and chapter 1 at 
1.1 especially at 1-3. 
2
 As required in terms of ss 8 and 39 of the Constitution.  See chapter 1 at 1.1; chapter 4 at 
4.2.1. 
3
 See chapter 1 at 1.1 especially at 1-2; 1.3.  See also the preamble; s 1; s 7(a) of the 
Constitution. 
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Nevertheless, although it is beyond doubt that the Bill of Rights is 
horizontally applicable,4 there has been considerable debate about the manner 
in which our system of contract law should be constitutionalised.5  This is the 
issue that I have grappled with in this thesis. 
In this chapter, I present a synopsis of the arguments advanced, and 
conclusions reached, in this thesis.  Further, I draw attention to those issues 
that have not been interrogated in this thesis and are left for further research.  
Finally, I sketch a way forward for the judicial process of constitutionalising our 
common law of contract. 
 
5.2 THE ARGUMENT OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter One took as its point of departure, that the common law of contract 
must be re-legitimated in terms of the Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of 
Rights.  In this respect, I accepted that the Bill of Rights was horizontally 
applicable to the traditionally classified ‘private’ law of contract and focused 
instead, on the respective roles of ss 8 and 39 of the Constitution.  I found that, 
whilst each of these provisions embodies elements of both direct and indirect 
horizontality, they can, and indeed, must work together, in order to 
constitutionalise our common law of contract, in a systematic and integrated 
manner.  In the end, I showed that this calls for the constitutional development6 
of South African contract law to take place within the common law framework, 
                                                 
4
 As per ss 8 and 39 of the Constitution.  See chapter 1 at 1.1; chapter 4 at 4.2.1. 
5
 See Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at paras 40-44; 69-69; 88-95; Afrox Healthcare 
Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) at paras 17-32; Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 
(5) SA 511 (SCA) at para 12; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at paras 6-16; 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) at paras 15; 23-30.  See also Johan Van der 
Walt ‘Progressive indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: Towards a co-operative 
relation between common-law and constitutional jurisprudence’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 341; 
Christopher J Roederer ‘Post-matrix legal reasoning: Horizontality and the rule of values in 
South African law’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 57; Deeksha Bhana and Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a 
reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited’ (2005) 122 
SALJ 865; Deeksha Bhana ‘The law of contract and the Constitution: Napier v Barkhuizen 
(SCA)’ (2007) 124 SALJ 269; Stuart Woolman ‘The amazing vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 
124 SALJ 762; PJ Sutherland ‘Ensuring contractual fairness in consumer contracts after 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 CC – Part 1’ (2008) 19 Stell LR 390.  See further Luanda 
Hawthorne ‘The principle of equality in the law of contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 157; Gerhard 
Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its implications for the 
development of contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395; Dire Tladi ‘One step forward, two steps 
back for constitutionalising the common law: Afrox Healthcare v Strydom’ (2002) 17 SA Public 
Law 473; Kevin Hopkins ‘Insurance policies and the Bill of Rights: Rethinking the sanctity of 
contract paradigm’ (2002) 119 SALJ 155. 
6
 As opposed to the constitutional assessment of contract law. 
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though with constitutional adjustments, as required.7  In this respect, I 
emphasised the general and case-specific dimensions of the 
constitutionalisation process that is contemplated by ss 39(2) and 8(3) of the 
Constitution respectively.  Whilst the entire body of contract law must be 
constitutionalised incrementally, over time, (essentially within the common law 
tradition), constitutional justice must be done simultaneously, in every individual 
contract case, too. 
Importantly, I took as my fundamental premise, that the principle of 
contractual autonomy comprises, and must continue to comprise, the keystone 
principle of our contract law.  In doing so, I set out the scope of my thesis as 
one that would interrogate the substance, form and attending legal mechanics 
of operation of contractual autonomy; the idea being that a constitutionalisation 
of contractual autonomy would, in effect, constitutionalise or, at the very least, 
set the stage for the constitutionalisation of our contract law, in its entirety.8 
In Chapter Two, I focused on the substance of contractual autonomy.  I 
began my analysis by unpacking its long established (neo-) classical liberal 
underpinnings.  In particular, I showed how the classical liberal preference for 
an atomistic, independent conception of the contracting self, as bolstered by 
strongly individualist values, was out of step with the constitutional vision of the 
self, operating in a substantively progressive South African society.  In other 
words, the formalistic, laissez faire (free market economy) understanding of 
contractual autonomy must give way to more substantive, interdependent 
(social market economy) conceptions, that pay greater attention to collectivist 
values.9 
Having thus shown the need for a shift away from the classical liberal 
paradigm, I fleshed out the constitutionalised basis for the post-apartheid 
conception of contractual autonomy.  For this purpose, I constructed a triage 
comprising the intrinsically fluid and multi-faceted foundational constitutional 
values of freedom, dignity and equality.  This triage, in turn, formed the basis of 
a shifting concept of contractual autonomy that at once is context sensitive and 
                                                 
7
 See chapter 1 at 1.2; chapter 4 at 4.2.1. 
8
 See chapter 1 at 1.4 especially 1.4.2. 
9
 See chapter 2 at 2.3; chapter 4 at 4.2.2. 
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dependent on the applicability of substantive rights, as well as on the broader 
constitutional vision of a post-apartheid South Africa.10 
Moving to Chapter Three, I drew attention to the conservative legal 
culture and the attending liberal legalist methodology employed in our common 
law of contract.  I showed how the extant contract law machine ensconces the 
classical liberal ideology’s conception of freedom of contract and pacta sunt 
servanda and so, for the most part, frustrates bona fide efforts to 
constitutionalise our contract law.  I argued consequently, that the legal 
methodology of contract law must dovetail, likewise with the foundational 
constitutional triage’s basis of contractual autonomy.  In other words, common 
law reasoning, with its current configuration of rules and standards, must be re-
aligned with the more fluid, constitutional conception of contractual autonomy.  
For this process, it is imperative that legal reasoning is justifiable, both in terms 
of principle and policy, including the policy of legal certainty.11 
Finally, in Chapter Four, I consolidated the theoretical foundations of this 
thesis and considered the practical implications of the conclusions reached, by 
contemplating their application in a number of concrete contexts.12  Here, I 
submitted that the foundational constitutional triage of freedom, dignity and 
equality must occupy centre stage where the triage is identified firstly with the 
‘objective normative value system’ of the Bill of Rights13 and secondly, with any 
substantive constitutional right(s) finding application, both in the abstract and in 
more concrete terms.14 
In the abstract, I focused on three broad groupings of rights – economic, 
civil-political and socio-economic rights – and postulated how this would 
implicate contractual autonomy and so, generally affect the legal outcome of a 
case.  In more concrete terms then, I chose three rights that are broadly 
representative of each of the groupings and have special connections with 
autonomy:  the economic right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession, 
the civil-political right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion and finally, the 
socio-economic right of access to health care services. 
                                                 
10
 See chapter 2 at 2.4; chapter 4 at 4.2.2. 
11
 See chapter 3 especially at 3.3; 3.4; chapter 4 at 4.2.3. 
12
 See chapter 4 at 4.2; 4.3. 
13
 As per s 39(2) of the Constitution.  See chapter 1 at 1.2.2. 
14
 See chapter 4 at 4.3. 
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In relation to each right then, I examined their basic content and nature, 
focusing on their interplay with the distinct dimensions of the constitutionalised 
contracting self, as per the foundational triage.  In this respect, I emphasised 
the distinction between the internal (content) and external (reach) dimensions 
of autonomy as pivotal, and showed how a proper (substantive and 
methodological) invocation of this distinction in contract law, can resolve much 
of the uncertainty surrounding the question of how, precisely, to approach the 
constitutionalisation process. 
The upshot is that, whilst there cannot be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, 
with much depending on the broader and particular context of every case, a 
systematic and principled approach to the constitutionalisation of the current 
conception of contractual autonomy remains possible and, indeed, crucial.  
Importantly, development of the content of contractual autonomy and the 
attending legal method must continue to take place within the established 
common law framework, incrementally over time, as cases present themselves 
before the courts.15 
 
5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The focal point of this thesis has been the conceptual framework of South 
African contract law, operating in a constitutional context.  So, whereas this 
thesis shows conceptually how to approach the constitutionalisation of contract 
law, this represents what ought to be the point of departure, for the 
constitutional exercise.  There are a myriad of contexts and avenues that are 
yet to be explored within this conceptual framework. 
To begin with, I have focused solely on the autonomy element of the 
‘valid formation of a contract’ dimension of our contract law.  Significantly, in 
doing so, I canvassed the classical, neo-classical and modern conceptions of 
contractual autonomy.  However, I did not purport in any way to reconcile the 
relevant conceptions.  Further, I did not interrogate the broader philosophical 
underpinnings of the concept of autonomy.  Rather, I focused more narrowly on 
how its leading philosophical conceptions have manifested in the prevailing 
legal understandings of autonomy, and contractual autonomy, in particular.  
                                                 
15
 See chapter 4 at 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3. 
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Similarly, I did not examine the scientific or medical (psychological) meaning of 
autonomy and/or the ability to exercise such autonomy.  Nor did I purport to 
deal with the collective conception of autonomy, (and therefore, the collective 
dimensions of freedom, dignity and equality), as exercised collectively by a 
group of persons, as opposed to individually. 
Beyond the foundational element of contractual autonomy then, the 
‘contents of a contract’ dimension of contract law, with its legal concepts of 
‘incorporation’ and ‘interpretation’, has not been evaluated at all.  Nor have the 
‘breach of contract’ and ‘contractual remedies’ dimensions been examined.16  
That said, these dimensions of our contract law, operating in the constitutional 
era, are equally grounded in the Bill of Rights.  Accordingly, to the extent that 
these aspects of our contract law flow from the traditional common law 
conception of contractual autonomy,17 their constitutionalisation must flow 
ultimately from the reconceptualised, constitutional notion of autonomy.  
Further, I would submit that their constitutionalisation should take place, 
likewise within the conceptual framework developed in this thesis. 
This brings me to an important point: In this thesis, I have not embarked, 
nor purported to embark, on the actual process of constitutional assessment 
and development of the specific rules, standards and doctrines of our contract 
law.  For instance, in relation to the element of contractual capacity, I 
highlighted the potential constitutional deficiencies of its current substance and 
form.  However, I did not purport to prescribe the actual development required.  
Similarly, in relation to the doctrine of mistake and the established categories of 
improperly obtained consensus, I simply pointed out where, and why, 
constitutional development may be required.  At most, I have provided a 
framework as to how to approach the constitutionalisation process.  The actual 
assessment and development aspect of the constitutionalisation process of 
South African contract law represents the next step, and is left for further 
research. 
                                                 
16
 For a discussion of the law’s current treatment of these dimensions of contract law see SWJ 
(Schalk) Van der Merwe, LF Van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke and GF Lubbe Contract General 
Principles 4ed (2012) at chapters 9-11. 
17
 Insofar as the common intention of the parties is determinative, I would submit that these 
aspects of our contract law must flow from the concept of contractual autonomy. 
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Furthermore, I have looked, generally, only at the civil-political, socio-
economic and economic groupings of rights, because these are the groupings 
usually implicated in contract law cases.  I did not look at other groupings, like, 
for instance, developmental and environmental rights, or ‘solidarity rights’, such 
as self-determination rights.  These may be interesting to explore in further 
research.  Moreover, I looked only at three substantive constitutional rights, one 
from each grouping, that are broadly representative of the kinds of 
methodological adjustments and substantive jumps that need to be made within 
our contract law.  Still, given that the enumerated constitutional rights are 
context-sensitive, it was not practicable to hypothesise about all potential 
permutations, in relation to their application.  Most notably, I did not interrogate 
the implications for contracts, of the operation of substantive rights, at a 
collective level.  Nor did I focus particularly, on standard form contracts or the 
scenario where the State is a party to a contract.  The upshot therefore, is that, 
although we now have a conceptual framework within which to assess the 
implications for contracts, of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the 
specific implications of the different rights and the varying contexts within which 
they operate are left for further research. 
As a common lawyer, this position regarding rights and varying contexts, 
dovetails also, with my emphasis in this thesis, on the constitutionalisation of 
the common law of contract from within, i.e. essentially from the common law 
platform, which embraces the common law tradition of incremental, judicial 
development, over time, as cases present themselves before the courts. 
The embracing of the common law platform, (as constitutionally 
adjusted), also explains why I have not engaged with the debate on the subject 
of legislative intervention, either as a preferred or secondary route, for 
constitutionalising our contract law.18  This thesis has proceeded rather, on the 
premise that legislative intervention may not be required and that common law 
                                                 
18
 See for instance Jonathan Lewis ‘Fairness in South African contract law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 
330; Tjakie Naude ‘Unfair contract terms legislation: The implications of why we need it for its 
formulation and application’ (2006) 17 Stell LR 361; Tjakie Naude ‘The use of black and grey 
lists in unfair contract terms legislation in comparative perspective’ (2007) 124 SALJ 128; Tjakie 
Naude ‘The consumer’s ‘right to fair, reasonable and just terms’ under the new Consumer 
Protection Act in comparative perspective’ (2009) 126 SALJ 505; RD Sharrock ‘Judicial control 
of unfair contract terms: The implications of Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 
295; Luanda Hawthorne ‘Responsive governance: Consumer protection legislation and its 
effect on mandatory and default rules in the contract of sale’ (2011) 26 SA Public Law 431. 
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development is a more doctrinally sound way of constitutionalising contract law.  
Even so, it may be worthwhile for further research to contemplate whether, and 
where, legislation would be appropriate.  In this respect, recent interventions 
such as the National Credit Act19 and the Consumer Protection Act20 ought to 
be assessed.  Admittedly, I have not interrogated any of these pieces of 
legislation.  Still, I submit that the interpretation of such legislation by the courts 
must be informed by, and dovetail with, the constitutionalised judicial approach 
advocated for in this thesis.21 
In the final event, a comparative analysis of the contract laws of other 
jurisdictions has fallen largely beyond the scope of this thesis.  This is 
necessarily so, given the somewhat unique South African context of 
transformative constitutionalism, with its mandate of doing public-law-type 
justice within the private law context.  Nevertheless, the international 
experience of continental jurisdictions especially, with the concept of 
substantive fairness in contracts, may be informative, for purposes of the actual 
constitutional development of our contract law.  Once again, this is left for 
further research. 
 
5.4 WAY FORWARD 
To sum up, the conceptual framework developed in this thesis, represents a 
systematic, integrated approach to the constitutionalisation of our common law 
of contract.  Such approach, will yield a legally sound, principled and 
(acceptably) certain body of post-apartheid contract law, that will work toward 
the achievement effectively, of the broader constitutional project of a 
substantively progressive and transformative South African society, based on 
freedom, dignity and equality. 
It is important to realise further, that contract law is but one building block 
in a private law system that is perpetuating the social and economic inequality 
and hardship experienced by an overwhelming majority in our country, and 
which, needs to change.  Accordingly, there needs to be similar developments 
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 34 of 2005. 
20
 68 of 2008. 
21
 See chapter 1 at 1.4.2. 
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in other areas of private law too, also within the common law framework, and 
this is an urgent area for further research. 
Still, in the words of the SCA: 
“A court cannot attack and overthrow principles of common law from within the 
shadows of the Constitution”22 
This statement epitomises the general fear of private lawyers that the 
Constitution will create such chaos in the realm of our long-established 
common law system that it will lead ultimately to the common law’s demise.  
Indeed, this fear explains why courts, in the post-apartheid era, have resorted 
to a form of common law purism and ‘business as usual’ adjudication, which 
has not only retarded constitutional transformation, but has also stunted 
development in the celebrated common law tradition itself. 
Nevertheless, I have shown in this thesis, that such fear is unfounded 
and that, the constitutionalisation and transformation of our common law of 
contract can be effected without sacrificing its doctrinal coherence and legal 
certainty.  To be sure, the constitutionalisation process must take place 
ultimately, by invocation of the common law framework, in a manner that re-
engages the basic substantive building blocks of our contract law system (i.e. 
contractual autonomy/freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda), and then, 
re-imagine the way in which the courts work with them (i.e. legal methodology). 
In this way, South African private law will eventually be freed from the 
shackles of its oppressive past and be enabled to do substantive justice 
between the peoples of South Africa, both individually and collectively. 
                                                 
22
 Brisley supra note 5 at para 24 which reads “’n Hof can nie skuiling soek in die skaduwee 
van die Grondwet om vandaar beginsels aan te val en omver te werp nie.”  Translation from 
Bhana and Pieterse op cit note 5 at 873. 
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